Under Revenue and Taxation Code section 1604, a county assessment appeals board must accept a taxpayer's opinion of market value of property if it does not make a final determination on an application for reduction within two years. Curtis, a corporation, filed an application for reduction of a tax assessment. Within two years the appeals board held a hearing. The person appearing as Curtis' representative was not a properly authorized agent, and Curtis' application was denied for non-appearance. Curtis' request for reconsideration was not timely filed within the sixty day statute of limitations. The board nevertheless granted reconsideration, with the understanding that Curtis would waive section 1604. When Curtis refused to waive the benefits of section 1604 the board rescinded its decision to reconsider the claim. Curtis sued to seek reinstatement of her claim. The trial court sustained the board's actions.

The appellate court reversed. The board did not lack authority to hear the plaintiff's complaint absent a signed waiver of section 1604. Therefore, the board's grant of reinstatement of Curtis' claim was authorized, and the board's revocation was improper. However, Curtis is not entitled to a windfall of receiving its own ascribed valuation under section 1604. Curtis was expressly notified that the board required a waiver of section 1604's two-year period but nevertheless withheld the waiver without notice. These facts manifest a “wrongful misleading silence” by Curtis with respect to its failure to satisfy the board's conditions of restatement. Therefore, Curtis is estopped from claiming the benefits of section 1604.

The president of a construction company filed a claim against the city alleging breach of contract. The claim was rejected and notice of the six month statute of limitations was given. On the last day for doing so, the company filed a complaint appearing “pro per”. The president of the company later filed a substitution of attorneys naming a law firm as its attorney of record. The trial court granted the city's motion to strike without leave to amend, because the complaint was filed without legal representation.

The appellate court affirmed that the initial complaint was defective but reversed the finding that dismissal without leave to amend was necessary. Representation of the corporation by an attorney is not an absolute prerequisite to the court's fundamental power to hear or determine a case. Therefore, a corporation's failure to be represented by an attorney should be treated as a defect that may be corrected, on such terms as are just in the sound discretion of the court. This approach honors the policy that, in furtherance of justice, complaints are to be liberally construed and disputes should be resolved on their merits. Here, the company substituted an attorney before the city appeared, thus making its self-representation brief, minimal, and essentially inconsequential. Therefore, the company should be granted leave to file an amended complaint.

Plaintiff alleges that while he was incarcerated three boxes of legal papers were unlawfully confiscated by authorities, reported lost, and never returned. He filed a tort claim for property loss which was denied by the County. The plaintiff then prepared and mailed a pro se civil complaint within the six month deadline imposed by Government Code § 945.6. However, the trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss because the plaintiff's complaint was filed by the Superior Court clerk after expiration of the six month statute of limitations.

The appellate court reversed. In Houston v. Lack (1988) 487 U.S. 266, the Supreme Court held that a notice of appeal by a pro se prisoner is filed when it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the district court. The court reasoned that prisoners face unique disadvantages. For example, the pro se prisoner has no choice but to entrust the forwarding of his filing to prison authorities whom he cannot control or supervise and who may have every incentive to delay. Furthermore, prisoners must entrust their filings to the postal service because they can not personally deliver documents to a court clerk. The same concerns are applicable to the filing of a civil complaint in this case. Therefore, the plaintiff's complaint was timely filed upon delivery to prison authorities for mailing.

Plaintiff sued the state. In his complaint, he alleged his Government Code section 910 claim was not timely served on a proper party, and contended the state was estopped from asserting the claim defense. The state demurred to the complaint on the ground plaintiff had failed to allege facts showing compliance with the claim requirements. The trial court overruled the demurrer. On petition for writ of mandate, the appellate court affirmed, ruling that the claim-presentation requirement was not an essential element of plaintiff's causes of action, and the claim defense therefore could not be asserted on a demurrer.

The Supreme Court reversed. Since 1857, California courts have held satisfaction of applicable claim requirements to be an essential element of a state law cause of action against a public entity. The 1963 Tort Claim Act did not change that rule. Thus, a plaintiff's complaint must allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim requirement. Otherwise, the complaint is subject to a general demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court remanded the case for a determination of whether plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded estoppel.

