The Medical Board accused the petitioner doctor of improper experimental treatments on his patients. During the administrative hearing, the state's and petitioner's medical experts presented divergent opinions on whether petitioner's treatments were within the standard of care. The Board ultimately ruled that all of petitioner's experts were unqualified, because they did not sufficiently address the specific facts concerning the patients at issue. It then disciplined petitioner. On an administrative mandamus petition, the trial court ruled that the Board had improperly disqualified the experts. Instead of remanding the matter, the trial court independently weighed the evidence (including the evidence the Board improperly refused to consider) and concluded the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence.

The appellate court issued a writ directing the trial court to remand the matter to the Board. The Board denied petitioner a fair hearing by disqualifying all of his experts. The experts indisputably had the credentials and knowledge to qualify as experts. The degree to which they addressed individual facts went to the weight of their testimony, not its admissibility. Since the Board had discretion over discipline, the trial court erred in reweighing the evidence itself. The court should remand the matter to the agency to consider the evidence and exercise its discretion after a full and fair hearing on the merits -- especially where, as here, the agency has unique technical expertise. The trial court's statutory ability to take evidence improperly excluded in the administrative hearing is no substitute for informed and fair agency decisionmaking.

Monterey County's Old Jail in Salinas was built in 1931 in the Gothic Revival style. In 1970, Cesar Chavez was imprisoned there, drawing national attention. The County intended to demolish the jail as dilapidated. After hearings, it determined CEQA did not require the County to pursue an Environmental Impact Report before destroying the jail. Instead, the County decided to adopt a Mitigated Negative Declaration (a lesser report than an EIR) setting forth plans to document the jail with photos, an historic monography, archived blueprints, and reuse of architectural elements. It concluded that with these mitigations, adverse environmental effects on cultural resources from the demolition would be less than significant. The trial court declined to issue a writ directing the city to prepare an EIR.

The appellate court reversed. Administrative hearing testimony from a certified historian and a certified architect, as well as the County's own studies, established substantial evidence supporting a fair argument that the jail was an historic resource. The demolition would obviously cause a significant impact to that resource. Substantial evidence also supports a fair argument that the proposed mitigation measures are inadequate: They fail to reduce the environmental detriment to insignificance. The demolition therefore meets the low threshold for requiring a full EIR.

A charter school requested that a school district make school facilities available to its students. The school's request included projections of the number of students that would be served. The district requested specific information about the students such as their names, dates of birth, home addresses and grade levels. The school refused to provide such data due to confidentiality concerns and its request was denied. The charter school sued to compel the district to provide facilities. The trial court granted the school's petition.

The appellate court reversed. Under the Code of Regulations, a request for facilities requires “if relevant, documentation of the number of in-district students”. The charter school interprets this clause as applicable only to new charter schools and not to existing schools. However, the plain language of the statute indicates that the clause is applicable to all charter schools. Furthermore, charter schools are required to make a showing of enrollment projections with relevant documents. Therefore, the district acted within its discretion by denying the facilities request.

A county department approved a proposal to allow development of land that would result in loss of seasonal wetlands. Based on an environmental impact report (EIR), the department found that the benefits of the project would outweigh the significant and detrimental impact on wetlands. The Sierra Club's appeal of the department's decision to the county board of supervisors was denied. The Sierra Club's petition to the superior court alleging that the development violates the CEQA was also denied.

The appellate court affirmed. The Sierra Club argues that the EIR was inadequate because it did not analyze the economic feasibility of the identified alternatives. However, the CEQA does not require that EIRs include an analysis of economic feasibility. The public agency bears the responsibility for making its decisions based on substantial evidence in the entire record. Here, the record did provide sufficient information for the department to consider and reject possible alternatives to the proposed development plan. Therefore, the plaintiff's claims were properly dismissed.

Beginning in 1983, Medicare began reimbursing hospitals according to predetermined rates based on diagnosis and geographic location. However, Congress acknowledged that this method disadvantaged hospitals serving disproportionately high numbers of low income patients. Congress thus allowed for a disproportionate share adjustment based on the extent to which a hospital cares for low income patients. The plaintiff hospital alleges that the measure of services rendered to low income patients should be measured against net inpatient care revenues less Medicare and Medicaid payments. The district court affirmed the Secretary's interpretation that services for low income patients should be measured against net inpatient care revenues as a whole. Applying this interpretation, the district court denied the plaintiff's request for an adjustment.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The statute does not clearly require the exclusion of Medicare and Medicaid payments from net inpatient revenues. Instead, the legislative history supports the Secretary's interpretation that in order to qualify for an adjustment the relevant state and local funding must exceed thirty percent of total net inpatient care revenue, without any deduction for Medicare and Medicaid. Because the Secretary's interpretation reflects a permissible construction of the statutory language, it is entitled to deference.

A city ordinance allows homeowners to construct affordable second dwelling units on their property. However, the ordinance requires a development permit and restricts both the income of second tenants and the rent that can be charged for such units. A homeowner filed an administrative appeal against the occupancy and rent conditions imposed on his permit. The appeal was denied on June 21, 1999. On September 7, 1999, the homeowner and other plaintiffs sued the city, challenging the validity of the ordinance. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' writ petition. The appellate court affirmed solely on statute of limitations grounds.

The California Supreme Court affirmed in part, but reversed dismissal of the claim by the homeowner whose administrative appeal was denied in 1999. Government Code section 65009 establishes a ninety-day statute of limitations to challenge planning and zoning decisions. Civil Procedure section 338 sets a three-year period for an action created by a statute. Here, challenges to the validity of the ordinance are barred by the three-year limit because the ordinance was adopted in 1981. Preemption claims based on the Costa-Hawkins Act are also barred because it became effective in January of 1996. However, the claim seeking removal of the conditions imposed on an individual permit was timely brought within ninety days of the final administrative decision imposing the conditions. Therefore, the homeowner's claim was timely filed.

Castaic Lake Water Agency (Agency) commenced efforts to sell water directly to consumers under Water Code section 12944.7. This section allows water sales to the public pursuant to a written contract with a water corporation, subject to regulation by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC). The Agency entered into a contract with the Water Company to comply with section 12944.7. However, water consumers sued, alleging that the Agency's plan violated the Water Code because the two entities would merge into a single company that would not be subject to PUC regulation. The trial court agreed that the Water Company was merely an alter ego to the Agency and prohibited it from selling water to consumers. The court also rejected the Agency's contention that the Agency Enabling Act (Act) was an independent grant of authority that the agency could rely on to sell water to consumers.

The appellate court reversed. The Act grants the Agency independent authority to sell water at retail without complying with section 12944.7. This authority is limited only by geography. Therefore, the trial court erred in ruling that the Agency was required to fulfill the contractual requirements of section 12944.7 before it could sell water directly to consumers.

Save the Bay challenged the city's approval of an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) evaluating a housing development plan. They sued to compel the city to rescind its approval, alleging that the report's conclusions were unfounded with regard to housing, agricultural resources and biological resources. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion.

The appellate court affirmed. Review is confined to whether an EIR is sufficient as an informational document. The report's conclusions that the development's cumulative housing impact is substantial but not adverse are supported by evidence. The development project will ameliorate the existing imbalance of more jobs than housing. The EIR acknowledges an adverse impact on prime farmland, but deems mitigation plans unfeasible. This conclusion is supported by the fact that large scale agriculture in Orange County will not be economically viable in the long run. Finally, the EIR sufficiently addresses biological resources by identifying mitigation plans to protect endangered species. Therefore, the city properly approved the EIR.

Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. (company) petitioned the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to designate its business as an excursion train not subject to regulation as a public utility. Initially, the PUC agreed because the train did not provide point to point transportation. After learning of the company's plan to disembark tourists at a new station the PUC reversed itself, holding that the company was a public utility. The city petitioned the PUC for rehearing hoping to retain local jurisdiction regarding the placement of the proposed station. The city's petition was denied.

The court of appeals reversed. The company is not subject to regulation as a public entity because it does not qualify as a common carrier providing transportation. The train does not take passengers from one location to another, instead it provides a round trip excursion from Napa. The company's proposed plan to expand service in the future does not entitle it to public utility status now. Finally, the PUC's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the company is not subject to regulation as a public entity.

The city council denied a mobilehome park owner's request for a rent increase to recover the costs of a purported capital improvement to the streets of her park. It found that the owner failed to prove she needed a rent increase to receive a fair return on her investment in the park. The owner sued, seeking administrative mandamus and damages for violation of substantive due process. She contended state and federal case authority gave her a constitutional right to a fair return on capital improvements, regardless of her return on the park as a whole. The trial court held in favor of plaintiff, awarded damages, and ordered the city to reconsider the rent increase.

The appellate court reversed the judgment in its entirety. Due process and the city's rent control ordinance only require a fair return on the mobilehome park as a whole, not a fair return on each discrete aspect of the park. The council properly applied that standard and rejected the requested rent increase.

Pollak, Vida & Fisher represents the city in this case.

A company publicly disclosed that its auditors had discovered improperly-recorded revenues. The company retained counsel to conduct an internal review and represent it in shareholder lawsuits that ensued. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and U.S. Attorney's offices initiated separate investigations of possible misconduct. The company executed confidentiality agreements with both agencies and shared the results of its investigation. The plaintiffs of the civil lawsuits argued that the company waived its attorney-client privilege. A trial court agreed and granted a motion to compel the results of the investigation.

The appellate court affirmed. Although parties aligned in the same side in an investigation or litigation may, in some instances, share privileged documents without waiving privilege, no such alignment exists here. The disclosure of documents to the government agencies was not reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the law firm was retained. By releasing the documents to third parties who did not have an interest in preserving confidentiality, the company waived any work-product protection and attorney-client privilege.

Under the Medi-Cal program a health care provider can be reimbursed for depreciation on buildings and equipment used to provide services to patients. Redding Medical Center (Redding) made current claims for such reimbursements. The Department of Health Services (DHS) timely audited the claims and requested documentation of the historical costs of the claimed depreciable assets. Redding sought reimbursement via administrative mandate, alleging that the costs had been validated by previously submitted reports. The petition was denied.

The appellate court affirmed. If a health care provider continues to claim depreciation, it must stand ready to document the historical costs underlying the current claim. Redding acknowledged that it had made several adjustments over time to the reported historical costs of depreciated assets. Redding's contention that section 14170 of the Welfare and Institutions Code deems previously submitted costs final is incorrect, as demonstrated by its own adjustments.

Plaintiffs are Medi-Cal patients with disabilities that will require treatment at the only county health facility that serves disabled patients. They allege that the county's proposed plan to close the facility violates the ADA. The district court granted a preliminary injunction barring the county from closing the facility without providing similar services elsewhere.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction. Eliminating entirely the only hospital of six that focuses on the needs of the disabled constitutes discrimination on the basis of disability. Plaintiffs established a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim. They also showed that the threat of irreparable harm resulting from closure outweighed the county's financial interests.

Tenants brought complaints alleging race and family status discrimination against property owners before the Fair Employment and Housing Commission. The Commission issued a final decision in favor of the tenants. The trial court initially denied the property owners' motion to reconsider as late-filed. It subsequently allowed the matter to proceed, finding that section 11523 was not applicable.

The appellate court reversed and instructed the trial court to grant the Commission's demurrer. The property owners' motion was defective on its face because it was barred by the thirty-day statute of limitations set forth in Government Code section 11523. The ninety-day statute of limitations referenced in Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 is not applicable, because it recognizes that a state law providing a shorter statute of limitations shall prevail.

Plaintiff scientists challenged the Interior Department's findings that the human remains of “Kennewick Man” were “Native American” within the meaning of NAGPRA, and its decision to transfer custody of the remains to a coalition of Tribal Claimants. The district court barred transfer for immediate burial, and granted plaintiff scientists the opportunity to conduct further scientific study of the remains.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. NAGPRA's language requires that for human remains to be considered Native American, that must bear some relationship to a presently existing tribe, people, or culture. Human remains that are 8340 to 9200 years old, and that bear only incidental genetic resemblance to modern-day American Indians, cannot be said to be the Indians' ancestors within Congress' meaning.

The CAA bars construction of any major air pollutant emitting facility not equipped with the best available control technology (BACT). The Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservancy (ADEC) evaluated two technologies for a proposed facility; one reduced emissions by ninety percent and the other by thirty percent. ADEC approved construction of the facility using the technology that reduced the least emissions. The EPA issued orders prohibiting ADEC from issuing a permit without documenting why the technology that reduces the most emissions was not selected and prohibiting construction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the EPA's authority to issue such orders.

The Supreme Court affirmed. The EPA properly exercised its statutory authority in finding that ADEC's acceptance of the least effective technology as BACT lacked evidentary support. The state's findings citing disproportionate cost as the basis for its decision were not supported by the record. Therefore, the EPA's orders were neither arbitrary nor capricious.

The owner of an apartment building began an extensive series of construction projects. Several tenants obtained rent reductions approved by the rent control board for negative impacts and loss or reduction of housing services caused by such construction. The board also mandated rent reductions for tenants who did not file petitions, reasoning that negative impacts were applicable to all units on the property. The property owner was denied review at the trial court.

The appellate court affirmed rent reductions for tenants who submitted petitions but reversed the board's decision with regard to other tenants. Under the Rent Control Charter Amendment the board's primary function is to set rents at a fair level, thus obligating the board to act as a neutral arbiter. The board lacks the authority to initiate individual petitions because it would be acting as an advocate for individual tenants as opposed to an impartial arbiter.

Plaintiff was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. Two police officers observed plaintiff prior to the administration of a breath test. The findings of the test were used by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to suspend plaintiff's license. The trial court granted a petition to set aside the suspension based on the allegation that the officer administering the test did not observe plaintiff for fifteen continuous minutes.

The appellate court reversed. California Code of Regulations, title 17, section 1219.3 provides that the subject of a breath test must be continuously observed for at least fifteen minutes prior to the collection of a breath sample. The statute does not require a single person to observe the breath test subject for fifteen minutes prior to the test.

The plaintiff was fired from his job as a detention officer for having sexual relations with a co-worker while on duty. He appealed with the city personnel board which upheld the termination at a hearing. Plaintiff then appealed to a trial court alleging that the hearing violated due process because the attorney representing the city had also acted as counsel for the board. The trial court upheld the board's decision.

The appellate court reversed. Procedural due process at an administrative hearing demands an appearance of fairness and the absence of even a probability of outside influence on the adjudication. The city attorney's relationship with the deciding board created a sufficient appearance of bias to invalidate the hearing.

A certified skilled nursing facility appealed the Department's final decision to deny it ”new provider” status to a federal district court. Under the Medicare Act such a designation would have allowed the facility to obtain greater reimbursements for its services. The district court reversed the Department's decision.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and reinstated the Department's initial ruling. Portions of the Medicare Act that define the meaning of a “new provider” are ambiguous and the agency's interpretation that a change in ownership cannot be used to attain such status is reasonable. The reviewing court should give effect to the agency's interpretation so long as it is reasonable.

