The district attorney's office initiated an investigation of alleged environmental contamination relating to a defunct gasoline station being converted into a parking lot. After an initial search was conducted, the person responsible for removal of an underground gasoline tank was indicted on twenty-one criminal counts. Two more searches were conducted before the case was transferred to the California Attorney General's office for prosecution. All charges were eventually dropped. The plaintiff alleges that the district attorney violated his civil rights because the second search warrant was unsubstantiated. The district court denied the district attorney's claim of absolute immunity.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for gathering additional evidence after probable cause is established. Here, the second search warrant sought evidence to prosecute the indictment. Probable cause had already been established by the indictment via a grand jury. Therefore, the district attorney's review of the warrant prior to submission was intimately associated with the judicial process and entitled to absolute immunity.

Genzler was arrested for homicide. His defense was imperfect self-defense. His first trial resulted in a conviction that was reversed on instructional error. At his second trial a witness testified that she was pressured by the deputy district attorney and investigator in the first trial not to disclose the victim's history of street-fighting. After Genzler was convicted of involuntary manslaughter he sued, alleging constitutional violations by the prosecution. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on immunity. The district court denied immunity for the investigator, the prosecutor, and the prosecutor's supervisors.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed denial of immunity for the investigator and the prosecutor, but allowed immunity for the supervisors. Absolute immunity applies only to an official's advocacy function, intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Here, the detective and prosecutor were engaged in an investigative function and not in quasi-judicial advocacy when they interviewed the witness before the first trial. Therefore, their alleged actions are unprotected by absolute immunity. But the alleged misconduct by their supervisors was closely related to prosecutorial decisions once the trial began. Therefore, the supervisors' actions involve advocacy and are entitled to absolute immunity.

A state inmate filed an action alleging that the state's failure to accommodate his osteoarthritis and osteoporosis violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court denied the state's motion for judgment on the pleadings on Eleventh Amendment grounds, and the state filed an interlocutory appeal. The appellate court affirmed denial of the motion. The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Tennesse v. Lane (2004) 539 U.S. 941, 124 S.Ct. 1978.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The denial of a state's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity is an interlocutory appeal and need not await final judgment. The state contends that the appellate court must also determine if the appeal involves a “serious and unsettled question of law.” However, the court has never required such a showing for an interlocutory appeal of Eleventh Amendment immunity. This conclusion is consistent with the findings in Lane and therefore the court's initial findings are affirmed.

Advocates for the rights of people with disabilities sued the sponsors of an annual rodeo competition. The sponsors leased the event's arena from a public university. Plaintiffs claim that disabled patrons were subjected to discriminatory access, substandard seating arrangements, and higher ticket prices. They allege violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) that regulates public accommodations operated by private entities. The district court dismissed all claims and held that the publicly owned arena was not a “public accommodation” under Title III.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. Private entities may not escape liability under Title III simply by leasing public venues they do not own. The ADA is intended to prohibit discrimination in privately operated public accommodations. A Department of Justice policy explicitly states that private entities that lease publicly-owned venues are subject to Title III. The policy is reasonable and consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, the district court's dismissal of the action is reversed.

The Attorney General of California sued several energy producers, alleging that they fraudulently sold energy from capacity that they had contracted to hold in reserve. The state alleged that these activities created rolling blackouts, endangered citizens' health and safety, and damaged the state's economy. The suit sought injunctions, restitution, disgorgement, and civil penalties against multiple parties. The defendants removed the case to a federal district court where all claims were dismissed. Prior to dismissal, the district court denied the state's motion to remand the case back to the state court.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. California's regulatory scheme is governed by tariffs approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). These tariffs dictate the amount of energy that companies must hold on reserve. Therefore, the state's claims are founded on allegations that companies violated federal regulation and the district court properly retained jurisdiction. Eleventh Amendment immunity protects defendant states from being sued in federal courts. Here, the state voluntarily brought suit as a plaintiff and thus waived any immunity. Therefore, the state cannot invoke the Eleventh Amendment to remand the case to a state court.

In the course of salary negotiations, the Orange County Employees Association (OCEA) requested access to records relating to reimbursement of travel expenses for judges and management employees. OCEA sued to compel that access, alleging that it was authorized under the California Public Records Act (CPRA). The county moved to dismiss the petition and sought sanctions, claiming the petition was frivolous.

The appellate court dismissed OCEA's petition and denied the request for sanctions. Although the county, as a public agency, is subject to the CPRA, the judiciary system is not. Instead, Rule 6.7 of the California Rules of Court is the proper mechanism by which OCEA may obtain the information it seeks. The rule requires a trial court to make available official documents pertaining to its budget, including expenditure reports. Therefore, the records sought by OCEA are not subject to disclosure under the CPRA.

The President established the National Energy Policy Development Group (Group) to give him advice and make recommendations on energy policy. Vice President Cheney acted as the Group's chairman. The Sierra Club and others sued under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) that imposes open-meeting and disclosure requirements. The plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring defendants to produce information about the Group's meetings. Despite allegations that disclosure would violate separation of powers principles the district court allowed discovery to proceed. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that defendants could still invoke executive privilege to avoid disclosure of sensitive materials.

The Supreme Court of the United States vacated and remanded. The Judiciary must afford Presidential confidentiality the greatest possible protection to shield the Executive Branch from vexatious civil litigation that might distract it from its duties. The appellate court erred in holding that the assertion of executive privilege is a necessary precondition to the Government's separation of powers objections. Therefore, the appellate should reconsider the district court's discovery order.

Disabled citizens sued the state alleging that they were denied physical access to the courts in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Respondent George Lane crawled up two flights of stairs to attend a criminal proceeding. When he refused to do so a second time he was arrested and jailed for failure to appear. The state alleged Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Sixth Circuit denied immunity.

The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed. Title II of the ADA, as applied to cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress' enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment. Title II's requirement of accessibility is valid because it is congruent and proportional to its object of enforcing the fundamental right of access to the courts. Therefore, Congress can abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity through Title II to protect a fundamental right.

Pamela Hood's initial Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition was granted. She sought further relief from her student loans on the basis that they posed an undue burden. A state agency that guaranteed the loans challenged the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to hear the matter based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Sixth Circuit denied the agency's motion to dismiss.