In 1996 and 2001 the county approved tentative and final subdivision maps related to the proposed development of twenty-eight homes. A neighboring home owner believed that the developer should widen a private road and improve a private bridge needed to reach the project. The county approved final plans without the owner's recommendations. The owner sued to compel the county to require the developer to construct the improvements he requested. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion.

The appellate court reversed. The trial court erred when it held that a ninety-day statute of limitations to the claims raised by the plaintiff was not applicable. The plaintiff failed to participate in the 2001 final map approval proceedings. Therefore, his claims should have been dismissed because he failed to avail himself of administrative remedies to his claims. The county properly exercised its discretion to decide that the improvements were not necessary.

The owner of two parcels paid in full a tax bill that failed to reference the correct year and thus assess late payment penalties. The county applied part of his payment to late penalties and sought recovery for the outstanding tax amount. The owner then sought declaratory relief in trial court where his claims were initially dismissed but a subsequent motion for a new trial was granted.

The appellate court reversed the motion for a new trial. Article XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution provides that an action to recover an allegedly excessive tax bill may be brought after payment of that tax and bars a court from issuing any declaratory or injunctive relief prior to such payment.

Plaintiff was a witness for the prosecution in a grand jury proceeding alleging murder charges against Orenthal James (O.J.) Simpson. Defendant deputy district attorney received information incorrectly describing plaintiff as “a felony probationer” and relayed it to an author. The author repeated the information in a published book. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the DA and his County employees seeking damages for defamation and alleging that the period of limitations initiated upon her discovery of the book. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants based on failure to present a claim within six months of accrual. The appeals court reversed.

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in favor of defendant. Under the single-publication rule there is but a single potential action for a defamatory statement contained in any single publication of a newspaper or book. The cause of action accrues and the period of limitations commences upon publication, regardless of when the plaintiff secured a copy or became aware of the publication. Defamation claims based on earlier disclosure to the author were also time-barred because they arose out of statements contained in the book.

Plaintiff died while participating in compulsory morning exercises at a detention facility operated by the county. The decedent's family filed a wrongful death claim with the county. After four months the claim was denied and the family initiated a separate claim based on federal law. The district court held that the action was barred by a one year statute of limitations.

The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. California law does not require that the two claims seek the same remedies, involve the same procedures or arise from the same laws in order for equitable tolling to apply. It is sufficient that the two claims are predicated upon the same wrong. The case was remanded for the trial court to determine if the statute of limitations should have been tolled during the four month period when the county considered the initial claim.

The California School Employees Association filed a claim with defendant California Public Employee Relations Board claiming that plaintiff Mosquito and Vector Control District had engaged in unfair practices in violation of the Myers-Milias-Brown Act. The trial court held in favor of PERB.

The appellate court affirmed. Section 3514.5 of the Educational Employment Relations Act authorizes PERB to promulgate procedures for investigating, hearing and deciding unfair practices charges. The action must be filed within six months after the allegedly unfair practices, which is a reasonable time limitation. Because more than six months had passed, dismissal was proper.

Plaintiff's son was arrested for firing at traffic. Arresting officers hog-tied the son, causing death by asphyxiation. Plaintiff, the administrator of her son's estate, sued the county, the sheriff's department and individual officers for wrongful death. A jury held the county liable. Plaintiff filed a cross-appeal, asserting that her government tort claim for wrongful death was sufficient to preserve a later survival pre-litigation suit by her son's estate.

The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Plaintiff's prelitigation claim was not sufficient to preserve a later suit by her son's estate. Nothing in the claim gave notice plaintiff was suing in any capacity except an individual -- rather than as the estate's administrator. There was nothing in plaintiff's complaint to give notice to the entity that it might be sued by the estate, and no evidence that there were any expenses that might be recoverable by the estate. The county was not required to notify plaintiff that her claim was defective because it was not defective; it simply did not include an estate claim.

