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"1999 - 2004 IN REVIEW"
California and Federal Cases Reported Since January 1, 1999

14. PUBLIC ENTITY VENUE

A construction contract between the petitioner builders (which had its place of business in Marin County) and Contra Costa County provided that any action arising out of the contract would be brought in Contra Costa County. It expressly waived the builder's right under Code of Civil Procedure section 394 to remove the action to a neutral county. The County sued the builders in a Contra Costa court for breach of contract. The builders timely petitioned to move the action to a neutral county. The trial court ruled the builders had waived their right to do so, and denied the petition.

The appellate court issued a writ directing the trial court to grant the petition. Section 394 permits a party sued by a county to remove the case to a neutral county. A contract's venue-selection clause cannot contravene that right. Although a party can involuntarily waive removal by delay, parties cannot voluntarily waive it by contract.

Arntz Builders v. Superior Court (County of Contra Costa) (1st Dist., Div. 3, September 30, 2004) __Cal.App.4th__, 2004 Daily Journal DAR __, 2004 WL ______.

The plaintiff sustained injuries while using a machine in a Ventura County High School manual training class. He brought suit in Los Angeles County against the Ventura Unified School District and a Los Angeles County Medical Center where he was treated. The medical center settled with the plaintiff, removing the only Los Angeles defendant from the suit. Defendant Ventura Unified School District moved for change of venue and the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the motion. The School District appealed.

The appellate court reversed. The mandatory provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 394 entitle the District to have the case tried in Ventura County where it is located and where the accident occurred.

Ventura Unified School District v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Lopez) (2nd Dist., Div. 3, October 1, 2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 811 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 260].

Two years after plaintiff residents of defendant City sued the City, the City filed a cross-complaint against a consulting company (the "cross-defendant"), alleging causes of action for indemnification, apportionment of fault, and declaratory relief. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 394(a), the cross-defendant brought a motion to transfer venue from the forum county, in which the City was situated, to a neutral county. (Section 394(a) provides that in an action by a plaintiff city against a defendant corporation, the corporation may bring a motion to transfer venue to a neutral county.) The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that Section 394(a) did not apply to cross-complaints and, even if it did, the cross-defendant could not obtain a transfer because it was doing business in the forum county. The cross-defendant petitioned for a writ of mandate.

Finding that Section 394(a) applied to cross-complaints, and that the cross-defendant was not "doing business" in the forum county under the applicable standard, this court granted the petition and ordered the trial court to enter a new order granting the motion, but left the trial court to decide whether to transfer only the cross-complaint or the entire action to a neutral county.

Kennedy/Jenks Consultants, Inc. v. Superior Court (City of Richmond) (1st Dist., Div. 5, May 16, 2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 948 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 817].

Here the trial court abused its discretion by denying Orange County's motion to transfer venue to Orange County, where part of the real party in interest's injuries occurred.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 394, plaintiffs seeking redress from a municipality for injuries occurring within the municipality caused by the municipality's negligence may bring an action only in that county. Even if only part of a plaintiff's injuries occur in the county whose negligence caused her injury, plaintiff must bring her action in that county unless the trial court exercises its discretion to change venue upon a proper showing under section 397. Here, the real party in interest did not rely on section 397. Thus, the trial court had no discretion to hold the trial outside of Orange County.

County of Orange v. Superior Court for the County of San Francisco (1st Dist., Div. 3, July 30, 1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1189 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 923].