The plaintiff's attorney hired an expert witness on the subject of windshields in preparation for a personal injury case. A year earlier, counsel for two defendants hired the same expert as a consultant on the same subject matter. The discrepancy was discovered when the plaintiff's attorney disclosed a list of the expert witnesses. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel and denied a motion for reconsideration.

The appellate court reversed. Once the plaintiff's firm discovered that it had inadvertently retained the same expert, it was duty bound to refrain from talking directly with that expert until the court resolved the problem. Here, the firm acted accordingly. There is no evidence that the plaintiff's firm received any privileged information from the expert. Nor is there any evidence that the firm acted intentionally because the expert never disclosed his dual retention. Instead, the firm acted with high ethical standards by discontinuing any further contact after the problem of dual retention was disclosed. Therefore, recusal of the firm was an abuse of the court's discretion.

The plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against a city and county based on roadway design. The plaintiff's attorney was served with a design immunity motion for summary judgment on the day he was admitted to the hospital for emergency surgery. He was not aware of the motion until he was released from the hospital and thus only had two days to respond. Although medically incapacitated, the attorney managed to file a perfunctory opposition and a request for a continuance. The trial court denied the continuance under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c and granted defendant's request for summary judgment.

The appellate court reversed. When a continuance is not mandatory due to a failure to meet the requirements of section 437c, the court must determine if the party requesting the continuance has nonetheless established good cause therefor. Here, the dire medical condition of the attorney constituted a plain and good cause for a continuance. Just because the evidence should have been on hand does not mean that the attorney, in his postoperative condition, had the physical ability to use the evidence to prepare and file a thorough document with the court. Therefore, the court abused its discretion in denying the request for a continuance.

An eleven year old child fell and injured herself while riding a scooter on a public sidewalk. She sued the county, alleging that the sidewalk was negligently maintained because there was a break that was raised over three inches above the adjoining sidewalk section. The trial court held that the county was not liable under the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk.

The appellate court reversed. An activity falls within the doctrine if it is done for enjoyment or thrill, requires physical exertion as well as elements of skill, and involves a challenge containing a potential risk of injury. The county failed to allege sufficient facts to meet this criteria. The mere possibility that any person who rides a scooter might be injured by the negligence of another is insufficient to invoke the doctrine.

The trial court found that defendant, State Dept. of Transportation, acted in bad faith when it submitted misleading data supporting its motion to dismiss a personal injury claim. The court awarded the plaintiff $28,725.00 in sanctions representing attorney's fees under Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c. The defendant appealed.

The appellate court reversed. Section 437c allows for recovery of “reasonable expenses” if the court determines that affidavits were presented in bad faith. It does not specifically reference attorney's fees. Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 defers resolution of attorney's fees to the parties unless specifically allowed for by statute. The court held that the legislative intent of Section 437c was to exclude recovery of attorney's fees.

The trial court found that defendant, State Dept. of Transportation, acted in bad faith when it submitted misleading data supporting its motion to dismiss a personal injury claim. The court awarded the plaintiff $28,725.00 in sanctions representing attorney's fees under Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c. The defendant appealed.

The appellate court reversed. Section 437c allows for recovery of “reasonable expenses” if the court determines that affidavits were presented in bad faith. It does not specifically reference attorney's fees. Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 defers resolution of attorney's fees to the parties unless specifically allowed for by statute. The court held that the legislative intent of Section 437c was to exclude recovery of attorney's fees.

Plaintiffs and Appellants filed a lawsuit against the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) after one party was killed and others injured in an automobile accident. Plaintiffs contend that lack of a guardrail at the accident location constituted a dangerous condition. The trial court granted Caltrans's motion for summary judgment, finding the action was barred by statutory design immunity as a matter of law.

The appellate court reversed and remanded. Plaintiffs presented conflicting evidence challenging discretionary approval of the design before construction, a necessary element of the defense. The court held that this patently factual question cannot be decided on summary judgment.