The Supreme Court of the United States held that a bankruptcy court's discharge of a student loan debt does not implicate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. A bankruptcy court's jurisdiction is premised on the debtor and his estate, not on the creditors. The court's in rem jurisdiction allows it to resolve all claims that anyone has against the debtor. States are bound by a bankruptcy court's discharge no less that other creditors. Therefore, the undue hardship determination sought by Hood is not a suit against a state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Plaintiffs are a class of more than two thousand indigent Idaho children who suffer from severe emotional mental disabilities. In 1980 they sued state officials alleging violations of federal and state laws relating to the provision of educational services and mental health care. The state promised to resolve deficiencies via consent decrees that the district court retained jurisdiction to enforce. The state challenged the district court's continued subject matter jurisdiction over the consent decrees. It also claimed that continued enforcement of the decrees was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The district court rejected the state's claims.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. A party seeking to enforce a consent decree need not show continuing federal law violations. The district court held that federal constitutional claims raised genuine issues of fact to be resolved at trial. Therefore, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. Once the consent decrees were entered to resolve the claims, the court retained jurisdiction according to the explicit terms of the decrees. The consent decrees entail prospective injunctive relief requiring compliance by state officials. Therefore, continued enforcement of the decrees does not violate the Eleventh Amendment.

The County's family support agency confused Hernandez's identity with that of another man who owed delinquent child support. The agency failed to correct the mistake, causing Hernandez economic and personal distress, including his wife leaving him for a period of time. Hernandez sued the County for violation of his civil rights. The trial court granted the County's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The appellate court reversed. The County is entitled to state actor immunity if the family support agency was acting for the state in its collection procedures. Here, it is unclear if the County's procedures for identifying and reporting delinquent support obligors were mandated by the state or developed independently by the County. If the County established faulty procedures then it may be liable for the resulting error. Therefore, the County was not entitled to a determination of immunity based on the pleadings. The trial court's judgment is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Olsen was registered as a physician assistant with the state board of medicine. After she overdosed on drugs her supervising physician withdrew the sponsorship required to maintain valid registration. Olsen alleges that during an interview to re-register she was asked inappropriate questions about her religion and lifestyle. She sued after her request to re-register was denied. The district court held that the defendants were entitled to absolute immunity for their quasi-judicial and quasi-prosecutorial conduct and that other claims were barred by a statute of limitations.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The medical board and its disciplinary branch function in a sufficiently judicial and prosecutorial capacity to entitle them to absolute immunity. But immunity does not extend to ministerial acts performed during the license reinstatement process. The only ministerial act within the statute of limitations alleged by Olsen involves a billing statement for her public records request. This act fails to state a cognizable claim under section 1983. Therefore, the district court's order dismissing the complaint is affirmed.

Officers thought they recognized appellant as a known car thief. When they approached him at a gas station the appellant identified himself as the suspect's brother. He was not carrying identification and his car had no vehicle identification number. The officers detained him and impounded the car. Police then escorted appellant's female passenger to his home and conducted a search. They discovered that appellant was the brother of the suspect and on felony probation. Appellant sued for false arrest and unreasonable search and seizure. The trial court granted defendant's demurrers on the ground that they were immune from liability. The appellate court reversed.

The California Supreme Court reversed in part. In California, the sheriff acts on behalf of the state rather than the county when engaged in investigating crime. Therefore, the sheriff is immune from liability under section 1983 by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court distinguishes Federal Ninth Circuit authority on the issue. The trial court properly sustained demurrers of the County, its sheriff's department and the sheriff. The sheriff deputies are not shielded by state agent immunity. However, the case is remanded for the Court of Appeal to determine if they are entitled to qualified immunity under section 1983.

Plaintiffs sustained permanent injuries when working in a mine. They sued the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) alleging that inspectors failed to conduct inspections and investigate safety complaints as required by the Federal Mine Safety Health Act (Mine Safety Act). The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis that the alleged violations were discretionary functions under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and that no tort action was available under Arizona Law.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. The MSHA has failed to show that inspections of the mine fell within the discretionary-function exception of the FTCA. Under the Mine Safety Act the MSHA is required to investigate complaints and make inspections of each mine in its entirety at least four times a year. Plaintiffs have pled facts sufficient to justify imposition of liability under ordinary state-law principles. Under Arizona law, similarly situated state and municipal entities would be liable for failure to perform mandatory safety inspections. Therefore, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity under state law or sovereign immunity under the discretionary-function exemption of the FTCA.

Plaintiff sued the Department of Corrections (Department) alleging negligent supervision in connection with his imprisonment for an alleged parole violation. The plaintiff was imprisoned for over a month before a judge at a parole revocation hearing held that his parole had already ended. The trial court held that the Department is entitled to immunity under Government Code section 845.8.

The appellate court affirmed. Section 845.8 has been broadly interpreted to preclude liability for injuries resulting from the allegedly negligent supervision of a parolee. Therefore, parole agents are immune from actions related to decisions to revoke parole. Here, all of the plaintiff's claims relate to actions the Department's agents took in their duties as parole officers in revoking his parole. The Department is therefore immune from all claims.

The plaintiff deputy district attorney, acting in a supervisory capacity, was asked to investigate allegations that a search warrant affidavit had been falsified. His investigation confirmed gross misrepresentation of facts which were documented in a memorandum and at a hearing challenging the affidavit. The plaintiff sued alleging that he was subjected to adverse employment actions by the district attorney's office in retaliation for engaging in protected speech (the memorandum and his testimony in court). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants based on qualified immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. Qualified immunity was not available to the individual defendants because the law was clearly established that the plaintiff's speech addressed a matter of public concern and that his interest in the speech outweighed the public employer's interest in avoiding inefficiency and disruption. The District Attorney was performing a county function when the alleged retaliation took place. Since the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to political subdivisions of the state, neither the District Attorney nor the county are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

A physician initiated a wrongful termination suit in state court against a state university. He alleged due process violations under federal and state constitutions. All defendants joined in removing the state superior court case to federal court. After an initial motion to dismiss was denied, the state moved to dismiss, arguing Eleventh Amendment immunity. The trial court held that by removing the case to federal court the state waived its immunity and denied the motion.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Removal is a form of voluntary invocation of a federal court's jurisdiction and therefore waives Eleventh Amendment immunity. It would be unfair for the state to invoke jurisdiction by removal but then request immunity after unfavorable litigation. The language of the Eleventh Amendment speaks, not to immunity from claims, but to federal jurisdiction over “any suit”. Therefore, the waiver of immunity applies to state law claims as well as federal claims.

