The police arrested Salazar based on allegations that she slammed on her brakes causing another driver's truck to rear end her vehicle. At a criminal hearing Salazar authorized a probable cause stipulation. All criminal charges were later dismissed. Salazar filed civil claims against the police alleging, in part, false imprisonment, defamation, civil rights violations, and negligence. The trial court dismissed all claims and awarded the police attorney's fees.

The appellate court affirmed dismissal of most claims and the award of attorney's fees for the claims properly dismissed. The trial court did not err in considering Salazar's stipulation that there was probable cause for the officer to stop and arrest her. The existence of probable cause defeats her claims of false imprisonment and negligence. An award of attorney's fees is allowed when an action is not filed in good faith and with reasonable cause. In light of the stipulation, there was sufficient evidence of lack of reasonable cause and good faith for Salazar's claims. Therefore, the award of fees was proper. Claims against some officers, as well as fees awarded because of those claims, were reversed on other grounds.

Plaintiff, an attorney, sued two private parties for slander alleging that they told others he was “doing cocaine”, thus injuring him in his profession. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Defendants then sought attorney's fees under section 1021.7. The trial court denied the motion but the appellate court reversed.

The California Supreme Court reversed. The statute is ambiguous, and therefore the legislative intent may be considered in determining its meaning. The statute's history shows that the Legislature intended to adopt a rule that would affect only cases involving police officers. Since none of the parties are police officers the appellate court erred in awarding attorney's fees.

The plaintiff city filed a lien against an apartment building after the defendant property owners failed to pay penalties for violations of numerous building and safety codes. The trial court ordered the lien to be foreclosed, the property sold and confirmed that the was city entitled to its attorney's fees and costs under a city ordinance.

The appellate court affirmed. Recovery of attorney fees is permitted when authorized by contract, statue or law. A city ordinance passed by a municipality is a law and has the same force within city corporate limits as a statute passed by the Legislature throughout the state.

Plaintiff sued the state for violation of the ADA. The District Court granted the state's motion for summary judgment. While the case was on appeal, the Supreme Court held that federal suits for damages against a state for violation of the ADA were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The court dismissed in light of that decision, but awarded costs to the state as a “prevailing party.”

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) may not be awarded where a claim is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In that case, the dismissed party is not a prevailing party. However, dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Appellant filed a cross-complaint against government officials. The trial court awarded costs to the defendants under Government Code section 6103 and dismissed appellant's cross-complaint.

The appellate court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. It affirmed the award of costs but vacated the associated sanctions. Government Code section 6103 states that a public agency need not pay a filing fee. Despite this, section 6103.5 authorizes the recovery of costs for filing fees when judgment is entered in favor of public officials.

Plaintiff sued the Department of Water and Power for personal injuries. The trial court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the suit was unmeritorious and frivolous. While the summary judgment motion was pending, the Department moved under Code of Civil Procedure section 1038. Section 1038 allows public entities to recover the costs, including attorneys fees, of defending against unmeritorious and frivolous lawsuits. The section 1038 motion was heard after summary judgment was granted, but before judgment was entered. A different judge than the one who granted summary judgment heard the motion. He denied the motion, finding that it was untimely because it was not brought at the same time as the summary judgment motion.

The appellate court reversed and remanded. A section 1038 motion for costs must be heard by the same judge who heard the dispositive motion. Further, the motion was timely. Although section 1038 is ambiguous on timing, the court interpreted it to require that a motion for costs be filed at the earliest practical time before entry of the judgment. That does not require that it be filed at the same time as the dispositive motion, or heard at the same time as that motion.

The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection put out a fire originating on defendant's property. CDF sent defendant a bill demanding reimbursement of the costs incurred in suppressing and investigating the fire. Defendant did not pay and CDF sued, alleging that Health and Safety Code section 13009.1 creates liability for the legal costs incurred as a consequence of a fire. The trial court held for defendant, and she moved for attorneys fees. The trial court denied the motion.

The appellate court affirmed. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021, a prevailing party is entitled to attorneys fees only when specifically provided by statute, contract or law. Health and Safety Code section 13009.1 does not mention the recovery of attorneys fees. A statute must actually refer to the award of “costs and attorneys fees.” A court may not alter or add to the language of a statute to create a right to attorneys fees.

The plaintiffs, drinking together in an apartment building, were across the street from a birthday party where many of the guests were off-duty sheriff's deputies. Party guests were confronted outside by the plaintiffs and several other males. A fight occurred and two off-duty deputies and a civilian responded. Conflicting stories existed as to whether the off-duty deputies used excessive force in diffusing the fight. Two on-duty sheriff's deputies responded to emergency calls as the fight was ending. The plaintiffs sued the off-duty sheriff's deputies and their civilian friend for brutally attacking them. One plaintiff recovered $4,380; the other $1,338. The court denied the plaintiff's request for nearly $250,000 in attorney fees, but awarded almost $240,000 for defendant's attorney fees, because the plaintiff's civil rights causes of action were frivolous and without merit.

The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to the defendants. Prevailing civil rights defendants can recover attorney fees only where the court also finds that the civil rights claim was frivolous, unreasonable or groundless. Here, the plaintiffs sustained real injuries as a result of the fight. But given the plaintiff's de minimus recovery, the trial court properly determined that a reasonable fee award for the plaintiffs was zero.

See further discussion under section 7.6, "Police -- Civil Rights."

A court may award attorney fees to a prevailing defendant under the federal Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. section 1365, only if it finds that the plaintiff's claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.