Plaintiff was crossing the street in a crosswalk when a car hit and injured her. She alleged the city failed to remedy a known dangerous condition. She claimed the city should have installed traffic safety devices in the heavy pedestrian area. The trial court sustained the city's demurrers.

The appellate court affirmed. Under Government Code § 830.4, a city cannot be liable solely for not installing traffic safety devices. This is true even if the street was expanded, causing more and faster traffic. Plaintiff must allege that the expanded street created a substantial risk of injury to pedestrians. Moreover, the fact pedestrian traffic has increased does not necessarily create a dangerous condition. Plaintiff must allege that the increased pedestrian traffic made it unsafe to cross the street.

A drunk driver cut across an Interstate median and collided with plaintiffs' BMW, killing their 5-year-old child. They sued the California Department of Transportation for wrongful death. Defendant asserted the affirmative defense of design immunity. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.

The appellate court affirmed. To raise a triable issue of loss of design immunity, plaintiffs had to -- and failed to -- produce evidence that the median's design had become dangerous due to a change in physical condition, and that defendant knew this and had time to remedy it. General evidence of increased traffic volume, increased cross-median accidents and changes in median standards cannot raise a factual issue about design immunity loss.

A McDonald's was put into a Wal-Mart. Shoppers regularly carry food into the Wal-Mart portion of the store. A safety sweep of the store is made every one and one-half hours. Plaintiff slipped on a french fry and severely injured her knee. In a negligence action based on premises liability, a jury held Wal-Mart liable.

The appellate court reversed. The jury should have been instructed on the law that states a premises owner must have actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition of its property to be held liable. Because the jury was not instructed on the law, the error was prejudicial. Although the parties to this action were private, the decision may also apply to dangerous condition suits against public entities.

Plaintiff public school student was struck by a vehicle as she crossed the street at a crosswalk. The crosswalk was located at an open gate at her school. The crosswalk was marked, but there was no signal. She sued the school district, arguing that the district did not warn of the dangerous condition or take reasonable precautions to protect students. The trial court held the district liable.

The appellate court affirmed. A school district is liable for creating a dangerous condition under Government Code § 830(a) where it keeps a gate open at a dangerous crosswalk. Although the district does not have control over the crosswalk, it retains control over the gate. Keeping the gate open encouraged students to use the dangerous crosswalk.

Pedestrian was struck by a car while crossing the street to reach a bus stop. She sued the Transit Authority for negligence. The Superior Court entered judgment in plaintiff's favor. The appellate court affirmed.

The California Supreme Court affirmed. The location of a bus stop may constitute a “dangerous condition” of public property within the meaning of the tort claims statute if, to reach the stop, bus patrons must cross a busy thoroughfare at an uncontrolled intersection. A piece of public property that itself has no defect may be dangerous because of adjoining property. The Court declined to decide whether the crosswalk leading to the bus stop was itself a dangerous condition of public property.

Plaintiff fell from a bridge owned and maintained by defendant county. The fall rendered him a quadriplegic. Plaintiff sued the county for negligence. The trial court held for the plaintiff. It found his total damages were $7.5 million. However, it found him 80% negligent because he was intoxicated at the time of the fall. It awarded him $900,000 after costs and attorney fees. The court decided not to enforce a Medi-Cal lien held by the Department of Health Services against plaintiff's recovery. The Department of Health Services appealed.

The appellate court affirmed. Injured Medi-Cal beneficiaries who have recovered from a third party, including public entities, are required to reimburse Medi-Cal. However, the collateral source rule of Government Code section 985(g) gives trial courts discretion to order no reimbursement of a Medi-Cal lien if it would result in undue hardship upon the injured person.

The city hired defendant contractor to construct roads. Plaintiff motorcyclist was injured when he fell where a public street was not leveled. He sued the city, the contractor and the sub-contractor. A jury found that the property was a dangerous condition of public property but that the city was not on notice of the condition. It held the contractor liable in negligence. The appellate court held that Civil Code section 3333.4 does not apply in an action for premises liability against a private entity.