The FPPC filed suit against an Indian tribe alleging failure to disclose lobbying activities and contributions to political campaigns, as required by the PRA. Defendant claims that as a federally-recognized Indian tribe, it is immune under the doctrine of tribal immunity. The district court denied the defendant's motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellate court affirmed. The doctrine of tribal immunity was created by the common law power of the Supreme Court. The State has a constitutional right, under the Tenth Amendment, to maintain a republican form of government. The right to sue to enforce the PRA is necessary to preserve a republican form of government free of corruption. The constitutional right of the State to sue to protect its republican form of government trumps the common law doctrine of tribal immunity. The FPPC can therefore sue the Indian tribe.

Westland Water District receives water from a federal water management project under a contract. The government reduced Westland's allocation to fifty percent of the contractual obligation in an effort to comply with the Endangered Species Act. Farmers within the district brought suit alleging that the reduction violated the contract. The district court held that the government had not waived sovereign immunity defenses against the farmers because they were not a contracting entity.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The farmers assert that they are intended third party beneficiaries of the contract and therefore a contracting entity. The farmers fail to satisfy the “clear intent” standard required to establish intended beneficiary status. Only the water district has direct enforceable rights under the terms of the contract.

Plaintiff alleged that the California State University and a construction firm knowingly submitted false claims to the Federal Emergency Management Agency in violation of the False Claims Act. Claims against the university were dismissed pursuant to a joint stipulation. The district court granted the firm's motion to dismiss, holding that it was acting as an agent for the university and was thus entitled to immunity for actions within the scope of official duties.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. The construction firm is a private corporation and was not acting as an arm of the state for sovereign immunity purposes. The firm's employees were not employed by the university; supervision by university officials does not transform them into government officials. The federal interest in protecting its contractors from state tort liability is not implicated in suits alleging that state contractors submitted false claims to the government.

Ley was a mentally disordered offender participating in a county-managed community outpatient treatment program when he was attacked by another patient with a knife. In self-defense, Ley stabbed his attacker and killed him. Ley then sued the county and state for damages and personal injuries. The district court dismissed state causes of action under absolute immunity provisions of Penal Code section 1618.

The appellate court affirmed. Section 1618 precludes civil liability against the state and the county for the criminal acts of persons committed to, or placed in, treatment programs. Immunity is supported by legislative intent and the longstanding public policy of immunizing public agencies and employees who decide how to confine mentally ill patients.

The three year old plaintiff suffered an electric shock while bathing. Her parents sued the defendant fire protection authority alleging that the defendant's 911 emergency dispatcher delayed dispatch of emergency personnel and thus denied their daughter early and prompt medical attention. The trial court sustained the defendants's dermurrers and dismissed the case.

The supreme court affirmed. Civil Code section 1714 imposes a general duty or care on all persons; but it is an insufficient statutory basis for imposing direct liability on public agencies. Direct liability is limited by emergency dispatchers' immunity under Health and Safety Code section 1799.107. That statute only allows for vicarious liability if the dispatcher acted in bad faith or a grossly negligent manner. The plaintiffs did not plead facts to disclose such negligence or bad faith. The court disapproved Ma v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 95 Cal.App. 4th 488 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 544].

Pollak, Vida & Fisher represented the Amici California cities, counties and joint powers associations in this case.

Plaintiff health care provider contracted with defendant California Department of Health Services to provide services. A contract clause prohibited DHS from paying damages for any violation of law not expressly incorporated into the contract. DHS assigned patients to a competing health plan. Plaintiff sued for having not received the patients. The trial court held in DHS's favor.

The appellate court reversed. A contract may not exempt anyone from responsibility for that party's own fraud. This public policy is provided by California Civil Code § 1668. The fact that DHS is a public agency does not allow it to expand its immunity from liability.

Plaintiff Alaskan native applied to be a teacher's aide at a local government-funded school. The teacher believed plaintiff was the most qualified candidate. The job went to a non-Native who was married to the school board's president. Plaintiff sued the district. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. The court applied the five-factor test set forth in Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College District, 861 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1988) in determining whether the school district was an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The school district is not an arm of the state under Mitchell. Most importantly, a money judgment against the district would not be satisfied with state funds.

The state of Arizona accepts federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act. Section 504 claims were brought against the state. The state asserted sovereign immunity. The District Court held that the state had not waived its sovereign immunity against the claims.

The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. A state waives its sovereign immunity against claims arising under the Rehabilitation Act when it accepts federal funds under the Act. The Court relied on its decision in Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff community college student was enrolled in a guide course for horse packing trips. She was injured off-campus while preparing for a class event. She sued the college for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in defendant's favor.

The appellate court affirmed. Students at community colleges are more experienced than young public elementary and high school students. Thus, a community college is not responsible for off-campus injuries of its students who are preparing a class assignment.

Decedents were fishing from their canoe on a public waterway when a motorboat struck them. Family members sued the city, county and state for wrongful death. The trial court held that decedents were involved in a hazardous recreational activity and thus the public entities could not be held responsible for their deaths.

The appellate court affirmed. Government Code § 831.7 immunizes public entities from liability for injuries suffered by participants in a hazardous recreational activity on public property. Boating is a hazardous recreational activity, and this includes leisurely canoe fishing.

Appellant is a social worker with the state of Nevada. She placed a child in a home knowing that the child had a tendency to be violent. The child sodomized one of the foster family's natural children. The parents sued the social worker under § 1983. The District Court ordered limited discovery on the issue of absolute immunity. A three-judge panel reversed, holding that the court should have dismissed on immunity grounds.

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition. The District Court was required to examine the social worker's function. In determining absolute immunity, the District Court must determine whether the social worker's duties were functionally comparable to duties for which officials were immune at common law.

The Department of Animal Control impounded plaintiff's dog. The county animal shelter charged a $211 fee to reclaim impounded pets. Plaintiff could not afford the fee. Plaintiff agreed to have the dog neutered in exchange for a reduced fee. Under his signature on the release from liability form, plaintiff wrote the words “under duress.” The dog died from complications. Plaintiff sued the county. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the county.

The appellate court affirmed. Food and Agriculture Code § 30804.7(d) provides a city or county with immunity from civil suit by a dog owner whose dog is spayed or neutered under a voluntary program. Plaintiff's argument that the county coerced him into neutering his dog fails since the dog was neutered under a voluntary program.

