In 1998, plaintiff sued the county for injuries sustained in an auto accident with a county sheriff's deputy. Absent tolling, the five-year statute required the case to be tried by May 2003. In February 2003, the court ordered the case into mediation, with a completion date of April 2003. In April 2003, the case was unsuccessfully mediated, and the mediator filed a notice of non-agreement. In May 2003, the county moved to dismiss the case under the five-year statute; and in July 2003 the trial court did so, ruling that the mediation tolled the deadline two months so that the deadline expired in July 2003.

Reversed. The trial court misinterpreted the five-year statute. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1775.7, since the case was ordered into mediation four years and six months after filing, the mediation order tolled the five-year deadline; and April 2003 became the new four-year-and-six-month date. The deadline to try the case was therefore six months later: October 2003.

Plaintiffs sued the city, alleging that its failure to properly maintain and repair a sewer line resulted in damage to their home. The plaintiff's principal attorney began work on the case. She then accepted a job at the city attorney's office. The plaintiffs moved to disqualify the city attorney's office based on the attorney's conflict of interest. The trial court concluded that disqualification of the entire office was required by the vicarious disqualification rule.

The appellate court reversed. An attorney who switches sides during litigation is disqualified from representing his or her former adversary. The disqualification extends to the attorney's entire law firm. A city attorney's office is not a “law firm” within the meaning of the vicarious disqualification rule. Disqualification of a non-supervisorial deputy city attorney should not result in the vicarious disqualification of the entire office. Here, the creation of an “ethical wall” to prevent access to information is sufficient to protect both the confidentiality of attorney-client communications, and the integrity of the judicial process. Therefore, disqualification of the entire office was not required.

The plaintiff suffered a brain injury following open-heart surgery at a county hospital. A complaint alleging medical malpractice by county doctors was filed against the county. The county's attorney requested and was granted two continuances due to scheduling conflicts. A request for a third continuance was denied, with the court granting only six days for defense counsel to seek an emergency writ from the Court of Appeal. Before the appellate court ruled on the emergency writ, the trial court began the trial without defense counsel. The trial court directed a verdict for plaintiff for $12.5 million dollars.

The appellate court reversed. The court must look beyond the limited facts which cause a litigant to request a last minute continuance and consider the degree of diligence in his or her efforts to bring the case to trial. Here, it is undisputed that the defendant's attorney requested a continuance in good faith. He was unexpectedly engaged in trial in another courtroom. Furthermore, he had invested over 250 hours preparing for a complicated medical malpractice case in which the parties intended to present the testimony of 43 witnesses, 18 of whom were designated experts. Therefore, contrary to the judge's finding, the county presented good cause for a continuance.

Herrera was elected City Attorney and resigned from private practice to assume the position. He had previously served as counsel to a company in a dispute with the city's department of building inspections. After the election, the same company was joined as a defendant in a lawsuit alleging unlawful payments or “kickbacks” to the head of the city's department of building inspections. The company moved to disqualify Herrera and the entire City Attorney's Office alleging a conflict of interest. The trial court granted the motion.

The appellate court affirmed. When a client has disclosed confidences to an attorney who later becomes its litigation opponent, vicarious disqualification is required to assure the preservation of the client's confidences. Here, Herrera had personally represented the company and had obtained confidential information from the company. Furthermore, the prior representation was substantially related to the current lawsuit. The court held that where an attorney leaves private practice to become the head of a public law office, vicarious disqualification of the entire public law office is generally required in matters substantially related to the attorney's earlier representations.

Plaintiff sued the county and a co-worker for sexual harassment. The county denied the co-worker any defense, claiming that his actions were outside the scope of his employment. Plaintiff dismissed the county and entered a stipulated judgment with the co-worker. The co-worker assigned his right to the plaintiff to pursue indemnification from the county. Plaintiff then sued the county seeking indemnification. The county's demurrer was sustained without leave to amend.

The appellate court reversed. Government Code § 825.2 allows a public employee plaintiff to seek indemnification from her employer -- even where the employer has refused a defense on the ground that plaintiff's accused was not acting within the scope of his employment.

Plaintiff underwent posterior spinal fusion surgery. He had to lay face-down during the procedure. After surgery, his vision was severely impaired. He sued the hospital and the county for medical malpractice under the theory of res ipsa loquitur. He presented no expert witnesses. The trial court granted the county's motion for nonsuit.

The appellate court affirmed. To recover in res ipsa loquitur, negligence either must be within a layperson's common knowledge, or the malpractice must be proven by expert testimony. Moreover, the county's expert testified that vision impairment could occur without negligence.