Defendant city had a policy of providing cash refunds to sewer customers. It waived the cut-off claim period for those who did not receive sewer services. Plaintiff assignee of refund claims sought to recover interest on refunds paid voluntarily by the city. The city argued that the statute of limitations barred interest payments against it. The trial court granted summary judgment in the plaintiff's favor.

The appellate court reversed and remanded. Under Civil Code § 3287 and Government Code § 53082, interest is recoverable against government entities. However, voluntary payment of a refund made without regard to any period of limitations defense does not constitute a waiver of such defenses as to the payment of interest in a later lawsuit.

Plaintiff is an at-home traffic school. It sought a writ of mandate against a county court to direct the court to approve the school. It also sought damages in the amount of $1 million. The court approved the school and sought to have the claim dismissed. The trial court granted the court's motion.

The appellate court affirmed. Under Government Code § 945.4, no lawsuit can seek monetary relief against a public entity until a written claim has been presented to and rejected by the entity. The same requirement applies if incidental damages are sought. In a writ proceeding, this provides the public entity the opportunity to settle the claim before a lawsuit is filed.

Defendant water district charged a $2,000 water connection fee and a $2,250 sewer connection fee under a county ordinance. Under the ordinance, rest homes paid fees equal to the connection fees multiplied by the number of beds in the home. Plaintiff was building a 32-bed rest home and paid $45,000 in connection charges. Plaintiff filed a notice of protest and sued the district for a refund. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the county.

The appellate court affirmed. Under Government Code § 66022, a lawsuit attacking an ordinance must be filed within 120 days after the effective date of the ordinance. Here, plaintiffs are attacking the ordinance rather than the imposition of a fee. Thus, the lawsuit was untimely.

The county informed plaintiffs that no complaints had been filed against a daycare facility. Plaintiffs enrolled their children in the facility. One of plaintiffs' children was sexually molested by a facility operator. Plaintiffs learned that contrary to the county's representation, several complaints had previously been filed against the facility. Plaintiffs hired an attorney more than six months after they discovered the misrepresentation. Plaintiffs' attorney failed to request leave to present a late claim as required by the California Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs' claim was rejected as late. Plaintiffs sued the attorney for malpractice. A jury found for plaintiffs.

The appellate court affirmed. An attorney filing suit in tort against a county has a duty to request leave to present a late claim if more than six months have passed since accrual of the action. Here, the action accrued when plaintiffs discovered that the county had misrepresented the daycare facility's history.

The Community Redevelopment Law requires 20 percent of tax increment funds received by local redevelopment agencies be placed in a fund for low income housing. Defendant community development commission placed 20 percent of its net tax increment funds into the housing fund. Plaintiff nonprofit association argued that the law required 20 percent of the gross tax increment funds be placed in the housing fund. The trial court agreed with the association. It ordered the commission to pay the difference for the entire period starting when the fund was established up to the date of judgment.

The appellate court reversed and remanded. The nonprofit association can only recover on amounts going back three years under Code of Civil Procedure § 338(a). Since the commission's violation was disclosed in public records, a diligent plaintiff would have promptly discovered the existence of his or her right. Thus, the discovery rule tolling the statute of limitations does not apply.

Arrestee died while being held in a detention center. His widow sued the county, the center's director and the center's physician for wrongful death. The trial court entered judgment in the widow's favor. The Supreme Court of South Caroline reversed.

The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 28 U.S.C.A. 1367(d), which tolls a statute of limitations while a tort suit against a public entity is pending in federal court, does not infringe on a state's sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment.

Developers of subdivision and the city entered into a development agreement. The developer sued the city for breach of the development agreement. The lower court held for the city on the ground that the claims were time barred by the 90-day statute to present a claim as set forth in Government Code §66499.37.

The appellate court reversed and remanded. The limitations period in Government Code §66499.37 does not apply to contract claims against a governmental body. A development agreement is a contract to which the ordinary period to present a contract claim applies. If the claim had involved a decision concerning a subdivision, the 90-day statute to present a claim as set forth in Government Code §66499.37 would apply.