Appellant was party to a lawsuit. The original judge recused himself voluntarily during post-trial proceedings. The case was transferred to respondent judge. Appellant's attorney had respondent disqualified. Appellant appealed. The disqualified judge had been elevated to the appellate court, and appellant lost on the appeal. He sued in District Court, alleging that the judge's presence on the state appellate court violated his due process rights. The Court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. A federal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a final judgment by a state appellate court. If the issues are inextricably intertwined with the issues decided in the state court's final decision, the federal court cannot hear the appeal.

Former employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources sued the Department, director and a supervisor alleging violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act. The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Ninth Circuit reversed.

The United States Supreme Court affirmed. State employees may recover money damages in federal court in the event of the state's failure to comply with the family-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act. Congress made its intention to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity unmistakably clear in the language of the Act.

Forty-four year old patient entered a state university hospital for a liver biopsy. The biopsy needle perforated her middle colic vein and she died. Her family sued the medical center and physician for violation of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act. They sought reasonable attorneys fees and costs. The Superior Court granted the university's motion for summary adjudication. It reasoned that Government Code §818, which exempts public entities from liability for punitive or exemplary damages, precluded the demand for attorneys fees and costs. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandate.

The appellate court granted the petition. Enhanced remedies for violation of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act including reasonable attorneys fees and costs, are not precluded by Government Code §818. Costs and fees are not considered punitive or exemplary.

Individuals with mental illnesses were institutionalized in Oregon state psychiatric hospitals. They sued Oregon's Governor, the Department of Human Services and the Department director alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. They alleged that the state failed to provide community-based treatment and that some patients were being unnecessarily institutionalized. The District Court denied defendants' motion to dismiss.

The appellate court affirmed and remanded. Congress validly abrogated Eleventh Amendment state immunity under Title II of the ADA. Oregon waived its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity by voluntarily accepting federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act. Moreover, an official who violates Title II of the ADA does not represent the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, yet he or she nevertheless may be held responsible in an official capacity for the violation.

Real party sought a referral for an abortion. She was referred to a public entity health maintenance organization. The public HMO negligently failed to properly credential the physician who performed the abortion. He was negligent in performing the surgery and the patient was severely injured. She then sued the HMO for medical malpractice based on negligent credentialing. The Superior Court denied the HMO's motion for summary judgment.

The appellate court reversed and issued the peremptory writ as to the HMO. The HMO's decision to credential the physician was a discretionary one. Thus, the HMO was immune from liability to patient for negligent credentialing.

An air quality management district notified a private ranch during pending sale of marketable pollution credits that the district had erroneously issued more credits than the ranch had actually earned for reducing agricultural burning. The ranch sued the district. The district moved for summary judgment based on misrepresentation immunity. The Superior Court granted the motion.

The appellate court affirmed. Air quality management district's accidental miscalculation of a private party's emission reduction credits is a negligent, rather than an intentional misrepresentation. Thus, the district is entitled to immunity. An air quality management district is not liable for accidental miscalculations.

Plaintiff was arrested and jailed for public intoxication. He was released without charges. While in jail, he was beaten badly by another prisoner. He sued the city for negligence. The jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the plaintiff was a detainee in protective custody and not a prisoner.

The California Supreme Court reversed. Government Code § 844.6(a)(2) says that a public entity cannot be held liable in negligence for injury to a prisoner. Someone arrested for public intoxication, held in protective custody and released without charges, may be considered a prisoner.

A former California resident moved to Nevada and sued a California tax collection agency. The Nevada Supreme Court denied in part the agency's petition for a writ of mandamus. It ordered the District Court to dismiss the negligence claim for lack of jurisdiction, but directed that the intentional tort claims could proceed to trial.

The United States Supreme Court affirmed. The Nevada court was not required to extend full faith and credit to a California statute conferring complete immunity on California agencies. Whereas the Full Faith and Credit Clause is exacting with respect to final judgment rendered by court with adjudicatory authority over subject matter and persons governed by judgment, it is less demanding with respect to choice of laws. A state has an interest in deciding which intentional torts injuring its citizens should be litigated.

Former county research project director sued the county qui tam under the False Claims Act. She alleged that the county hospital fraudulently obtained federal grants for a research project using drug-dependent pregnant women. The District Court relied on Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens (2000) 529 U.S. 765 [120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836] and held that states are not persons subject to FCA qui tam actions. It granted the county's motion to dismiss. It held that counties cannot be subjected to treble damages since treble damages are essentially punitive and not remedial in nature. The appellate court reversed and remanded.

The United States Supreme Court affirmed. Municipal corporations are “persons” amenable to qui tam actions under the False Claims Act. A private corporation and a municipal corporation should be treated alike, and a corporation has always been considered a “person.” The meaning of “person” has not changed since the Act was passed in 1863. Neither the history nor the text of the original Act provides contextual evidence that Congress intended to exclude municipalities from the class of persons. Moreover, the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986 did not repeal municipal liability. It raised the ceiling on damages recoverable from double to treble. Treble damages are not always punitive in nature since they are not a pure penalty in all cases. Classic punitive damages leaves a jury open-ended discretion over the amount.

Plaintiff was forced to resign from his employment at defendant bank. He then attempted to charter a new bank. The FDIC and a state banking association concluded that he was not fit to serve as an officer or director. Plaintiff sued the previous employer bank and the state of Nevada banking association. He alleged numerous violations of state law as well as federal constitutional violations under Equal Protection and §1983. Defendant filed a notice to remove the case to federal court. The trial court dismissed on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity. It held that the state had not waived its immunity by joining in the removal to federal court.

The Appellate Court reversed and remanded. A state waives its immunity from state-law claims by joining in the removal of the case to federal court. It has voluntarily invoked federal jurisdiction. The court relied on Lapides v. Board of Regents (2002) 535 U.S. 613 [122 S.Ct. 1640, 152 L.Ed.2d 806] which held that for purposes of state law claims, a state waives its immunity to suit in a federal court when it removes a case from state court.

Plaintiff is deaf. She relies on her guide dog to accomplish many important life activities. The state quarantined all dogs entering the state for 120 days to prevent the introduction of rabies. When plaintiff flew into the state, they quarantined her dog. She sued under Title II of the ADA. On sovereign immunity grounds, the district court denied the state's motion to dismiss.

The appellate court affirmed. The district court's denial of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is an appealable collateral order. An appellate court has jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine whether or not an Ex Parte Young claim (which allows a plaintiff to sue an individual as opposed to the state, avoiding a sovereign immunity defense) survives the motion stage of litigation.