The California Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Civil Code section 3333.4 bars an uninsured motorist from recovering noneconomic losses against a private company that maintained control over a dangerous condition of public property. The statute does not differentiate between public and private defendants. Moreover, it does not distinguish dangerous conditions on private property from dangerous conditions on public property.

The city failed to install curb ramps on public sidewalks and did not maintain existing sidewalks so as to ensure accessability by persons with disabilities. Plaintiff class of disabled persons sued the city alleging violation of the ADA. The district court granted the city's motion for partial summary judgment.

The appellate court reversed and remanded. The ADA covers any service, program or activity of a public entity -- including maintenance of public sidewalks. The ADA regulates the accessibility of new construction and alterations performed by a city; such projects must be made accessible for use by disabled persons.

Plaintiffs' father shot and killed their mother when both appeared for a hearing at the downtown Los Angeles courthouse. Plaintiffs sued the county (which operated the courthouse) and its sheriff's department (which provided security there) for negligence, dangerous condition of public property, and violation of plaintiffs' due process rights. The trial court sustained the county's demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed it. The appellate court reversed, holding that plaintiffs could state causes of action against the county and the sheriff's department in negligence and due process.

The Supreme Court reversed. Plaintiffs failed to allege facts stating a cause of action against the county for either vicarious or direct liability. As a general rule, public entities are not liable for failing to protect private individuals against crime. Plaintiffs failed to plead a cause of action for vicarious liability because they did not allege facts establishing that any County employee voluntarily undertook special duties to protect the decedent or control the assailant's conduct on the date of the attack, or did anything on that date to induce decedent in particular to rely on a promise of special protection. Nor do they allege facts showing any employee engaged in an affirmative act that increased the risk to decedent. Further, the sheriff's department could not owe plaintiffs a duty; a public employee's acts cannot place the entire law enforcement agency that employs him in a special relationship with either the plaintiff or the public generally.

Nor could the county be held directly liable for negligence. Civil Code section 1714 -- which controls private landowners' liability for negligence -- cannot be applied to extend a public entity's liability for property conditions beyond the usual reach of the more-limited Government Code section 835. Under section 835, the public entity cannot be held liable for third party criminal acts on its property unless a defect in the property is causally connected to the particular act that injured the plaintiff. Plaintiffs identified none. Further, because the only security precautions that might have prevented the attack involved deployment of security forces, Government Code section 845's immunity for providing police protection applied. Finally, public entities generally cannot be held liable under due process for failing to protect individuals from private crime. The facts plaintiffs alleged did not fall into any exception to that rule.

This is a watershed decision that settles many long-disputed issues concerning liability for third-party crime on public property.

Decedent minor was the passenger in an uninsured auto owned by her parents. Following an auto accident, a helicopter owned by the city picked up the passenger to take her to the hospital. On the way, the helicopter crashed and the passenger died. Her parents sued the city for wrongful death. The city claimed that California Civil Code section 3333.4 precluded their recovery of noneconomic damages because they were uninsured. The trial court held for the city.

The appellate court reversed. Section 333.4 does not preclude recovery of noneconomic damages for claims unrelated to the city's roads and highways. Plaintiff's status as uninsured motorists bars their recovery from the city of noneconomic damages arising out of the automobile collision. The city, as owner and operator of the helicopter, is not entitled to the benefit of section 3333.4 because plaintiff's helicopter-related theories are that the city negligently inspected and serviced the helicopter. None of these arguments are property-related theories of liability related to the city's roads and highways.

Plaintiff slipped and fell on spilled milk while shopping at a Kmart store. There was no evidence that Kmart had notice of the spill and the plaintiff was unable to establish how long the milk had been there. The trial court held in favor of the plaintiff, and the appellate court affirmed.