Plaintiff physician prescribed medical marijuana to a patient. The Drug Enforcement Agency revoked her license. She did not request a hearing, and the final revocation was entered. Then, the physician requested a reopening of the case. The request was denied as untimely.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a) provides that petition for review of an agency decision must be filed within 30 days. Plaintiff's petition was filed 32 days after the published order revoking her license. Moreover, she did not present evidence of changed circumstances in order for the proceedings to be reopened.

The county approved a housing development. It did not approve an environmental impact report as required by the California Environmental Quality Act. Instead, it prepared an addendum to an old EIR. Environmental groups alleged that the EIR violated CEQA. The trial court held in favor of the environmental groups. The county filed a petition for writ of mandate.

The appellate court granted the writ. Public Resource Code § 21167.6 provides that an EIR in CEQA cases must relate to and reflect the subject of the action. The amended EIR was not significantly different from the report prior to the addendum. Moreover, the addendum was necessary because the report must reflect the final agency decision in a matter.

Defendant city adopted a policy requiring the police department to record the race of individuals pulled over but not cited or arrested. The purpose was to investigate racial profiling on behalf of the department. The Police Officers Association petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the city to meet and confer regarding the policy.

The appellate court granted the petition. A policy requiring officers to track the race of motorists who do not ultimately receive a citation significantly affects the officers' working conditions. An officer accused of racial profiling would be subject to discipline. Moreover, how the data is collected could interfere with the officers' relations with the public and his or her effectiveness.

Defendant Teacher's Association provided plaintiff school district teachers with protest buttons. The buttons stated that the district's teachers were paid lower than other teachers in the county. The district prohibited the teachers from wearing the buttons in the classroom. Defendant determined that the rule interfered with the teachers' right to protest. The district petitioned for a writ of mandate.

The appellate court granted the petition. Education Code § 7055 permits certain restrictions on political activity in the classroom. Wearing union buttons is disruptive in the classroom and can be restricted by the district.

The California legislature enacted a law enabling defendant Department of Water Resources to purchase energy as quickly as possible. The Department would in turn sell the power to utility companies. The Department would recover its costs from the Public Utilities Commission. Plaintiff utility company sued DWR alleging that the energy costs were unreasonable. A trial court held that DWR violated the Administrative Procedure Act.

The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The revenue requirements are not regulated by the APA. A public hearing is not required. But DWR must review and determine whether its revenue requirements are just and reasonable under Public Utilities Code § 451. Mere declaration that the prices are just and reasonable is insufficient.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration adopted amendments to the Federal Motor Vehicles Safety Standard. The amendments were issued on December 6, filed on December 17 and published in the Federal Register on December 18. Petitioners sought review of the amendments on February 12. Plaintiff intervened, stating that the petition was filed more than 59 days after issuance of the amendments.

The Ninth Circuit disagreed. A petition for judicial review must be filed within 59 days after the decision is issued. Under the NHTSA, a regulation is “issued” on the date it becomes available for review by the public. Here, publication was on December 18. Fewer than 59 days had passed before petitioners sought review on February 12. In the interest of justice, the court transferred this case to the D.C. Circuit.

California Health & Safety Code § 41865 reduced the amount of leftover rice straw that could be burned in California fields following the rice harvest. Defendant agencies were to develop recommendations as to what to do with all the leftover straw. Plaintiff rice growers filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the agencies' recommendations failed to comply with § 41865. The petition was denied.

The appellate court affirmed denial of the writ, reasoning that the agencies' recommendations were not arbitrary, capricious or without evidentiary support. The agencies were performing a quasi-legislative goal in making recommendations in aid of prospective legislation. Their attempts were accurately given great deference by the courts.

Government Code § 65590, the Mello Act, provides that residences constructed along certain areas of the California coast must be low-income housing. Defendant builder bought coastal land and sought to put up expensive housing. Part of defendant's land was covered by the Act and part of it was not. The city approved the project. Plaintiff sought a writ of mandate. The trial court denied the petition.

The appellate court affirmed. Under the Mello Act, certain areas must not be developed into residential housing unless that housing is low-income. However, expensive housing may be built adjacent to the areas covered by the Mello Act and non-residential buildings may be put in the Mello zones.

Indian tribes argued that the Bonneville Power Administration failed to treat fish and wildlife on par with power in making its business decisions. The tribes sought judicial review of a series of the BPA's administrative decisions. They alleged that the decisions violated 16 U.S.C. § 839b.

The Ninth Circuit denied the petitions. Section 839b does not require every BPA decision to treat fish and wildlife on par with power. Individual decisions may favor power if as a whole their decisions treat fish and wildlife on par. Moreover, any administrative decision occurring before 90 days before the request for judicial review is time-barred.

Penal Code § 13519 requires local law enforcement officers to participate in two hours of domestic violence training. The County sought reimbursement for that training through the Commission on State Mandates. The Department of Finance argued that the training was intended to come from already-existing funds. The trial court found that the training cost the County extra money and granted its petition for a writ of mandate.

The appellate court reversed. Legislation requiring domestic violence training does not mandate a higher level of service than the current officer training programs. The County is required to reallocate its already-existing sources to cover domestic violence training.

Congress required reformulated gasoline to consist of at least two percent oxygen by weight. The state of California banned a commonly-used oxygenate because it threatened water supplies. California's governor requested a waiver of the oxygen requirement. The Environmental Protection Agency denied the request.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. The gasoline oxygen requirement must be waived by the EPA if compliance interferes with the attainment of a national primary ambient air quality standard. A waiver request must be granted when failure to do so would effect air quality under NAAQS. The EPA has otherwise abused its discretion.

In 1953, the Pacific Gas and Electric Company established the Poe Project. It timely filed notice for its intent to apply for a new license. It was a day late for reasons beyond its control. The FERC deemed the project an “orphan.” It waived its own regulations and allowed the power company to participate in the licensing proceedings because of its incumbent status. Plaintiff city petitioned for review of the FERC's order.

The appellate court denied the petition. The Federal Power Act allows the FERC to waive its own regulations where a power company acted in good faith. Moreover, preference for incumbent power companies furthers the Act's intent to prevent the transfer of a project to new owners without good reason.

The city contracted with a public agency for the prevention of cruelty to animals. The city would contribute funds for construction of an animal shelter. The Department of Industrial Relations found the project was a “public work” under Labor Code § 1720 and therefore was subject to the state's prevailing wage law. The city argued that the prevailing wage law should not apply since it was a charter city. Its petition for writ of mandate was granted.

The appellate court reversed. Construction of a public work includes planning, design and project management. If construction of a public facility in a charter city is publicly funded, it is a public work subject to the prevailing wage law and not a strictly municipal affair.

An Alaskan fishing company challenged regulations establishing the Vessel Incentive Program, a fishery management plan created by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council. The fishing company also challenged fines imposed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for exceeding the standards for halibut bycatch set by the agency under the VIP. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States. Appellants contended that the District Court should have supplemented the administrative record with statements from a meeting of the Council discussing the effectiveness of the VIP.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed, upholding the federal fishery management regulations. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to supplement the record. Appellants failed to make the strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior that may justify an inquiry into the thought processes of administrative decision makers under Public Power Council v. Johnson (1982) 674 F.2d 791.

A closed military base was conveyed to a state university board of trustees. The trustees noted environmental impact on the land but refused to pay for the needed infrastructure improvements. The Superior Court ordered the board to vacate its resolution approving the campus plan or provide for mitigation measures.