Plaintiffs sued the county and state for intentional and negligent destruction of trial court records relating to a prior action. They claimed that due to the destruction of trial court records, they were unable to appeal the case and were required to dismiss. The Superior Court sustained the State's demurrer without leave to amend.

The appellate court affirmed. Under California Government Code section 815.6, the state or a county cannot be held liable for tort claims unless otherwise provided by statute. No statute confers a duty upon the state or counties to preserve trial court records. Moreover, appeal in a case is always possible, even if trial court transcripts have been destroyed.

Debtor operated a mechanic's shop without worker's compensation insurance. An employee was injured and was compensated by the state of Arizona. The state sought reimbursement from the mechanic's shop. The shop declared bankruptcy three weeks later and attempted to discharge the debt owed to the state. The state claimed sovereign immunity. The bankruptcy court held that the state waived its right to sovereign immunity.

The district court affirmed. A state's sovereignty is abrogated in the Constitution because the federal government enacts bankruptcy laws. Moreover, the injury is the date of the “transaction.” Because the injury was more than three years before bankruptcy, the debt owed was dischargeable and the state had waived sovereign immunity.

Plaintiff construction workers sued the Department of Corrections for failure to ensure payment of the agreed-upon wage. They sued as third party beneficiaries of a prison construction contract between the department and the contractor. The trial court sustained the department's demurrer.

The appellate court affirmed. The construction workers had no standing as third party beneficiaries. The contractor, not the department, promised to pay prevailing wages to the construction workers.

Appellee guardian ad litem filed a section 1983 action against the state family services department on behalf of a foster child. They alleged that the child's rights were violated when the appellants placed the child in foster care knowing that a foster child in the home might be a sexual predator. The district court granted immunity to the state.

The appellate court vacated and remanded. State child services workers involved in ongoing state court dependency proceedings enjoy absolute immunity for the placement of a child in a foster home. Caseworkers need to exercise independent judgment in fulfilling their post-adjudication duties. The fear of litigation would compromise their judgment.

One of plaintiff contractor's subcontractors was injured on the job. Although the contractor did not have worker's compensation insurance, the state paid benefits to the injured subcontractor. They also recorded a lien against the contractor's residence. The contractor sued and the state removed the lien. Then, the contractor sued state employees under state and federal law. The trial court dismissed the complaint.

The appellate court affirmed. The federal 1983 claim was barred by a statute of limitations. The state claims against the state employees are barred by immunity under California Government Code section 821.6 because the employees were acting within the scope of their employment. Moreover, section 821.6 immunity is not limited to malicious prosecution actions.

A state university professor sued the university under section 1983 when it placed sexual harassment allegations in his personnel files. Defendants removed the case to federal district court and then sought dismissal under sovereign immunity. The district court held that the state had waived its immunity when it removed the case to federal court. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. It reasoned that the law was unclear as to whether the state attorney general could waive the state's sovereign immunity.

In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed. A state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it removes a case from state court to federal court. The state involuntarily entered the case as a defendant. However, when it voluntarily agreed to remove the case to federal court, it invoked the federal court's jurisdiction.

In 1973, the city sought an injunction against the state regarding construction of a freeway awaiting environmental studies. Twenty-five years later the freeway project was approved. The parties stipulated to dismissal of the old lawsuit. The city sued again. The state invoked sovereign immunity against litigating the state law claims in federal court. The district court rejected this defense, holding that the state had waived its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense during the old litigation. It reasoned that both suits involved similar parties, facts and legal issues.

The appellate court reversed and remanded. A state's waiver of its sovereign immunity defense in an old action is not carried over into a similar new action between the parties. The city voluntarily dismissed the old action. Such a dismissal leaves the situation as if the action had never been filed. Any future lawsuit based on the same claim is an entirely new suit unrelated to the earlier dismissed action.

Plaintiff's wife had difficulty breathing. Plaintiff took her to a hospital that did not provide emergency services. A security guard there called 911. Defendant CCSF ran the 911 call-taking and dispatch services. Upon hearing the wife's symptoms, the 911 call-taker/dispatcher assumed the wife was on drugs and violent. She disregarded protocols requiring a highest-priority response for breathing difficulties, sent police instead of an ambulance, and transmitted the call to emergency medical services as lower-priority. Due to the delay in emergency medical treatment, the wife died of an asthma attack. The trial court sustained summary judgment for CCSF, holding it had no duty to plaintiffs and was entitled to discretionary immunity under Government Code section 820.2.

The appellate court reversed. Analyzing common-law duty factors, it concluded that the CCSF had a duty of care to the decedent in the manner in which it implemented its 911 emergency service. Analogizing to case law finding no discretionary immunity for public health care employees' diagnosis or treatment, it held that section 820.2 did not immunize CCSF for the manner in which its employees implement its 911 services. The court also declined to apply Health and Safety Code section 1799.107, which provides qualified immunity for emergency rescue personnel when they provide emergency services. Noting that the legislature had rejected attempts to amend the statute to expressly include 911 dispatchers, the court concluded that the statute did not apply to them.

Plaintiff alleged that the Government's negligence resulted in her husband's death while he was an inmate in a federal prison. She alleged that prison personnel failed to remove her husband from the cell after his cellmate had threatened him; negligently failed to investigate the cellmate through a computer evaluation; and negligently failed to find the murder weapon during a cell search. The district court dismissed the case on grounds that the claim was barred because the Government's actions involved the use of discretion.

The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Government had a statutory, nondiscretionary duty to perform a computer evaluation of the cellmate before assigning plaintiff's husband to the cell. However, failing to find the murder weapon and failing to remove plaintiff's husband from the cell following a threat, involved the exercise of discretionary functions. The Government is not required to follow a specific course of action regarding threat procedures. Moreover, this discretion is unique to the context of a prison. Therefore the Government is immune from negligence liability.

Although this case involved federal law, its holding may be useful in evaluating public employees' discretionary immunity under Government Code section 820.2.

The County contracted with a private hospital to handle overflow obstetrical work. The contract required the County to defend and indemnify the hospital for lawsuits arising under the contract. Truck insured the hospital. The County was an additional insured under the policy. The County and the hospital were sued for medical malpractice. The County declined to defend the hospital, concluding that the suit did not arise under the contract. The County was found liable in the malpractice action, and the hospital was exonerated. Truck sued the County in subrogation to the hospital's indemnification claim against the County. The trial court granted the County summary judgment on the ground that because the hospital and the County were covered under the same policy, Truck could not subrogate against its own insured.