Petitioner and his wife were driving on a state freeway when the road became blocked by smoke. Petitioner's wife pulled off the road. The car caught fire and petitioner's wife died. Eight months after the incident, petitioner filed an application to present a late claim against the state for negligent maintenance of grass abutting the highway. The application was denied by operation of law. Petitioner filed a Government Code §946.6 petition for relief from the claim requirements on the ground that the delay was due to excusable neglect. He claimed that the loss of his wife created a severe state of emotional depression. The court granted the petition.

The appellate court reversed. The trial court abused its discretion by granting the petition. Petitioner had a total absence of due diligence and is not entitled to §946.6 relief. He failed to consult with an attorney until eight months after his wife's death. He should have consulted with an attorney during the six-month claim period. Moreover, significant emotional depression is expected in virtually every major personal injury and wrongful death case.

Officer shot and killed the plaintiff's son during the nighttime execution of a search warrant. Plaintiff sued for wrongful death and for civil rights violations. The district court dismissed the negligence claim without prejudice for litigation in state court even though four years had passed since the shooting of appellant's son. It reasoned that the state law claim was pending while the federal claim was being litigated. Thus the statute of limitations was tolled.

The appellate court affirmed this portion of the holding. The statute of limitations tolls a plaintiff's state court claims while the plaintiff pursues a civil rights action in federal court involving the same facts against the same defendant. A state law claim remains pending until the district court actually dismisses it.

The police department operated a police explorer program for young men and women between the ages of fourteen and eighteen to encourage them to consider a career in law enforcement. Three minors in the program had consensual sexual encounters with one of the supervising officers. The minors sued the city and the officer for negligence, battery, sexual battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The breach of contract claim was not set forth in the complaint. The trial court dismissed the breach of contract claim.

The appellate court affirmed. A claim filed in anticipation of litigation must set forth all potential claims in any subsequent lawsuit. Under Government Code section 945.4, no suit for money or damages may be filed against a public entity for which a claim is required to be presented until a claim is presented. Plaintiffs' claims do not mention any contract breach and cannot be construed to include those claims because they fail to put defendants on notice.

The minor plaintiff sued the county for medical malpractice that he alleged occurred from July 1997 through March 1998. In October 1998 he filed a claim and an application for leave to present a late claim in which he alleged his cause of action accrued June 1998. The county granted the application, reserved its rights to resolve the date of accrual in the main action, and rejected the claim on its merits. At trial, the court bifurcated the issue of whether the application was filed within a year of accrual, and tried it first. Over the plaintiff's objections, the court tried the issue without a jury. The court ruled that the accrual date was more than a year before the application, barring the action.

The appellate court reversed. The plaintiff had a right to jury trial on the issue of when the cause of action accrued. True, accrual dates can be decided in a Government Code section 946.6 petition proceeding for relief from the claim requirements; and by statute such petitions must be tried without a jury. But by granting the late claim application under a reservation of rights, the county chose to resolve the accrual date at trial rather than in a section 946.6 proceeding. And at trial the parties have a right to jury trial of that issue. In an unpublished portion of the opinion the court determined the county had not waived the accrual issue by granting the application under a reservation of rights.

Plaintiff was allegedly injured in an auto accident involving a City police officer. Within five months after the accident, plaintiff's attorney sent the officer a letter stating the attorney had been consulted about the accident, and that he was investigating it. It requested a statement from the officer, and instructed the officer to forward the letter to his insurance company. The City Attorney responded to the letter stating all further contacts with the officer should be through the City Attorney's office. Nine months after the accident, plaintiff applied to the City for leave to present a late claim. The City denied it. Plaintiff filed an untimely late claim petition with the court, and then withdrew it. She then filed a complaint alleging compliance with the claim requirements. The city moved for summary judgment based on plaintiff's failure to comply with the claim requirements. The trial court granted summary judgment.