The Supreme Court affirmed. A plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence to prove a dangerous condition existed for an unreasonable period of time. Evidence of a store's failure to inspect the premises within a reasonable time is sufficient to infer that the danger existed long enough for the store to discover and remedy it.

Although this case involves a private defendant, its holding may apply to determining constructive notice of a dangerous condition of public property under Government Code sections 835(b) and 835.2(b).

The plaintiff, a two-year-old girl, was being supervised by her 12-year-old sister and great aunt while she played at a City of San Diego beach park. After those present heard screams, the plaintiff was seen leaving a nearby fire ring. The plaintiff sued the City after burning her feet on hot coals in the fire ring. The trial court granted the City summary judgment on the ground that the fire ring was not a dangerous condition. The plaintiff appealed.

The appellate court affirmed. The fire rings are not dangerous conditions since they pose only a minor, insignificant, or trivial risk of injury when used with due care. Moreover, to find that the fire rings pose a substantial risk of injury simply because it is foreseeable that small children who are moderately supervised may become injured, would be tantamount to an imposition of strict liability on public entities. The trial court properly looked at the circumstances as a whole, including the supervision of the plaintiff by her family. Further, the plaintiff's contentions of liability under Government Code section 835, subsections (a) and (b), for negligent creation of a dangerous condition and notice of the dangerous condition, were also baseless.

An abandoned City hospital sat on the edge of the property plaintiffs leased. Their daughter entered the old hospital, and caught the Hantavirus, which is spread by contact with infected mice droppings. She died. Plaintiffs sued the City for maintaining a dangerous condition of public property. The trial court sustained the City's demurrer based on Government Code section 855.4, which immunizes public entities and employees for discretionary decisions on whether to perform acts to prevent or control disease.

The appellate court affirmed. Although section 855.4 is not in the section of the Government Code that prescribes liability and immunities for dangerous public property conditions (sections 830 to 840.6), any immunity within the Tort Claim Act section on entity and employee liability (sections 814 through 895.8) applies to dangerous condition liability, unless the sections themselves clearly say otherwise. The disease-control immunity therefore applies, protecting public entities for failing to control disease-carrying vermin.

Plaintiff tripped in a large pothole on a city street, and fell. A hospital that treated her billed $17,168 for her care. But plaintiff's insurer had a contract with the hospital that provided for reduced rates, and under the contract the insurer only paid the hospital $3,600. At trial, the plaintiff's attorney elicited testimony from city employees whether the condition of the pothole was such that it would have been noticed by an employee, or warranted repair. At his request, the court instructed the jury that the employees were agents of the city. The jury found for plaintiff. It awarded her $99,064, including $17,168 for the hospital's treatment.

The appellate court affirmed, but modified the judgment to reduce the damages awarded. The evidence and agency instruction did not mislead the jury into finding the city liable for common law negligence. The evidence was relevant to notice of the pothole, a crucial element to dangerous condition liability under Government Code section 830. But plaintiff was not entitled to any more than $3,600 for the hospital's treatment. A plaintiff cannot recover more for pecuniary damages than either the plaintiff or a "collateral source" such as the insurer paid. The hospital could not assert a lien for the balance against plaintiff, so that is not a valid reason to increase the damages.