The appellate court reversed. The rule barring an insurer from subrogating to a cause of action against its own insured only applies if the insured holding the cause of action and the other insured are covered for the same loss. The court interpreted the additional-insured endorsement to only cover the County's vicarious liability for the hospital's acts, and thus not cover a lawsuit arising out of the County's acts. Further, even if the County was covered, it would only be covered for its own defense costs and indemnity -- not for the loss Truck sought to recover, the hospital's defense costs. The court also held inapplicable the rule that equities prevent an insurer from subrogating to a contractual indemnity cause of action. That rule only applies if the indemnitor did not cause the loss.

A third party defaulted on an agreement to purchase property from plaintiff Tucker Land Company. MRCA, a Joint Powers Agency made up of three public entities pursuant to Government Code section 6500, purchased the property in a bankruptcy action for $30,000. Tucker sued the agencies, claiming that as constituent members of MRCA, they were jointly and individually liable for the obligations of MRCA. They also claimed that California was liable because all members of the JPA are state agencies. The trial court held that the constituent agencies were not responsible for a JPA obligation and that the constituents were not alter egos of MRCA.

The appellate court affirmed. Government Code sections 6500-6599 authorize municipalities to jointly do anything they could each do separately. Section 6508.1 provides that the obligations of the agency will be the obligations of the constituent entities unless they otherwise agree. Here, the agreement specified that the constituents would not be responsible for the JPA's debts. Moreover, there was no abuse of organizational formalities or diversion of funds. No fraud was perpetrated on Tucker. Thus, there is no liability on the part of the constituents as alter egos of the JPA.

The plaintiff settled the Office of Real Estate Appraisers' investigation of him by entering into a confidential "stipulation and waiver" with OREA and the state. The stipulation barred the state and OREA from informing the complainants of anything but the investigation's outcome. Plaintiff sued OREA and the state, alleging they violated the stipulation's confidentiality clause by relating their findings and conclusions to the complainants. He asserted causes of action for breach of contract and violation of mandatory duty. The defendants asserted they were immune from liability under Government Code sections 815.2 and 821.6. The trial court sustained their demurrer.

The appellate court reversed. Under Government Code section 814, section 815.2's immunity from common-law liability and section 821.6's immunity from liability for prosecution does not apply to breach-of-contract claims. The settlement stipulation is a contract, and plaintiff alleged its breach. Further, plaintiff properly alleged that the defendants violated mandatory duties imposed by statute to keep the information confidential. Section 821.6 immunity does not apply to Government Code section 815.6 liability for breaching a mandatory duty.

Attorney plaintiff Franceschi received a Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge. Later, the bankruptcy court sanctioned him for prosecuting a frivolous lawsuit. He refused to pay the sanctions. The State Bar disciplined him for failing to pay the sanctions. Plaintiff sued the State Bar in the bankruptcy court, asserting that the sanctions were within the ambit of his Chapter 7 discharge. The State Bar asserted eleventh amendment sovereign immunity. The bankruptcy court granted its motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appealed.

The bankruptcy panel affirmed. If the bankruptcy court had granted injunctive relief, it might coercively affect the legal position of the State in its disciplinary proceeding. Although sovereign immunity does not bar bankruptcy courts from discharging debts owed to state entities, a disciplinary proceeding is not a debt. Even if the sanction itself was discharged, the State Bar has an interest in the reasons for the sanction. Lawyers may not usurp the State Bar's disciplinary function.

Wholesale energy supplier Duke Energy sought injunctive relief against California Governor Davis after Davis seized options to buy inexpensive power following an energy shortage in the state. Duke claimed that Davis' commandeering orders were preempted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and violated the Supremacy clause. The trial court found for Davis and Duke appealed.

The appellate court reversed. Under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, a suit challenging the legality under federal law of a state official's action in enforcing state law is not a suit against the state, and hence not subject to state sovereign immunity. Because a state can not authorize its officers to violate federal law, the suit must be against the official in their individual capacity. The immense importance of an interest, such as the availability of affordable energy, does not bar the application of the Young doctrine. Moreover, granting Duke the relief it requests will not deprive the governor of his regulatory authority.

In a preceding suit against the City, plaintiff alleged that a City police officer used excessive force in arresting him. The trial court entered judgment for the City and the judgment was upheld on appeal. In this subsequent suit, plaintiff claimed that two City police officers, who were witnesses in the first case, had fabricated information pertaining to the arrest. The officers claimed absolute immunity and moved for summary judgment, on the theory that their prior testimony could not be used to find them guilty of conspiracy. The trial court denied summary judgment.

The appellate court agreed. Absolute witness immunity does not shield an out-of-court, pretrial conspiracy to engage in non-testimonial acts such as the fabrication or suppression of evidence. However, the appellate court also held that the record contained no evidence that the officers had in fact been involved in the alleged conspiracy and ultimately reversed the trial court's decision to allow the plaintiff's claim to go forward.

Plaintiff criminal defense lawyer filed a complaint in district court alleging the following facts: (1) defendant assistant district attorneys induced a witness to testify falsely in a prosecution of plaintiff; (2) defendants filed a crime report against plaintiff as complaining witnesses; (3) defendants posed as advisors during grand jury proceedings; (4) defendants opposed re-appointment of plaintiff's former counsel; and (5) defendants made defamatory statements to the press about plaintiff. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds of absolute prosecutorial immunity.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Absolute immunity from civil suit protects functions, not actors. Only actions closely associated to the judicial process are protected. Thus, immunity does not extend to prosecutors when they act as administrators, investigators, or witnesses. The allegations of fabricating evidence, filing a false crime report, and investigating the purported crime were improperly dismissed. The defendant prosecutors acted as detectives because the grand jury had not yet been empanelled. Also, they acted as witnesses when they filed the crime report. However, allegations that the defendants secured the grand jury indictment, secured an arrest warrant, and opposed re-appointment of counsel were properly dismissed because these were acts of advocacy. Initiating prosecution and arguing motions are traditionally prosecutorial functions. Also, since the defendant prosecutors did not personally swear to the facts in the criminal complaint, they were not acting as witnesses. Finally, any statements defendants made to the media were not protected.