The appellate court affirmed. By showing plaintiff failed to present a timely claim, the City carried its burden on summary judgment. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that her attorney's letter was a "claim as presented" that put the public entity on notice that the claimant was attempting to file a valid claim and that litigation would result if the matter was not resolved. Not only did the letter not substantially comply with the claim requirements, nothing in it put the City on notice that the plaintiff was trying to file a valid claim. Further, since the letter was not directed to a proper recipient under Government Code section 915, it could not be a "claim as presented." The court declined to follow its earlier decision, Jamison v. State (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 513 [107 Cal.Rptr. 496], which held an improper recipient of a claim had a duty to forward the claim to a proper recipient. It agreed with other courts that Jamison was at odds with section 915.

Government Code section 66022 sets forth a 120-day statute of limitations for public agencies challenging ordinance-imposed utility fees -- if the fee is meant to cover costs of capital improvements. Utility Cost Management sued Indian Wells for imposing capital facilities fees on Kern Community College District. The trial court held that the fees fell within section 66022, and that the 120-day statute of limitations barred the claim. The court of appeal reversed.

The Supreme Court of California reversed, upholding the statute of limitations. Public utilities may impose fees on public school districts, as long as the fee is necessary to cover actual construction costs directly benefitting the entity. Therefore the fee falls squarely within the ambit of section 66022. The claim is time-barred because it was not brought within 120 days of enactment of the ordinance.

Plaintiffs asserted federal and state causes of action against the defendants. They presented a claim, which the defendant County rejected in March 1997. In June 1997, plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal court against the County. In February 2000, the federal action was dismissed by the parties' stipulation. In July 2000, plaintiffs filed a state action asserting the state law claims they pursued in the federal action. The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer, finding the claim barred by 28 U.S.C. section 1367(d).

The appellate court affirmed. Section 1367(d) tolls the time to bring a state lawsuit on a cause of action while that cause of action is pending in federal court, and for 30 days after the federal action is dismissed. The Court disagreed with another opinion, Kolani v. Gluska (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 402, which held that section 1367(d) required any state lawsuit to be filed within 30 days of the federal suit's dismissal. The plain meaning of section 1367(d) is that any time left on the state statute of limitations at the time the federal lawsuit is filed is “tacked on” to the time to file after dismissal, plus 30 days. But even with that extra time, the complaint was late. Plaintiffs had six months after the County rejected their claim to sue. They had 77 days left when they filed the federal suit. That took them to June 2000. The July 2000 complaint was therefore barred. In the proper situation, equitable tolling could provide tolling in addition to that under section 1367(d). But equitable tolling requires that the party acted diligently. Here, the complaint was filed late due to attorney negligence. That is not diligence.

Plaintiff, a mental patient, sued the County for malpractice. The County denied his application to present a late claim. He then filed, simultaneously, a petition for relief from claim requirements under Government Code section 946.6, and a complaint that did not name the County as a defendant. Plaintiff won the petition. She told the County's attorney that she intended to present a second claim to the County, wait for the County to reject it, and then file an amended complaint naming the County. The County attorney voiced no objection, but advised plaintiff on how to serve the amended complaint. Plaintiff presented the second claim. It was rejected. All parties stipulated to allow plaintiff to file her amended complaint naming the County. The County then demurred, arguing the complaint was filed more than 30 days after plaintiff obtained relief under section 946.6. The trial court sustained the demurrer.

The appellate court reversed and remanded. The trial court correctly sustained the demurrer. Section 946.6 does not give a plaintiff leave to file a subsequent "late claim," followed by an even later complaint. Instead, it relieves a plaintiff from having to file any claim at all; but requires her to file her complaint within 30 days of the order granting relief. Cases allowing "premature" complaints filed before the petition is granted do not apply; premature complaints are only valid when they name the public entity and allege its liability. But the trial court should have allowed plaintiff to amend her complaint to allege that the County's attorney's silence when told her plan estopped the County from asserting the 30-day statute of limitations. Estoppel is a factual issue that cannot be resolved on demurrer.