Plaintiff was a building contractor on a site outside the city. One of plaintiff's employees convinced an officer and a building inspector in the city to harass plaintiff. The officer and the building inspector visited the site and identified themselves as building inspectors. One of them poked plaintiff in the chest and told him that he did not have the appropriate building permits. In reality, the permits were not needed. As a result of the visit, construction was delayed for three days. Plaintiff sued the city in tort. A trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the city.

The appellate court affirmed. A city is not vicariously liable if its employees identify themselves as city employees outside the city limit to harass someone for personal reasons. The employees were not acting within the scope of their employment. It is immaterial that the parties actually were employed by the city.

A municipal agency and a private landowner engaged in a redevelopment project to build a luxury hotel. The project was regulated by a regional planning agency. The private landowner filed for bankruptcy, owing money to the general contractor and the lender. The general contractor asserted that its lien trumped the lender's deed. The bankruptcy court found the general contractor's lien untimely. The general contractor alleged that the project was subject to acceptance by a public entity and thus the construction's completion should be deemed the date of acceptance.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's holding. The general contractor's work was not subject to public acceptance. Therefore, its lien was untimely. A luxury hotel is not the sort of improvement traditionally associated with public dedication. Public support of the hotel is not assumption of a public interest. Approval of a private work constitutes public acceptance only if it results in assumption of some public interest in a civic improvement. Mere approval by a public official is not enough.

Appellant was convicted for aiding and abetting a former city and county councilman in fraud and conversion of public property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666. That section criminalizes misappropriation of government property or funds. Appellant challenged the facial constitutionality of § 666.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. It held that § 666 is facially constitutional. The District Court did not err in determining that the finding of a federal nexus for valid application of § 666 is a question of law for the court. It is not an element of the offense that must be submitted to the jury.

A city clerk refused to certify an initiative petition for a zoning change after deciding based on extrinsic evidence that it was circulated in violation of state law. Citizens' group sued to compel the city clerk to certify the petition. They alleged that the city clerk's fact finding exceeded the scope of her duties. The trial court granted the writ.

The appellate court affirmed. If an initiative petition complies with the statutory requirement that title and summary appear on each page, a city clerk lacks authority to engage in discretionary fact finding. Her role in certifying an initiative petition is confined to the ministerial task of examining the four corners of the petition for compliance with submission requirements.

A Riverside County Sheriff sexually abused his two children for years. When his daughter was fourteen, he got her high and had her strip for a dozen uniformed police officers in a motel room. One of the officers raped her on three different occasions, as he was friends with her father. The daughter sued the Department for vicarious liability after her father was convicted. She alleged that her father abused his official authority as Sheriff. The trial court granted the County's nonsuit motion.

The appellate court affirmed. A Sheriff is not acting within the scope of his employment when he sexually abuses his daughter in front of uniformed officers and allows another officer to rape her. The relationship between the Sheriff and his daughter is one of ongoing abuse outside of the scope of his work. The fact that he controlled the young girl with the threat of force as an officer is not a sufficient nexus for construing a family matter as job-related and holding the employer liable.

Appellant Employees Retirement Association orally offered to settle a restitution claim with the city if the city would suspend litigation until the offer was decided on. An option contract was necessary if the city was to gain approval of the settlement offer from fourteen governmental bodies. The city was awarded $950,000. The trial court denied the Association's motion to amend.

The appellate court affirmed. Under some circumstances, a city may bind another party in oral contract if it would be beneficial to the city, even if a city ordinance requires the city's contracts be in writing. The oral option contract was within the city's power because it received the benefits of a litigation standstill. Because of this, the Association is estopped from asserting its invalidity.

The police department operated a police explorer program for young men and women between the ages of fourteen and eighteen to encourage them to consider a career in law enforcement. Three minors in the program had consensual sexual encounters with one of the supervising officers. The minors sued the city for negligent hiring and training, claiming that the city was vicariously liable for the officer's misconduct. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants.

The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. There was a special relationship between defendants, as sponsors of the shadowing program, and the plaintiffs. Defendants thus owed plaintiffs a duty of care to protect them from foreseeable harm based on the special relationship doctrine. The department can be vicariously liable for negligent hiring or training of the officer only if they knew or should have known that the officer posed a risk. Moreover, the department cannot be held vicariously liable for the officer's abuse because the officer was not acting in the scope of his authority over the plaintiffs.

A grand jury returned an indictment against defendant city attorney. They found that defendant had a financial interest in contracts he made in his official capacity. The trial court dismissed the indictment on the grounds of grand jury confusion.

The appellate court affirmed. The defense attorney failed to instruct the jury on the standard of “wilfully and knowingly.” In doing so, he violated the accused's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. He also failed to transcribe and produce opening and closing remarks. Given the nature of the errors, it is likely that the grand jury indicted the defendant on something less than probable cause.