The District Attorneys of Napa and Sonoma Counties, on behalf of the People, sued the appellants, alleging that the advertising claims for their weight loss product violated various statutes governing false or misleading advertising and unfair competition. The appellants filed a special motion to strike the amended complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The appellants argued that subdivision (g) of the statute, which exempts public prosecutors from its strictures, violated the equal protection clauses of the United States and California Constitutions, because private plaintiffs who sued a defendant for conduct which is in furtherance of the defendant's free speech rights are subject to the anti-SLAPP statute but public prosecutors are not. The trial court denied the appellants' special motion.

The appellate court affirmed. The classification created by subdivision (d)'s exemption of public prosecutors' enforcement actions from anti-SLAPP motions did not violate the equal protection clause of either the United States Constitution or California Constitution. The exemption furthered the state's legitimate interest of allowing prosecutors -- who did not create the SLAPP problem -- to pursue actions to enforce laws, unencumbered by delay, intimidation, or distraction. The exclusion enables prosecutors to perform their constitutional duties thoroughly and effectively. Subjecting them to the SLAPP procedure could unduly hinder and undermine their efforts to protect the health and safety of the citizenry at large by delaying an enforcement action.

Although this case interpreted the federal Tort Claims Act, its analysis may be applicable to California's discretionary immunity statute, Government Code section 820.2.

Two pilots died when the airtanker they were using to drop flame retardant on a forest fire crashed. The pilots were employed by a company that contracted with the United States Forest Service to provide airtanker services to assist in fighting forest fires. The pilots' families sued the Forest Service for wrongful death. The district court found that the Forest Service's failure to require its contract pilots to undergo a specific type of training contributed to the deaths. The government appealed, arguing that the Forest Service's conduct was protected by the discretionary function exception to the federal Tort Claims Act.

The appellate court reversed and remanded. The government was immune from liability under the Act for the Forest Service's discretionary failure to require its contract pilots to undergo a specific type and form of training. The extent and type of the Forest Service's flight training were matters left to the agency's discretion and were susceptible to policy analysis. The Forest Service's conduct was discretionary since no statute, regulation, or policy specifically mandated the Forest Service to require such training. The Forest Service's conduct was susceptible to policy analysis because the decision whether to require the training of contract pilots necessarily implicates competing policy considerations, such as employee and public safety, economic resources, impact on the agency's relationship with contractors, and the agency's goals and duties.

Whitmore Union Elementary School District lost money as a result of an alleged improper pooled money investment by the defendant Treasurer of Shasta County. Under the Education Code the District is required to deposit the money it receives, including state apportionments and tax revenues, in the county treasury. The defendants reasoned that because the District money must be deposited in the county treasury, the Treasurer may invest it without the consent of the District, regardless whether the money is required to meet the District's immediate financial needs. The court granted defendants summary judgment on the theory the action was barred by the discretionary immunity granted the Treasurer by the Tort Claims Act.

The appellate court reversed. Since the Treasurer lacked discretion to invest the money, the investment was not subject to the discretionary immunity provided by Government Code Section 820.2. The Treasurer's discretionary authority is limited by its terms to surplus money -- money not required for the immediate needs of the depositor -- and by the requirements that the governing board of the district delegate to the Treasurer the authority to invest its surplus money. Here, the Treasurer did not determine whether the District's money was surplus. Nor did he secure the District's delegation of authority to invest the money. Only the District is in a position to determine its financial needs; and only the District has the political and statutory responsibility to decide whether it has surplus funds that should be invested.

The 22nd District Agricultural Association is a state institution that conducts horse racing and contracts with organizations that conduct events unrelated to horse racing on its fairgrounds in the City of Del Mar. A City ordinance authorized the City to levy and collect a tax on the price of admissions to the fairgrounds. The City began receiving a percentage of wagers from horse racing and satellite wagering in lieu of imposing the admissions tax. The contractors who conducted events unrelated to the horse racing activities paid business license fees and the admission taxes. Event operators began to refuse to pay the fees and taxes, and demanded the City refund that money paid by them for past events. The court granted summary judgment for the City, holding that a section of the Business and Professions Code authorized the City to impose the fees and taxes. Further, the court issued a supplemental order ruling the ordinance was facially valid.

The appellate court reversed. The taxing provision of the ordinance was invalid to the extent it was applied to the District's sovereign activities in contracting with entities to put on consumer-oriented events such as home and garden, gun or antique shows. The District's sovereign immunity, as a state agency, extends to entities contracting with the District that operate consumer exhibitions and demonstrations encompassed within the District's broad functions. Therefore, its contractors are exempt from the City's local regulations under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, because the District was acting within its governmental capacity in contracting with the private entities.

The Los Angeles Grand Jury returned an indictment against the Lazars for environmental crimes resulting from their operation of gas stations. The Lazars filed for bankruptcy on behalf of themselves and their corporate entities. The state criminal charges arose from violations of an environmental act. The act established the Fund, a reimbursement program administered by the State Board of Water (Water), used to comply with another environmental act. Before filing for bankruptcy, one of the Lazar companies submitted twenty claims against the Fund to Water. The California State Board of Equalization (Equalization) submitted at least five proofs of claims for unpaid taxes. Water denied the twenty reimbursement claims, on the ground of the Lazars' misconduct. The appointed trustee filed a petition for a Writ of Administrative Mandamus in the Superior Court, against Water (the Mandamus Adversary). The case was removed to the bankruptcy court on a motion by the trustee. Water argued that, as an arm of the state, it had Eleventh Amendment immunity. The bankruptcy court ruled that the State of California waived its sovereign immunity by filing its proofs of claims in the bankruptcy proceeding and by making a general appearance in support of its position. It further held the Fund was an entity of the State of California for the purpose of claiming sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The district court reversed, holding the Fund was not an arm of the state. The court also found that since the Fund was the source of any money damages, and that it was not an arm of the state, Water's immunity claim was moot.

The appellate court reversed, holding that although Water was an arm of the state, it waived its immunity because Equalization filed proofs of claims in the Lazar's bankruptcy proceedings. When a state or an arm of the state files a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding, the state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity with regard to the bankruptcy estate's claims that arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the state's claim. The court applied the logical relationship test and found the trustee's Mandamus Adversary arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the Equalizations's proof of claim. The court did not find it significant that Equalization and Water were separate agencies in assessing the question of waiver. Further, the court reversed the district court, determining the Fund was an arm of the state, thereby entitled to invoke separate Eleventh Amendment immunity. The California legislature established the Fund to serve the central governmental function of ensuring safe and healthy water resources for the state's citizens. That the Fund worked to the benefit of owners and operators of underground storage tanks did not diminish its public importance.