The Cornettes were injured in a cross-median auto accident on the Antelope Valley freeway. They sued Caltrans for failing to install a median barrier. Caltrans asserted Government Code 830.6's design immunity as a defense. The parties stipulated that the elements of design immunity were satisfied in 1964, when the median was built: The median design (including the lack of a barrier) caused the accident; a state official exercised his discretion in approving that design; and at the time, omitting a barrier was reasonable. But between 1964 and the 1992 accident, traffic and the accident rate had increased. In 1990, Caltrans decided to install a median on a stretch of the highway that included the accident site; in 1991, the Caltrans district office recommended that the barrier installation be made a high priority. Nevertheless, the barrier was not built until after the accident. The Cornettes contended that because of the changed conditions, Caltrans had lost design immunity. The evidence on when Caltrans had notice that the absence of a barrier was no longer reasonable -- and whether they acted with reasonable speed in changing the design -- was in dispute. The trial was bifurcated, with the design immunity issue tried first. The trial court denied the Cornettes' request for a jury. The court determined that it -- not a jury -- should resolve the factual dispute on whether design immunity had been lost. It found for Caltrans. The appellate court reversed, ruling that a jury should have resolved the factual issues.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court. Under Baldwin v. State of California (1972) 6 Cal.3d 424, 427 [99 Cal.Rptr. 145, 491 P.2d 1121] and the 1979 amendment to section 830.6, a plaintiff must establish three elements to prove loss of design immunity: (1) the plan or design has become dangerous because of a change in physical conditions; (2) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition thus created; and (3) the public entity had a reasonable time to obtain the funds and carry out the necessary remedial work to bring the property back into conformity with a reasonable design or plan; or the public entity, unable to remedy the condition due to practical impossibility or lack of funds, had not reasonably attempted to provide adequate warnings. Because the Legislature specified in section 830.6 that the "reasonable approval" element of design immunity must be tried by the court, but declined to so specify for the of loss-of-immunity elements, the Legislature did not intend that issues concerning loss of immunity should be reserved for court resolution. The court declined to supply the language the Legislature omitted. Baldwin implies that a jury should resolve the loss-of-immunity elements. The several lower appellate court decisions holding that all design immunity decisions are for the court, not the jury, are unpersuasive. The Court rejected the argument that the public entity's decision whether the design remains reasonable is a second design decision that -- like the initial design approval -- must be analyzed by the court for reasonableness, to prevent jury second-guessing of the entity's discretion. Section 830.6 does not allude to any such finding. It merely provides that if the entity receives notice that the design has become dangerous, the immunity continues for as long as necessary to permit the entity to either remedy or warn of the design's inadequacy.

A tourist driving a motor home on Highway 395 stopped to consult maps. A motor home behind him braked quickly to avoid hitting him. A tractor-trailer rig following the second motor home also braked and jackknifed into oncoming traffic. Decedent collided head on with the tractor-trailer. Decedent's survivors sued defendant Caltrans. The trial court found, among other things, that a generally applicable speed limit does not put a state highway in a dangerous condition. Therefore defendant was shielded from claims based on the impropriety of the posted speed limit (55 miles per hour) by the doctrine of design immunity. The trial court agreed, entering a judgment of nonsuit.

The appellate court affirmed. Design immunity prevents a jury from reweighing the same factors considered by the governmental entity that approved the design. The state can invoke it when it proves three elements: (1) the design caused the accident, (2) the design had discretionary approval before construction, and (3) the design was reasonable. The elements are questions of law for the court to decide. Here, plaintiffs themselves alleged the speed limit caused the accident. The speed limit had discretionary approval because, even though it did not predate the construction of the highway, it was integral to its functionality. The speed limit was reasonable because it was based on a speed study. In some situations where the government has notice that a speed limit governing a bridge or curve has created a dangerous condition because of changed circumstances, design immunity might no longer apply. But here, there was no proof of changed circumstances.

A northbound driver veered over the center median of a highway and crashed into plaintiff's southbound vehicle. The impact injured plaintiff and killed his wife and two children. He sued the State, claiming the lack of a center median barrier constituted a dangerous condition of public property. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State on the grounds of design immunity.

The appellate court affirmed. Design immunity applied. An improvement must conform to an approved plan in order to trigger design immunity. The highway conformed to such a plan. Although the 45 foot 5 inch median missed specifications by 7 inches, the shortcoming was immaterial. Absence of a median barrier, not median width, caused the accident. The median indisputably met state warrants without a barrier. At the time of installation, Traffic Manual section 7-02.3 did not require barriers on medians wider than 45 feet. No changed circumstances mandated installation of a barrier. Although traffic doubled, the increase remained within acceptable volume/width warrants. Accident rates remained within accident warrants. The speed limit increased, but speed is not a criteria for the warrants. No conclusive evidence suggests that higher speed limits lead to higher cross-median accident rates.