Decedent was a crane operator employed by a general contractor hired by the California Department of Transportation. He forgot to reextend the outriggers, causing the crane to tip over. He was thrown to the pavement and killed. Decedent's wife sued Caltrans on the theory that it had negligently exercised control it had retained over safety conditions at the jobsite. Caltrans moved for summary judgment, claiming that the suit was barred by Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, 955 P.2d. 504] and Toland v. Sunland Housing Group (1998) 18 Cal.4th 253 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d 721]. The trial court granted the motion, but the Court of Appeal reversed.

The California Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The hirer of an independent contractor is liable to an employee of the contractor insofar as a hirer's exercise of retained control affirmatively contributed to the employee's injuries. The hirer is not liable to an employee of the contractor merely because the hirer retained control over safety conditions at a worksite. Plaintiff failed to raise triable issues of material fact as to whether defendant actually exercised the retained control so as to affirmatively contribute to the death of her husband. Privette and Toland recognized that it would be unfair to impose tort liability on the hirer of the contractor merely because the hirer retained the ability to exercise control over worksite safety.

The City and several of its employees were sued in tort. The City retained the Petersen Law Firm to jointly represent the City and its employees. The employees wanted their own defense counsel and wanted the City to pay for it. The City refused and sued for declaratory relief. The trial court held in favor of the City.

The appellate court affirmed. Where the City and its employees are sued but have potential or actual conflicts of interest, the public entity need not supply the employees with defense counsel. Because the current suit was filed by the City against its employees, there was a potential conflict of interest. Where there is an actual conflict of interest between the City and its employees, the City can refuse to provide any defense at all.

Medical Doctor Chambi sued his employer, Regents of the University of California. He alleged that Regents settled a medical malpractice action against him without his consent, in violation of Business and Professions Code section 801. The trial court held that the Regents were not insurers under the Code and thus were not obligated to get Dr. Chambi's consent.

The appellate court affirmed. Regents, a self-insured government entity, is not an insurer. Their agreement to indemnify employees for claims arising in the course and scope of their employment is not insurance. Thus, they are not bound by Business and Professions Code section 801. They had no duty to obtain the insured's consent before settling an action against him.

McLachlan, a NASA employee, sued a co-worker and two of his supervisors for defamation. The United States Attorney certified that the three defendants were acting within the scope of their employment and removed the case to federal district court, requiring that the United States be substituted as the sole defendant. The district court denied McLachlan's motion to remand the case to state court.

The appellate court affirmed. Certification was proper since the conduct of all three defendants was within the scope of their employment. Even assuming that the defendants acted entirely out of malice, the conduct took place at work, in ways relating to work, on issues arising out of the work all of them did for NASA.

Although this case involved federal law, it may be persuasive authority in the analogous state-law area of scope of public employment under Government Code section 815.2.

A bus driver for the Santa Clara Valley Transportation Agency called the sheriff's department and Agency agents because the appellant was on the bus without proper identification. The appellant was arrested in response to the driver's allegedly false criminal report for battery. The district court dismissed all claims.

The appellate court reversed in part. If the driver, acting on behalf of the government, reported the battery to maliciously cause the appellant to be arrested, he is liable under the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, if the officers did not independently investigate the battery claim, probable cause to arrest was lacking. Moreover, if the driver summoned the police, with a false statement, so as to confine the appellant, the driver is liable for a state law claim of false imprisonment. Further, since the driver acted in the course of his employment, the Agency may also be liable under a theory of respondent superior.

The plaintiffs' daughter was injured when the car she was riding in struck the back of a negligently parked Los Angeles City trash truck. She then died when the helicopter carrying her crashed en route to the hospital. Relying on the rule that an original tortfeasor is liable for injuries or death occurring during the course of medical treatment of the injuries suffered, the Court held that an original tortfeasor is also liable for injuries or death suffered while transporting the victim to a medical facility for treatment of the injuries resulting from the accident. This rule holds true even if the intervening act of the third person was done in a negligent manner, so long as the act was a normal response to the situation created by the defendant's conduct and was not performed in an "extraordinarily" negligent manner.

If a public entity determines that conduct alleged against an employee was outside the scope of that employee's employment, Government Code section 995.2(a)(1) permits the public entity to refuse to provide that employee a defense against suit. Here, Regents refused to provide for the defense of a past employee who was sued for allegedly stealing human eggs and embryos while working as a fertility specialist on the University of California, Irvine campus. Concluding that the conduct alleged was outside the scope of the past employee's employment, the court held that the Regents did not abuse their discretion in refusing to provide a defense.

A city was not liable under respondent superior for the actions of an unpaid volunteer because the volunteer was neither an employee nor a servant of the city. Labor Code section 3352(i), which excludes volunteers from the definition of employee for workers' compensation purposes, explains that the legislature did not intend for public entities to be liable for the actions of unpaid volunteers.