The appellate court reversed. Under Government Code § 54999, traffic and fire safety costs for off-campus improvements are the responsibility of the locality. Such costs are not the responsibility of the state university board of trustees who own the land.

The water replenishment district provides water to 148 public entities. The entities pay an assessment to extract the water. The entities sued the water replenishment district, alleging that the assessment fee should include the right to store water in times of drought. The trial court held that the right to storage was separate from the right to extraction, and was not included in the assessment fee.

The appellate court affirmed. Entities with extraction rights in a water basin have the right to extract the water -- they do not own the water. Their rights to extract are completely separate from any right to store the water. The water replenishment district has the sole right to store water for the purpose of replenishing the district during times of drought.

Indian tribe sued the city, its public utilities and the United States alleging they were harmed by a dam and reservoir project owned by the city. The District Court refused to certify the tribe as a class and granted summary judgment in favor of the city.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss. It affirmed the District Court's denial of the tribe's recusal motion. It affirmed dismissal of the tribe's claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. However, the District court inappropriately granted summary judgment in favor of the city on the Treaty-based claims because it lacked jurisdiction to hear those claims.

The California Horse Racing Board suspended plaintiff's license to race horses in California after trace amounts of morphine were detected in his horse's urine. While his appeal was pending, plaintiff sued under §1983 seeking to enjoin the state proceedings on the ground that the Board had failed to preserve the horse's blood samples. The Board argued that the principles of the Younger abstention required the District Court to decline jurisdiction. (Younger v. Harris (1971) 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669.) The District Court nevertheless decided the case.

The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the action. The Younger abstention, as a circumscribed exception to mandatory federal jurisdiction, applies. There is a pending state proceeding that implicates important state interests and provides the federal plaintiff with an opportunity to raise federal claims. California has a significant interest in protecting the integrity of horse racing. Plaintiff can fully litigate his claims in the state forum. Moreover, the horse's blood samples were not destroyed out of bad faith but under a policy.

An electric utility sued the Louisiana Public Service Commission after the LPSC regulated rates the utility could charge. The District Court upheld the order. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed. It reasoned that LPSC was not attempting to regulate interstate wholesale rates as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is supposed to do, and thus the regulation was not preempted by FERC.

The United States Supreme Court reversed. A state public service commission may not regulate utility rates if pre-empted by a system agreement approved by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. The state system need not directly attempt to regulate interstate wholesale rates in order to be pre-empted by FERC.

A city ordinance required public utilities to relocate facilities at the utility's own expense. A telephone company wanted to relocate its facilities and wanted the city to foot the cost. The city sued the telephone company for failure to comply with the ordinance. The Superior Court sustained the utility's demurrer based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The appellate court affirmed. The Public Utilities Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether a utility must foot the cost for relocating its facilities. The Superior Court did not have jurisdiction or even concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate which party must bear the facility's relocation cost.

Chairman of the Fair Political Practices Commission signed a document delegating the Commission's functions to FPPC employees in investigating violations of the Political Reform Act. Before the FPPC ratified the delegation, the employees held proceedings against an organization and two of its treasurers for PRA violations. In a proceeding to obtain a civil judgment, the FPPC must show that the fine was imposed following the procedures set forth in the Political Reform Act. The FPPC sued to obtain a civil judgment against the organization and its treasurers as allowed by Government Code §91013.5. Defendants claimed that since the delegations were not ratified, the employees did not comply with the PRA. The trial court entered judgment in the FPPC's favor.

The appellate court affirmed. Defendants cannot argue that the FPPC was not entitled to a civil judgment - - even if it does not establish that the fine was imposed following the proper PRA procedures. Even assuming the delegation was ineffectual, the de facto officer doctrine applies and the employees were acting as FPPC investigators in compliance with the PRA.

Police officer attended a barbeque for three hours while he was supposed to be on duty. Then, he submitted a false daily activity report. He was terminated. He petitioned for administrative mandamus that city and police chief be compelled to reinstate his employment. The Superior Court denied the petition.

The appellate court affirmed. The decision to terminate officer's employment was not abuse of discretion. Police officer integrity is vital to effective law enforcement. The officer diminished the public trust and confidence when he deprived the public of police protection for a significant period. Moreover, the one-year limitations period for filing a charge against the officer began to run when a sergeant discovered the possibility of the misconduct.

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved reorganization of utility subsidiaries. Petitioners state and state power agency sought judicial review of the approval. They argued that the Commission provided inadequate notice of the subsidiaries' applications, provided inadequate opportunity for a hearing, and failed to conduct properly the “public interest” analysis mandated by §230 of the Federal Power Act.

The Ninth Circuit denied the petitions for review. Notice published in Federal Register satisfied due process requirements. Expedited approval of applications did not violate either state's statutory due process rights or agency's constitutional due process rights. FERC provided all procedural protections due when it considered petitions for rehearing and motions to intervene. Moreover, substantial evidence supported factual finding that proposed reorganization was consistent with public interest.

Plaintiff's decedent died. As required by state and federal law, the Department of Health Services on behalf of California taxpayers, sought reimbursement for the cost of medical services provided to the decedent. The trial court struck the Department's Medi-Cal lien.

The appellate court reversed. When Medi-Cal has provided medical services to an indigent beneficiary, the California Department of Health Services may obtain reimbursement from the recovery made by the beneficiary's survivors in a wrongful death action.

In the Hours of Service Act, Congress limited the number of consecutive hours train employees could be on duty. Petitioner Union challenged duty calls that workers were getting while off-duty. These brief calls informed the worker when to come in. The calls often were received during a four hour rest period. The Federal Railroad Administration held that such a call did not violate the Act.

The Ninth Circuit, holding that the FRA's interpretation of the Act was reasonable, denied review. A single, brief phone call informing a worker when to come in does not violate the Hours of Service Act. Repeated calls, however, could disturb rest and accordingly might interrupt the off-duty period.

A contractor specializing in public underground construction projects unlawfully administered city contracts with deceit and corruption. The city council made an administrative ruling permanently debarring the contractor from contracting with the city. The contractor petitioned for writ of administrative mandamus. The Superior Court granted the petition and ordered the city to adopt a proposed alternative resolution to debar the contractor for three years.

The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. City council's decision that contractor that administered city contract with deceit and corruption should be permanently debarred, must stand. Due process rights set forth in federal regulations code and state government code were not owed to the contractor. Contractor was afforded the opportunity to effectively participate in the debarment hearing. The Court of Appeal must presume that the city council considered all evidence and that the decision was not biased.

Housing Authority board of commissioners upheld plaintiff former employee's termination for disclosing confidential information. She brought a mandamus action to set aside the decision. The Superior Court denied relief.

The appellate court reversed with instructions. The authority's board of commissioners conducted a hearing when they rejected the officer's findings of fact, and thus former employee was entitled to notice of right to have complaint held in open session. The board's failure to give notice rendered the decision null and void, even though the actual decision was made at a later meeting.

Real Party applied for a coastal development permit. The city classified the property as “wetlands” and denied the application. Real party petitioned the court. The petition was granted. The court held that the city's interpretation of “wetlands” was unreasonable. The Commission approved the application with conditions. Real party challenged the conditions. The court granted the petition ordering the Commission to set aside the conditions. The Commission and the city sought a stay granting real party's second writ. The court issued the stay.