Plaintiffs filed suit against the County more than six months after the County rejected their claim. The County moved for summary judgment based on Government Code section 945.6(a)(1)'s six-month statute of limitations. To establish mailing of the rejection notice, the County submitted an assistant claim manager's declaration that she "caused" the notice to be prepared and mailed to plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiff denied receiving the notice, and objected to the declaration as lacking personal knowledge. In response, the County filed another declaration from the assistant stating that she typed the rejection letter, printed it out, and "mailed" it to plaintiff's counsel. It also filed a declaration from a risk management office technician who described his daily routine of gathering and posting outgoing mail. He concluded by stating that, "[t]o the best of my knowledge," he followed that procedure on the day the notice was mailed. The trial court granted summary judgment.

The appellate court affirmed. The assistant's first declaration was indeed inadmissible for lack of personal knowledge. But the second declaration was admissible. It did not contradict the first. The technician's declaration supplemented the assistant's second declaration by defining the term "mailed." Further, the technician's use of the phrase "to the best of my knowledge" did not "magically nullify" the statement that followed it. The phrase did not inject any uncertainty into the declaration.

The plaintiff minors alleged that their foster parents abused them. The juvenile court appointed independent counsel under Welfare and Institutions Code section 317 and empowered the counsel to pursue any tort claims on the plaintiffs' behalf. The independent counsel did not present any claims for damages to the County. Over a year later, new counsel for the children applied to the County for leave to present late claims. After the County denied the application, the trial court granted the minors' petition for relief from claim-filing requirements. In its initial decision, the appellate court reversed that decision. It ruled that the minors were able to present a claim when the independent counsel was appointed; and that their failure to present a claim within a year of that date barred the trial court from granting late-claim relief. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Crystal B.) (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 65 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 849].)

On rehearing, a divided appellate court changed its mind, and affirmed the trial court. An independent counsel appointed by the court cannot take the place of a parent or guardian ad litem. Therefore, a child who is not in a parent's custody and who has no guardian ad litem cannot present a tort claim -- even if she has independent counsel appointed. The child's time to apply for late claim relief is tolled during the time she cannot present a claim due to the lack of a guardian. Therefore, the plaintiffs' time to apply had not run out when they filed their application. Because the application was timely, and the children were minors during the entire claim period, the County had to grant their application; and when it refused, the trial court had to grant the minors' petition. The dissenting justice argued that under existing law, independent counsel appointed under section 317 have full power to present tort claims on minors' behalf.

Plaintiffs' son asphyxiated while hobble-tied by County sheriff's deputies. The incident produced audio tapes of numerous radio and telephone calls. Twenty-eight days after the incident, the decedent's mother presented a claim for damages to the County, in which she contended the County was responsible for her son's death. The decedent's father's claim followed. Ten months after the incident, plaintiffs sued the County for wrongful death. Plaintiffs served a request for production of all audio recordings concerning the incident. The County did not produce any recordings. Later, during a deposition the plaintiffs learned of the various tapes made, and requested them. The County responded that in accordance with County policy the tapes had been retained for 120 days, then destroyed. Plaintiffs moved for terminating sanctions. The trial court denied the motion. It based its decision on Government Code section 26202.6, which permits destruction of tapes of police telephone and radio communications after 100 days, unless they are evidence in a "claim filed or pending litigation." Under case law, public entities have no duty under this statute to preserve tapes unless they have actual notice that the tapes are evidence in a filed claim or pending litigation. The trial court found that the County did not receive the required actual notice within 100 days.

The appellate court granted a writ reversing the trial court's order. A government tort claim is a "claim" within the meaning of section 26202.6. Further, decedent's mother's claim served as actual notice that the tapes concerning the incident would be evidence concerning that claim. One purpose of the claims requirement is giving public entities notice of their need to investigate while evidence and witnesses are available. The claim therefore put the County on notice that it needed to preserve evidence concerning the incident. Section 26202.6's reference to a "claim filed," and its use of a 100-day period (at the time section 26202.6 was enacted, the time to present a claim was 100 days after accrual), shows a legislative intent that public entities preserve tapes when they receive tort claims. Further, the claim to the County constituted actual notice to the Sheriff's Department too. The court suggested that the County develop a system in which a claim concerning a police incident will trigger preservation of all police tapes concerning the incident. It also remanded the decision to the trial court to determine whether the County acted in bad faith, and whether it should be sanctioned.