The appellant was struck by a car while driving his motorcycle through an intersection. In addition to suing the driver, the appellant sued the County of San Bernardino and the City of Fontana under theories of nuisance and dangerous condition of public property. When the County and City learned that, at the time of the accident, the appellant did not have liability insurance on his motorcycle as required by state law, they moved to exclude from trial any evidence of damages for pain and suffering. The trial court granted the motion, finding the appellant's action subject to California Civil Code section 3333.4 (Proposition 213). The appellate court affirmed.

The Supreme Court affirmed. The appellant was statutorily barred from recovering noneconomic damages against the County and City. Both section 3333.4's language and its intended purpose supports a construction that precludes uninsured drivers from recovering noneconomic damages in actions against local public entities for nuisance and dangerous condition of property. The appellant was the owner of an uninsured motorcycle, and his action against the public entities sought to recover damages arising out of the operation of that motor vehicle. Further, section 3333.4 contains no exception for suits against public entities.

Plaintiff contended that she was injured while walking across a public boat ramp when the ramp gave way and caused her to fall. She sued the City, alleging that the City neglected its duty to maintain the ramp in a safe condition. The ramp connected a parking lot to a dock. The City asserted that the ramp was a "trail," and therefore was entitled to immunity under Government Code section 831.4(a) and (b). The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings for the City and the plaintiff appealed. The appellate court reversed. It interpreted section 831.4(a) and (b) to provide public entities immunity from liability caused by the condition of a "trail" when it is used for recreational activities, or to provide access to recreational areas. It held that in this case, extending the definition of "trail" to include a ramp that was used to connect a parking lot to a boat dock went beyond the legislative intent to provide incentives to public entities to keep recreational "trails" open to the public. In essence, "an object is what it is," and stretching the meaning of "trail" to encompass the ramp goes beyond a reasonable interpretation of section 831.4(a) and (b).

While rehearsing for a play at the Poway Center for the Performing Arts, an actor fell into an open trapdoor on stage and sustained injuries. The trapdoors were used by the actors for a dramatic entrance and exit from the stage. The center was owned and operated by the city, but the trapdoors were owned by the production company responsible for producing the play. The actor sued the city for premises liability and the jury found for the actor. In a post-trial ruling, the court granted the city's motion for JNOV. It held that the actor was not injured by any dangerous condition of the stage. Instead, the actor was injured by the presence of the privately owned trapdoors. Since the city did not own or control the trapdoors, the trial court concluded that the city was not responsible for the injury. The appellate court reversed. It held that a public entity is liable for a dangerous condition on its property even if the danger was created by equipment owned and operated by a private entity, in this case the trapdoors.

A large tree growing along the side of a highway fell and killed a man in a truck. The plaintiff sued the City of Los Angeles for wrongful death, claiming that she had standing to sue as the decedent's putative spouse and sole heir. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60, only a decedent's heirs, which includes a putative spouse who was dependent on decedent, may bring a wrongful death action. Section 377.60(b) defines putative spouse as the surviving spouse of a void or voidable marriage who is found by the court to have had a good faith belief in the validity of the marriage. Decedent and plaintiff had made no attempts to comply with the procedural requirements for a lawful marriage in California, nor had they engaged in a solemnization ceremony. Rather, they had lived together for 30 years, conducted themselves as if they were married, shared incomes, filed tax returns as husband and wife, and held property together as husband and wife. The plaintiff asserted that she held a good faith belief in the validity of the alleged marriage and should be considered a putative spouse with standing to sue. On appeal, the court held that the determination of a good faith belief in the validity of a marriage is based on an objective standard. The court found that a reasonable person in plaintiff's position would not have believed that she was lawfully married to decedent. Thus, plaintiff did not have standing to sue.