The appellate court affirmed. Where a local government approves a project in response to a writ ordering it to do so, and the Commission was a party to the writ proceedings, the Commission may not hear an appeal of the approval. Extraordinary relief is appropriate because in absence of writ relief, irreparable harm could result. The effect of the Commission's order was to overturn a valid court order -- which it cannot do. As party to the writ proceedings, the Commission was bound by the ruling whether or not final.

The county helped prepare an environmental impact report for a housing development project. The report failed to state the amount of water actually available for the project. It included estimates as given by experts. The EIR was certified. Plaintiff environmental group alleged that estimates rather than actual water availability made the EIR invalid under the California Environmental Quality Act. The trial court denied plaintiff's petition.

The appellate court reversed. An EIR must state accurately the amount of water available for a development project. A report that merely estimates the amount of water available does not inform the public and its officials of an environmental decision before it is made. It should at least attempt to discuss the differences between entitlement and actual supply.

Foster children sued the Washington Department of Social and Health Services. They alleged that the Department violated the Social Security Act by reimbursing itself for foster care expenditures from foster children's Social Security benefits. The Superior Court entered summary judgment in favor of the class. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded. A state, as representative payee of foster care children, is entitled to the children's Social Security benefits in order to reimburse itself for expenditures of care. Such a use does not amount to an “execution, levy, attachment, garnishment or other legal process” prohibited by the Act. Prohibiting the state from using the money would detrimentally reduce money available to care for the children.

Appellant not-for-profit corporation advocates for individuals eligible for Medicaid benefits. It sued the Department of Health Services claiming that certain of its policies were void because they were not promulgated in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of DHS. It reasoned that many of the policies of DHS were not “regulations” within the meaning of the APA since they were unnecessary.

The Appellate Court reversed and remanded. DHS failed to demonstrate absence of a triable issue of material fact. It is unclear whether policies are “regulations” under the APA. Thus, summary judgment was inappropriate.

Rent control ordinance entitled mobilehome park owners to a fair return. “Fair return” was the amount needed to maintain base year net operating income. It established 1985 as the base year. Respondent mobilehome park owner applied for an extraordinary rental increase. It lost its 1985 financial records, so it used 1996 as the base year for calculating return. The hearing officer denied the application for failure to use 1985 NOI. The Superior Court ordered the city to reconsider respondent's application. In response, the city amended the ordinance to allow for estimated 1985 base year NOI and reconsidered the application. Respondent's application still used 1996 as the base year. It was again denied.

The appellate court affirmed. Respondent was not entitled to use an alternative base year for purposes of determining a permissible rent increase. The hearing officer's denial was neither unreasonable nor unlawful. The decision must be upheld absent evidence the interpretation lacks a reasonable foundation.

A manufacturer discontinued a car line and terminated plaintiff's franchise. Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of administrative mandamus, seeking to compel the New Motor Vehicle Board to hold an evidentiary hearing. The trial court denied the writ petition.

The appellate court affirmed. California Vehicle Code sections 3060 and 3061 prohibit involuntary termination of a dealership without good cause. The New Motor Vehicle Board has implied authority to dismiss a protest where undisputed facts demonstrate good cause for franchise termination.

Respondent worked for the California Youth Authority. He was dismissed for neglect of duty. He contested the dismissal. An administrative law judge upheld the decision to dismiss. However, the state personnel board issued its own decision revoking the dismissal. The CYA sought to overturn the board's decision. The trial court denied the motion.

The appellate court affirmed. In a California Youth Authority employee dismissal action, a court is not required to give great weight to administrative law decisions regarding credibility. Government Code section 11425.50 requires deference only to the extent the ALJ identifies observed demeanor, manner or attitude of the witnesses.

Real parties' homes were built on a bluff above the ocean. There was erosion at the base of the bluff. Geotechnical engineers believed the bluff was likely to collapse, possibly within weeks. They requested a special use permit under the emergency exemption to the California Environmental Quality Act. The city approved construction of a steel-reinforced seawall due to emergency. Plaintiff public benefit corporation did not see an emergency. It thought the city should prepare an environmental impact report in compliance with CEQA. The trial court found an emergency and held in favor of the city.

The appellate court affirmed. Emergencies need not be unexpected when the project's purpose is to prevent the emergency. Professional opinions that the bluff was likely to collapse soon provided substantial evidence that the bluff required immediate action. No statute or ordinance required the city to hold a public hearing to determine the project's emergency exemption from CEQA. Thus, Public Resources Code §21168.5 governs the action. Under that section, the city is not required to make findings or hold a public hearing to determine a project's exemption.

Plaintiff fishery wanted to harvest sablefish in an area regulated by the defendant National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). NMFS claimed that because plaintiff had harvested only halibut during the regulatory base period, it could not now harvest sablefish. Plaintiff pointed to a statute allowing fisheries to land sablefish if they had landed either halibut or sablefish during the regulatory period. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of NMFS. The court deferred to an NMFS interpretive rule which held that only persons actually landing sablefish during the regulatory base period were qualified to fish for sablefish.

The appellate court reverse and remanded. Deference to an administrative agency interpretive rule is only proper where a regulation is ambiguous. There is no ambiguity in a regulation that states a person may land either halibut or sablefish in a regulated area. Where there is no ambiguity, the court must rely on the statute and may not defer to an agency's interpretive rule or prior administrative appeals decisions addressing the regulation.

Plaintiff was arrested for drunk driving. He did not request a hearing before the Department of Motor Vehicles, although he was advised of this right during his arrest. Instead, he sued. The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by requesting a hearing under Vehicle Code section 13558.

The appellate court affirmed. A driver must request an administrative hearing before the DMV under Vehicle Code section 13558 before seeking judicial review of a suspension. Judicial review is barred until plaintiff requests an administrative hearing.

An attorney represented a corporation that enforced private property parking rights. She wanted to obtain confidential residence address information from the Department of Motor Vehicles to send collection letters to persons who failed to pay their parking tickets. The trial court granted the attorney's writ.

The appellate court reversed. An attorney for a corporation that enforces private property parking rights does not have access to confidential residence addresses held by the DMV. This is based on the strong policy considerations favoring the protection of privacy. Moreover, the requested information was not necessary for the attorney to represent her client.

Plaintiff public safety employee was denied a promotion. He filed an appeal with defendant county civil service commission. The commission found that they did not have jurisdiction over his appeal. The employee obtained a writ of mandate from the Superior Court directing the commission to hear and decide the appeal.

The appellate court reversed. The commission lacks jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal because it was not expressly authorized by charter. Although the county has a legal obligation to provide an administrative appeal to a public safety employee, the commission does not have jurisdiction to conduct the appeal, either under its own authority or pursuant to court order.

The Department of Health Services issued a citation against plaintiff nursing home. Within 15 days of receipt of the citation, plaintiff notified DHS of its intent to contest the citation and requested a citation review conference. The trial court held that plaintiff's action was barred by the statue of limitations set forth in California Health & Safety Code section 1428(b). It dismissed plaintiff's claim.

The appellate court reversed. Under section 1428(b), when a facility chooses to contest a citation by requesting a citation review conference, the limitations period starts running when the request is withdrawn. If the request is not withdrawn, the limitations period starts running when a decision is received by the facility.

The Public Utilities Commission revised a formula to determine the amount petitioner Southern California Edison is required to pay certain small electricity providers. Southern California Edison challenged the formula. Its petition for rehearing was denied.

The appellate court affirmed. The Legislature did not provide a specific formula in its deregulation bill. It was up to the Commission to arrive at a formula. That section only requires that prices be a reasonable proxy for utility's avoided cost. Because the price of electricity is wildly fluctuating, a specific formula would be less accurate.