Based on information that plaintiff's husband was molesting plaintiff's daughter, a County sheriff's deputy and a County social worker entered plaintiff's house without a warrant and removed the daughter. Plaintiff sued those involved, including the County, and asserted state and federal causes of action. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on the state law causes of action, on the ground that plaintiff's claim failed to set forth the factual allegations relevant to her cause of action. The Ninth Circuit reversed. Plaintiff's claim set forth names, dates, details and causes of action based upon state grounds, violation of statutes, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Its allegations therefore satisfied the requirements of Government Code sections 910 and 910.4; and supported causes of action for statutory violations and infliction of emotional distress. Further, even though the County was not specifically listed on the claim form under the section entitled "public officers or employees causing the injury," the claim supported a cause of action against the County. The claim was submitted on a County form -- entitled "Claim against County of San Bernardino." That was sufficient.

See Section 10, "Civil Rights and Qualified Immunity," for further discussion of this case.

Government Code section 946.6 permits a party who presents an untimely prelitigation claim to obtain relief from the claim requirements. To obtain relief on the basis of mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect because the petitioner failed to discover a crucial fact in time, the petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that during the claim period he was reasonably diligent in investigating and pursuing the claim. Here, the petitioner was injured in a car accident caused by a flooded road. DWP work caused the flood. The police accident report stated that the road was flooded; stated that a DWP crew was working on a water line near the accident; and included photos of the DWP crew. At all relevant times, that information was in the possession of or available to the petitioner and his attorney. The other driver in the accident filed a timely tort claim, based on the same information. Petitioner's only excuse was that the other driver's insurance carrier did not inform him of DWP's potential liability. But it is "totally unreasonable" to rely on another party to determine the parties with potential liability. DWP's actual knowledge of the potential claim's circumstances was irrelevant. The trial court abused its discretion by granting the petition.

Plaintiffs sued in federal district court for the deaths of their relatives in the City of Eureka's jail. They asserted both federal due process claims and supplemental state wrongful death claims. The district court granted summary judgment on plaintiffs' federal claims, and dismissed their supplemental state claims without prejudice. After plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit, it affirmed the judgment, and denied plaintiffs' petitions for rehearing and for a stay of mandate while they filed certiorari. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Plaintiffs then filed a state court action on their supplemental claims. The trial court sustained the city's demurrer, on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired. This court affirms. 28 U.S.C. section 1367(d) tolls the statute of limitations to file a state court action while a federal action on the same claim is "pending," and for 30 days after it is dismissed. The court concluded that an action is "pending" while a plaintiff pursues an appeal in the federal court of appeals. But once the federal circuit court affirms, the case is no longer "pending." It is not pending during the time the plaintiff petitions for certiorari or pursues review in the Supreme Court.

Noting the split of authority on whether Government Code section 900 et seq., commonly known as the claims presentation statutes of the Tort Claims Act, applies to both tort and contract claims against public entities, the Second District held that it did; and that it "is more accurately described as [the] government claims act."

The court held that the legislature expressly included contract claims within section 900 et seq., and invited either the legislature or the Supreme Court to resolve the split of authority over whether section 900 et seq. applies to contract claims. (Because the plaintiff did not petition for Supreme Court review, the High Court had no opportunity to pick up this gauntlet, at least on this case.)

The legislature has amended Government Code section 911.4 (which sets the deadline for filing a late claim application) to add subdivision (d), a tolling provision that applies to children who are removed from their parents' custody. The time during which the child is detained or adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court is not counted if:

1. The child is in the custody and control of an agency of the public entity to which the claim is to be presented; and
2. That public entity (or its agency):
   1. (a) Is required to make a report of injury, abuse or neglect to the juvenile court or the minor's attorney; and
   2. (b) The entity or agency fails to make that report within the time period required by statute of enactment (with the time to report commencing on the date the entity or agency becomes award of the injury, abuse or neglect).

Further, if the entity or agency makes a late report, the "claim period" is tolled for the period of the delay caused by the failure to make a timely report. (It is unclear if "claim period" refers to the time to file a late claim application, or the time to actually present a claim.)