The City of Los Angeles issued defendant, Stoneman Corporation, a permit to build a condo. In exchange, Stoneman agreed to install traffic signals at a nearby intersection. Stoneman hired defendant, KOA, to install the signals. Two years after the agreement no operational signals existed. Plaintiff was injured when his motorcycle collided with an automobile at the intersection.

Neither Stoneman nor KOA had a duty to install signals at the intersection. Where a promisor agrees to provide services to a promisee, which are necessary to protect a third person, the promisor has a duty of care to the third person if: (1) the promisor increases the risk of harm to the third person, (2) The promisor undertakes a duty the promisee already owed to the third person, or (3) injury occurs because the third person or the promisee relied on the promise. Here, (1) neither defendant altered the intersection to make it more dangerous; (2) the City did not owe the public a duty to install traffic signals (See Government Code section 830.4); and (3) neither the City nor plaintiff relied on Stoneman's agreement to install the signals before completing the condo.

Public entities do not owe the public a duty of care to provide safe beaches or to warn against concealed dangers caused by natural conditions. Here, the fact that the plaintiff was a student in a course the city taught did not alter the city's duty because the condition of the beach did not create an undue risk of harm to the plaintiff.

Coaches and sports instructors owe their students only a duty not to increase the risks inherent in the learning process undertaken by the student. Here, the city's instructors did nothing to increase the risk of harm to the plaintiff.

Prior to this case, the 5th District did not require plaintiffs to show changed physical conditions to defeat the defendant's design immunity. (See Bane v. State of California (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 860 [256 Cal.Rptr. 468] (holding that after 1979, when the legislature amended Government Code section 830.6, plaintiffs need not show changed physical conditions to defeat a public entity's design immunity; instead design immunity terminates once a public entity has notice that its design has become unreasonable for any reason and has had sufficient time to remedy it). Other districts held that public entities have design immunity unless plaintiffs show that changed physical conditions have rendered the design unreasonable. (See Baldwin v. State of California (1972) 6 Cal.3d 424 [99 Cal.Rptr.145, 491 P.2d 1121].)

Here, the 5th district abandoned Bane and joined the other districts in requiring that plaintiffs show changed physical conditions. The record, in this case, did not support the plaintiff's contention that changed physical conditions in the form of increased traffic flow on a state highway created a dangerous condition which the state should have remedied by installing a median barrier. An engineer's recommendation, that the state install a median barrier because its benefits now exceed its costs, did not constitute a determination or admission that the highway had become a dangerous condition.

Plaintiff was injured in an intramural soccer game at California State University, Sacramento. He brought a lawsuit for negligence against the University. Concluding that soccer is a hazardous recreational activity, the appellate court found that the University was immune from liability for any injury under Government Code section 831.7.

A pedestrian was hit by a car while crossing a street in a crosswalk that was unlighted due to an inoperative streetlight. She died two years later. The executor of her estate filed an action for damages based on the pedestrian's accident-related injuries. The appellate court ruled that the City had no duty to light the crosswalk.

Under Antenor v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 477, 483 [220 Cal.Rptr. 181], public entities have no duty to light their streets unless a peculiar condition of property renders lighting necessary for travel. The Plattner court held the crosswalk was not such a "peculiar condition." It found that the crosswalk was no more dangerous with an inoperative street light than it would have been if the City had not installed a streetlight at all. The unlighted crosswalk did not constitute a dangerous condition of public property.

In Lurye v. So. Cal. Edison, a Second District case decided after Plattner, the court held the exact opposite: That a crosswalk is a "peculiar condition" requiring lighting under Antenor. The Supreme Court depublished Lurye, and declined review of Plattner. Plattner is therefore the undisputed controlling authority on the subject.