The owner of a trailer park sued the city's rent control board arguing that the board could not determine whether mobilehome leases are subject to local rent control. The trial court found that the rent control board is entitled to determine whether mobilehome leases are exempt from rent control and can impose excess rent penalties.

The appellate court affirmed. A rent control board may determine whether mobilehome leases are exempt from local rent control. The state Mobilehome Residency Law does not preempt the city's rent control ordinance. Administrative agencies regularly exercise a range of powers designed to induce compliance with their regulatory authority. By denying regular rent increases, the board is taking reasonable, nonarbitrary measures to induce compliance with the rent control ordinance.

The city adopted a resolution that prohibited vehicles from parking on residential curbs unless the car belonged to a resident on that street. Businesses were required to obtain parking permits from the city. The Chamber of Commerce sued under the California Environmental Quality Act on the basis that the city failed to prepare an Environmental Impact Report. The trial court denied the Chamber's petition for a writ of mandamus.

The appellate court affirmed. The parking legislation is exempt from the requirements of CEQA. The regulation involves adjusting a particular group of persons permitted to use existing facilities -- existing curbside parking on residential streets. Because it involves negligible or no expansion, the legislation does not require an EIR.

The Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control suspended a bar's liquor license because it allowed a minor to enter and remain on the premises for ten minutes before checking identification in violation of California Bus. & Prof. Code section 25665. The appeals board affirmed the suspension.

The appellate court reversed and remanded. If it is unreasonable for a bartender to immediately check all identification of every patron in the bar, the bar's liquor license should not be suspended for allowing a minor to remain on the premises for ten minutes. It is unrealistic to expect a bartender to check an identification immediately when there are fifty or sixty patrons in a bar and only one bartender on duty.

A wine grower paid for advertising in a retailer's exclusive sales catalog. The Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control suspended the grower's license for furnishing something of value to the retailer in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code section 25502. This is known as a “tied-house” law. The Appeals Board reversed the decision.

The appellate court vacated the Board's decision and reinstated the Department's decision. A wine grower may not advertise in the exclusive sales catalog of a retailer. By paying for advertising the wine grower is furnishing something of value to the retailer. The Department's decision was a reasoned interpretation and application of the alcoholic beverage control laws.

Plaintiff's licence was suspended for driving under the influence. He claimed that the document authorized by a criminalist purporting to show his blood alcohol level was inadmissible hearsay. The Department of Motor Vehicles claimed that the document fell under the official records exception to the hearsay rule. The superior court issued a writ of mandate in favor of the plaintiff.

The appellate court affirmed. A criminalist is not authorized to perform forensic alcohol analysis and could not have had an official duty to perform such analyses. Therefore, a document authorized by a criminalist reporting an illegal blood alcohol level is inadmissible hearsay.

A local rent control ordinance prohibits a landlord from increasing rent rates unless a tenant moves out and is replaced by a new tenant, a sublessee or an assignee. Plaintiff landlord more than doubled the rent when a tenant moved out and the tenant's adult son moved in, pursuant to a state statute. The Rent Board held that the local rent ordinance should apply because the tenant's son was not a sublessee or assignee. The trial court affirmed.

The appellate court affirmed. The tenant's son was not a sublessee, assignee or new tenant when the landlord notified him of the rent increase. Thus, the state statute did not govern a rental increase; the rent control ordinance controlled.

A county board of supervisors revoked the license of a massage parlor for soliciting prostitution. The revocation notice identified a local attorney as the hearing officer. The business owner objected that the county may not hire its own hearing officer to conduct the hearing because that relationship created an actual conflict of interest in violation of due process. The superior court declined to instruct the county on how to select a hearing officer. The appellate court found a violation of due process.

The supreme court affirmed. A temporary board-appointed hearing officer, like a judge, has an impermissible financial interest if the government unilaterally selected and paid the officer on an ad-hoc basis. The officer's future income depends entirely on the government's good will or on the number of cases handled. Thus, the officer cannot be impartial as required by due process.

Petitioner California Water Resources Control Board sought a writ of mandate to vacate an order disqualifying the Attorney General's office from further representing the Board because the Office was also representing the Department of Fish and Game in an underlying water law action. After the trial court granted the motion to disqualify, the Board and the Department asked the court to allow the Department to obtain separate counsel so that the Office could continue to represent the Board. The court denied the request, and the Board petitioned for a writ of mandate.

The appellate court issued the writ of mandate. Water Code section 186 unambiguously requires the Board's legal counsel, not the Office, to represent the Board when another state agency that is represented by the Office is a party to the action. Therefore, if the Department is represented by the Office, the Office may not also represent the Board. However, if the Department retains outside counsel in substitution for the Office, the statutory prohibition no longer applies.

Plaintiffs own El Dorado mobile home park in Palm Springs. They sought approval from the City to subdivide the rental units to convert it into a resident-owned park. The planning commission conditionally approved the application and recommended that the City Council approve it. The City Council imposed three further conditions. El Dorado petitioned for a writ to compel approval without the council's conditions. The trial court denied the petition.

The appellate court reversed and remanded. Pursuant to Government Code section 66427.5, in an application to convert a mobilehome park into resident ownership, the power of the City Council extends only to determining whether the subdivider has complied with the statute. Thus, the City Council lacked authority to condition approval of the subdivision.

Defendants own a rural low-income apartment complex under section 515 of the National Housing Act. They appealed their property tax assessment with the Kern County Assessment Appeals Board. The Board determined that the assessor had incorrectly assessed the property and adopted the defendants' value calculation. However, the trial court granted the assessor's petition for writ of mandate and directed the Board to vacate its value determination.

The appellate court affirmed. Although defendants are correct that the income approach is the appropriate method for valuing low-income housing, it was reasonable for the assessor to incorporate the effective interest rate into the value calculation. If property is subject to legal restrictions based on income that are unrelated to cost, its value must be assessed using the income approach. This appraisal method rests on the assumption that in an open market a willing buyer of the property would pay a willing seller an amount approximately equal to the present value of the future income to be derived from the property.

The Medical Board of California sued Doctor Bonnell for gross negligence, repeated negligent acts and incompetence. The administrative law judge recommended dismissal of the accusation. The Board adopted the recommendation. The trial court granted a petition for writ of mandate. They held that the 28-day stay, granted by the Board for the purpose of evaluation of a petition for reconsideration of its decision, was in excess of the 10 day stay which Government Code section 11521 authorizes for the purpose of considering the petition.

The appellate court reversed. Government Code section 11521 authorizes a stay of up to 30 days for the purpose of filing an application for reconsideration -- even if the petition is already on file. Under section 11521, the Board must act on a petition for reconsideration within the original jurisdictional period of 30 days of the issuance of the decision, unless the Board specifies a shorter period as the effective date of its decision, or within the period of any stay issued within such periods.

The state of California and the FBI together sought to investigate fraud in the state's Medicaid/Medi-Cal Program. An FBI audit report would freeze funding to a suspect Medi-Cal recipient. Plaintiffs, as providers of medical services to Medi-Cal recipients, sought to enjoin the withholding of payments. The district court held in favor of the plaintiffs.

The appellate court dismissed in part, reversed in part and remanded. Because plaintiffs cancelled their laboratory license, their claims are moot. By cancelling the license, plaintiffs became ineligible to participate in the Medi-Cal program. They could no longer benefit from the injunctive relief the district court had granted. Moreover, attorney fees were improper. Plaintiffs prevailed solely because of the district court's error of law.