Plaintiff, a former director of the Southern California Rehabilitation Services Inc., filed a qui tam action under the Federal False Claims Act (FCA) against the State of California, the California Department of Rehabilitation (CDR), the state Office of the Attorney General, and the former state attorney general. She alleged that the attorney general had conspired with the CDR to defraud the federal government, and sought to recover allegedly misappropriated federal funds awarded to the state for vocational rehabilitation services. The district court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim and the plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims against the state, the CDR, and the attorney general's office, holding that they were immune from liability under the FCA. It reversed the dismissal against the former attorney general as to conduct that was wholly unrelated to or outside of his official duties. The FCA claim is a fraud claim which must be pleaded with particularity. The court gave plaintiff leave to amend her complaint as against the former attorney general, and attempt to plead the FCA claim with particularity.

Defendant was a deputy public defender who represented the plaintiff in a criminal trial for bank robbery. The case was initially assigned to another deputy public defender, but was transferred to the defendant. When the defendant received the plaintiff's case file, it contained an FBI memo that stated that a confidential source had identified someone other than the plaintiff as the bank robber. The defendant disregarded the memo, and the plaintiff was convicted for the bank robbery and sentenced to serve 16 years. A month after the conviction, the prosecutor informed the defendant that the memo might exculpate the plaintiff. Subsequently, the conviction was set aside and the plaintiff obtained a judicial declaration that he was factually innocent of the bank robbery. The plaintiff then sued the deputy public defender, alleging negligent representation. The trial court granted summary adjudication for the defendant, concluding that Government Code section 820.2 shielded the defendant from liability.

The California Supreme Court held for the plaintiff. The court determined that section 820.2 provides public employees immunity from liability for injuries resulting from their exercise of discretion. Under section 820.2, basic policy making decisions are discretionary, but the routine operational duties of an employee does not fall within the scope of discretion in section 820.2. The court held that once a deputy public defender has undertaken to represent a client, her actions implementing that decision, to the extent that they do not concern policy-level decision making, can be subject to judicial review for alleged negligence.

The Board of Prison Terms denied an inmate parole after he had served 16 years of a 15-years-to-life sentence. The board explained to the inmate that although he might have been eligible for parole after having served 10 years, and he had signed a plea agreement with that understanding, that did not mean that the board would find the inmate suitable for parole. Two years later, the chairman of the board stated in a news article that one of the goals that may be set for inmates sentenced to 15-years-to-life, is that the inmate serve 15-21 years before the inmate is deemed suitable for parole. The inmate filed a personal injury action against the chairman, alleging that the chairman's statement shows that the board had no intent to parole an inmate in his position after serving 10 years in prison. Since that fact was not disclosed to the inmate when he signed the plea agreement, he contended that the agreement was based on fraud and deceit.

The appellate court found that Government Code sections 820.2 and 845.8 were applicable to this case. Section 820.2 states that a public employee is not liable for acts which result in injury if the act was the result of discretion vested in him. Section 845.8 specifically extends immunity to public employees for injuries resulting from a decision to not release a prisoner. Since the parole determination was discretionary, the chairman, as a public employee, is immune from suit for injuries allegedly resulting from that discretionary decision. The court also noted a strong argument that the appeal is moot because the inmate had served more than 15 years before his parole hearing.

The defendant County fired plaintiff shortly after hiring him as an attorney. Plaintiff alleged that the County induced him to take the position by leading him to believe that the position was "permanent" when it was in fact a "provisional" position. He sued the County for, among other things, punitive damages and for double damages under Section 972 of the Labor Code for common law fraud and for violation of Labor Code section 970. Section 970 prohibits employers from inducing employees to relocate by means of a knowingly false representation relating to employment terms.

Finding that plaintiff's misrepresentation claims regarding his recruitment and hiring as an employee arose out of a business transaction between plaintiff and the County, the court held that the County was immune from plaintiff's suit under Section 818.8 of the Government Code, which provides that a public entity is not liable for injury caused by its employee's misrepresentation. The finding that it was a business transaction was critical to the court's decision as the California Supreme court held in Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782 that Section 818.8 immunity only applies when the misrepresentation interfered with a financial or commercial interest.

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity to suit in federal court is a defense that can be waived. The immunity does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. A public entity must therefore raise the immunity early in the litigation. The first day of trial is too late.

In this case, the plaintiffs, members of a community college soccer team, were injured during an automobile accident on the way to a game in another city. The soccer team's assistant coach, an employee of the defendant, was driving when the accident occurred. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Here, the appellate court affirms that the defendant was immune from liability under California Code of Regulations, section 55450. Section 55450 immunizes community colleges from liability for accidents that occur during field trips of excursions. Education Code section 87706, however, provides that community colleges are vicariously liable where employees' torts injure students during off-premises, school-sponsored activities. This court holds that trips connected to extracurricular sports programs are field trips or excursions, instead of school-sponsored activities. Thus, the defendant was entitled to immunity under section 55450.

A state medical board was not entitled to absolute immunity from 42 U.S.C. section 1983 liability for its response to another state board's verification inquiry because this act had an administrative purpose, and was not closely associated with the judicial process. However, the board may still be entitled to qualified immunity for its action.

The secretary of the board was entitled to absolute immunity for signing a disciplinary complaint under penalty of perjury that according to his information and belief the complaint was true because his actions were equivalent to a prosecutor's act of initiating charges. The court distinguished Kalina v. Fletcher (1997) 522 U.S. 118 (denying absolute immunity to a prosecutor for personally attesting to the truth of the facts in a certificate to determine probable cause) because, here, the secretary made his statements on information and belief and as part of a disciplinary complaint, rather than on the basis of personal knowledge of facts in a separate document to establish probable cause.

Judges performing judicial functions in any matter over which they have jurisdiction have absolute immunity no matter how serious their misconduct. Judicial acts relate to functions normally performed by a judge where parties understand that they are dealing with a judge in his official capacity.

Here Judge Williams had absolute immunity for verbally assaulting plaintiff in the hall outside his courtroom during a settlement conference (including swearing and making obscene gestures) because he was performing a judicial function. Judge Williams did not have absolute immunity, however, for defamatory statements made to a reporter because speaking to the press about one of his cases was not a judicial function.

Ordinarily, Congress has no power to allow a private individual to sue a non-consenting State in its own court because States have Sovereign immunity. But public entities that are not arms of a State do not have sovereign immunity. Thus individuals may sue them without the States' consent.