Medicare service providers sued the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. They contended that the Secretary unlawfully repealed a carry-forward provision in the Medicare statute. The provision had allowed providers to carry forward reasonable costs disallowed in a particular fiscal period to succeeding fiscal periods. Repealing it caused some Medicare beneficiaries to shoulder an extra expense. The district court held for the Secretary.

The appellate court affirmed. The Secretary has flexibility to fashion a rule with adverse effects, if that rule is not expressly mandated or prohibited by Congress. Congress permitted the Secretary to implement a carry-forward provision but did not expressly require the Secretary to provide for it. Moreover, the Secretary could have reasonably concluded that the repeal was unlikely to result in an unnecessary increase in charges. Because it was not an arbitrary or capricious agency action, it shall stand.

Respondent was injured while working for the County of San Luis Obispo and was awarded workers' compensation. One of respondent's payments arrived fifteen days late. He sued on grounds of unreasonable delay. Because the County did not explain the reason for the delay, the Worker's Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) ordered a penalty. The County appealed.

The appellate court reversed. The County established that the delay was not unreasonable. Determining reasonableness of a delay requires achieving a fair balance between the employee's right to prompt payment of benefits and the employer's right to avoid imposition of harsh and unreasonable penalties. Inadvertent delays, without more, are not unreasonable. The delay was attributed to a clerical error, and prompt corrective action was taken when discovered. Further, Barnes failed to notify his employer when the check had not arrived on time.

Appellant Sierra Club sued the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) when it failed to take action against a water treatment plant operating in violation of the Clean Water Act. The district court held that the EPA did not have a mandatory duty to investigate. The court further held that, even after a violation was found, the agency did not have a mandatory duty to enforce the Act.

The appellate court affirmed. An agency's refusal to enforce or investigate is within the agency's discretion, unless Congress has indicated otherwise. Even if a statute provides the agency "shall" act, the duty to act is not mandatory. The EPA has limited resources and must choose to investigate those situations which the agency administrator believes are the most serious. Moreover, an agency's decision not to take action involves balancing many factors that are peculiarly within its expertise.

The State Department of Health Services contracted with the State Controller's office to delegate its audit responsibility of Medi-Cal payments. The federal Health Care Financing Administration approved in writing the Department's delegation. The Controller reviewed the respondent medical provider's claims, and issued final audit overpayment findings. The respondent appealed, contending that the federal Medicaid law precluded the delegation. The trial court issued a writ of mandamus directing the Department to set aside its final decision. The Department appealed.

The appellate court reversed. The Administration's approval of the delegation was proper. The Administration's construction of the federal law that it administers is entitled to deference. Further, its construction of the federal statutory single state agency requirement was a reasonable and permissible construction, and the application of the regulation to the circumstances of this case was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.

CBS requested, under the California Public Records Act, disclosure of information regarding child care workers with criminal record exemptions from the Department of Social Services. The Department refused, asserting that nondisclosure was warranted under the right to privacy. CBS petitioned for a writ of mandate when a trial court denied its request for an injunction.

The appellate court granted the writ. The Department is duty-bound under the Act to disclose the information. The identity of each individual granted a criminal conviction exemption and the child care facility employing such individual clearly fall within the Act. Further, there is no invasion of privacy since both a criminal conviction and a license to operate, work at, or own a day care facility is a matter of public record.

The appellant, Director of the Department of Health Services, sued under Welfare and Institutions Code section 14124.70 et seq. to recover money the Department spent for medical care on the respondent attorney's client. Section 14124.70 et seq. grants the state a lien upon a tort victim's settlement or judgment when monies are spent by the Department to treat the victim's injuries. Here, the Department paid for the medical care of Day, who was represented in a medical malpractice action for a birth defect. The trial court granted the respondent's demurrer.

The appellate court reversed. A birth defect is an injury within the meaning of sections 14124.70 et seq. The statutory phrase "an injury for which another person is liable," means some harm to a person, for which the Department will provide benefits, and for which legal recompense can be sought.

McIntyre, a former fire fighter, applied to the Santa Barbara County Employees' Retirement System, Board of Retirement for a service-connected disability retirement. Before the hearing occurred, McIntyre filed a writ of mandate, compelling the Board to follow certain procedures in deciding his application. The trial court denied the petition.

The appellate court affirmed. The Board fulfills, rather that breaches its fiduciary duties when it retains staff, lawyers and doctors to represent it at benefit hearings. Moreover, due process rights are not violated when a hearing officer is unilaterally selected to decide the application or by actively opposing the application. Further, the Board does not violate the 1937 Public Employees' Retirement Act when it acts as an adverse party at the hearings, purports to determine whether a disability is service connected, or requires applicants to submit their own medical records for review and be examined by a Board-appointed doctor.

Defendant MTA issued a request for proposal (RFP) soliciting bids for the installation of public toilets. MTA promised to provide advertising sites to the lowest bidder. Real Party in Interest Eller found the RFP sites undesirable, and did not submit a bid. Petitioner STI submitted the only bid. After reviewing STI's License Agreement with MTA, Eller requested documents relating to the RFP pursuant to the California Public Records Act and the Freedom of Information Act. When MTA refused to produce all requested documents, Eller filed a petition for writ of mandate in Superior Court. MTA asserted attorney-client privilege as to document "C," prepared by County Counsel for MTA's Director of Real Estate; and "V," a copy of "C" forwarded to STI. STI asserted attorney-client privilege as to document "R," a letter prepared by STI's counsel, and shared with MTA. The Court ordered production of all three documents. It held "C" should be produced because it was not prepared for use in litigation, while "V" and "R" should be produced because they were not exempted under Government Code section 6524.

The appellate court vacated the order. Government Code section 6254 exempts from disclosure documents whose disclosure is exempted pursuant to state and federal law, including provisions of the Evidence Code relating to privilege. Evidence Code section 912, subdivision (d) provides that when a disclosure is necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer was consulted, the disclosure is not a waiver of attorney-client privilege. Evidence Code section 952 provides that disclosure to third persons to whom disclosure is necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer was consulted is a confidential communication. Neither section suggests privileged disclosure must be litigation related. Here, disclosure of the documents in question was reasonably necessary to further the interests of both MTA and STI in negotiating for the License Agreement. Thus, privilege was not waived.

Plaintiff was injured by a vaccination. The Federal Claims court awarded her $3 million pursuant to the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. While the NVICP action was still pending plaintiff received Medi-Cal benefits for the same injury. When the Department of Health Services discovered the benefits, it placed a lien on the award. The trial court ruled the department could properly seek reimbursement for the Medi-Cal benefits.

The appellate court affirmed. Since Medicaid is the payor of last resort, its administering agency must seek reimbursement from any third party responsible for a patient's medical expenses. Since Congress mandated the NVICP should pay for vaccine injuries, it qualifies as a responsible third party. The lien was not unjust. Plaintiff could have incorporated Medicaid expenses into her award, but failed to disclose them to the court before it entered a judgment.

Real Party in Interest "County Mental Health Plan" contracted with respondent Department of Mental Health (DMH) to provide psychiatric inpatient hospital services to County Medi-Cal patients. County used DMH funds to reimburse petitioners hospitals upon receipt of appropriate treatment authorization requests (TARs) and supporting medical records. TARs had to meet guidelines set forth in Cal. Code Regs., Tit. 9, sections 17174 et seq. Hospitals could file a first-level appeal with the County MHP if TARs were reduced or denied, and a second-level appeal with DMH. In 1997 plaintiffs sought a writ of mandate in trial court challenging DMH's denial of TARs. The administrative record contained medical records, petitioner hospitals' requests for appeals, County form letters denying first-level appeals, and DMH decisions denying second-level appeals. The court denied County's request to submit expert declarations in support of its TAR denial decisions. It also overturned DMH's denials of TARs concerning 225 days of inpatient hospital care.

The appellate court reversed and remanded. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b), an administrative decision that does not involve a fundamental vested right must be supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean the agency rendering the decision must set forth findings bridging the analytic gap between raw evidence and the ultimate order. DMH's boilerplate rejections of appeals failed to meet this requirement. Therefore the trial court had no adequate basis for ruling on the validity of the denied TARs. The parties' appellate briefs also failed to settle the record. The matter was remanded so that DMH can make new decisions containing specific findings.

The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) studies the effects of hazardous substances and institutes medical programs when needed. ATSDR can fund its programs with Superfund monies, and then sue polluting parties for reimbursement. For three decades, the Department of Energy (DOE) produced plutonium in plaintiff's region. The resultant radiation damaged plaintiff's endocrine system. Plaintiff sued the DOE to compel it to budget for a medical monitoring program that the ATSDR was statutorily required to institute. The district court found the plaintiff lacked subject matter jurisdiction because (1) plaintiff failed to meet the requirements for instituting a citizen's suit under CERCLA, and (2) there was no final agency action to challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff lacked constitutional standing to compel the DOE to make budget requests. To have standing, a plaintiff must show (1) there was a concrete and actual injury, (2) a causal connection existed between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a favorable court judgment would redress the injury. Plaintiff did not meet the causation requirement because she sued the wrong party. The ATSDR, not the DOE, had a statutory duty to implement the medical monitoring program. Whether or not the DOE provided funding, the ATDR retained its decision-making authority. Plaintiff also failed to meet the redressability requirement. Because she could not prove that a budget request would lead to implementation of the program, she also could not prove a judgment in her favor would help her.

Plaintiffs alleged four causes of action against the Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC). Central to all causes of action was an allegation that Government Code section 84305 was unconstitutional. Section 84305 prohibits anonymous mass mailings during an election campaign. The superior court upheld section 84305 when applied to candidates or candidate-controlled committees. It denied plaintiffs' motions but did not formally enter a judgment. Plaintiffs appealed the first cause of action, a writ for administrative mandate. Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court upheld the ruling. After a subsequent ruling by the United States Supreme Court on a related case, plaintiffs renewed the four causes of action in superior court. The superior court entered summary judgment for the FPPC, but the appellate court reversed the judgment and held section 84305 unconstitutional in its entirety. While the doctrine of law of the case holds that an appellate court's statement controls in later proceedings in the same case, an intervening change in controlling law can block application of such law where it would result in an unjust decision. The appellate court concluded the United States Supreme Court decision had changed controlling law; that only the writ of administrative mandate had been ruled on; and therefore the "injustice" exception to the doctrine of law of the case allowed it to rule on the second, third, and fourth causes of action.

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal's decision. The original appeal for writ of mandate to the appellate court necessarily encompassed all four causes of action. The "one final judgment" rule bars appeal of denial of an administrative mandamus petition while other causes of action joined with the writ are still pending. Because it implicitly resolved all the other pending causes of action, the superior court finding that a narrowly-tailored version of section 84305 was constitutional was a final judgment. Once the Supreme Court affirmed the holding, the Court of Appeal could not entertain a second appeal in the same action on the merits of plaintiff's causes of action. In addition, plaintiffs could not raise the "injustice exception" because there was no pending legal proceeding to which it could be applied, only an improper revival of litigation after its final conclusion.

Respondent state tax agency disciplined the plaintiff employee for various acts. The plaintiff filed an administrative appeal with the defendant State Personnel Board, which sustained the charges and imposed punishment. After a hearing on the plaintiff's petition for writ of administrative mandamus, the trial court upheld some of the personnel agency's findings, but reversed and remanded others. The plaintiff did not appeal. Upon remand, the defendant imposed a reduced penalty. The plaintiff then filed a "supplemental" petition for writ of mandate challenging the findings upon which the penalty was based. The trial court reasoned that if the plaintiff was dissatisfied with the original judgment, he should have appealed. The trial court concluded that principles of res judicata preclude relitigation of the charges.

The appellate court affirmed but reached its decision on different grounds. The plaintiff sought a readjudication of factual issues decided adversely to him by a judgment in the same action and therefore the plaintiff was seeking a new trial of those issues. Because the plaintiff did not file a motion for a new trial, the trial court properly declined to retry those issues. The plaintiff's supplemental petition could not serve as a motion for new trial or notice of intention because it was not so entitled, it did not designate the grounds for the motion, and it did not specify whether it was made on the basis of affidavits or court minutes.

The Perry's wanted to build an inn on four acres of land in Mendocino County. The County Planning Commission adopted a negative declaration approving a permit for the project. Several interested groups appealed the decision to the County Board of Supervisors, which upheld the decision of the Planning Commission. The opponents appealed the Board's decision to the California Coastal Commission. The Coastal Commission conducted a de novo hearing and adopted a resolution of approval, which granted the permit subject to the California Environmental Quality Act. The appellant, a member of the Sierra Club and a resident of the County, petitioned for mandamus and injunctive relief. The trial court denied the petition on the grounds that the Coastal Commission was an indispensable party.

The appellate court affirmed. The Coastal Commission was an indispensable party. It had the jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the Board's decision. It heard the entire permit application de novo which contemplated an entire trial of the controversial matter in the same manner in which the same was originally heard, and the decision therein took the place of and completely nullified the former determination of the matter. Moreover, once the Coastal Commission conducted its de novo examination, there was no longer a decision by the Board to review, so the Board was no longer an adversarial opponent. Additionally, it was the Commission that issued the permit authorizing the real parties to build their inn, and the conditions of that permit were fixed by the Coastal Commission. Further, if the trial court had entered a judgment against the Board, the Coastal Commission would not have been bound by the judgment.

The respondent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued several orders in response to a significant increase in the wholesale price of electricity. The Commission specifically concluded that the electricity market structure and market rules devised by California's restructuring plan were seriously flawed and a significant cause of the unjust and unreasonable short-term rates in California. It adopted a number of retroactive and prospective remedies to address the flaws in the short-term wholesale power rates. The City of San Diego and the California Power Exchange, a nonprofit public utility that operates an auction for trading electricity, filed petitions for writs of mandamus regarding the remedies.

The appellate court denied the petitions. The Commission acted within its scope of authority to address structural flaws affecting market-based rates. The Commission did not violate section 206, subdivision (a) of the Federal Power Act when it terminated the Exchange's wholesale tariff and rate schedules. The Commission had authority to address structural flaws of a market-based rate regime in those circumstances. Moreover, the Commission's prohibition against voluntary sales into the Exchange's markets was not discriminatory or arbitrary. The sales could be made through the Exchange or under any other wholesale rate schedule, and the measure was squarely addressed to the fundamental problem identified by the Commission as distorting the California wholesale electricity rates: over-reliance on the spot market. Additionally, the Commission's breakpoint imposed on real-time imbalance energy markets did not discriminate against the Exchange in favor of other competing near-term markets. The Commission had reason to focus its remedial efforts on the Exchange since there were structural defects in the exchange that contributed to the electricity crises, and no other electricity exchange was found to have contributed to the problem. Further, the Commission did not unreasonably delay in taking action on requests for retroactive refunds from wholesale electricity sellers.