In an effort to increase racial diversity a school district adopted an open choice plan instead of simply assigning students to the high schools nearest their homes. It also adopted a plan that uses a series of four “tiebreakers” to determine which students will be admitted to oversubscribed schools. The second “tiebreaker” is based on race. Parents challenged this method as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. A district court upheld the school district's plan.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. For race-based educational policies to withstand the requisite strict scrutiny analysis, the admissions program in question must employ narrowly tailored measures that further a compelling governmental interest. The Supreme Court has recognized the diversity rationale as a compelling government interest. However, the proposed admission plan is not narrowly tailored to further diversity. The racial “tiebreaker” criteria is virtually indistinguishable from a pure racial quota, because it establishes both a floor and a ceiling for each ethnicity to determine which students will be admitted. Furthermore, the district failed to demonstrate an earnest consideration of race-neutral alternatives to achieve diversity, such as an admissions lottery. Therefore, the district's proposed plan is unconstitutional.

Plaintiffs sued a school district under the IDEA on behalf of a hearing impaired student. The parents sought reimbursement for placement in a private institution. The dispute was litigated before a hearing officer and by an appellate hearing officer before a federal district court remanded the case to an administrative law judge. The judge objected to the parent's attorney because he was not a member of the State Bar. The concern was resolved when the state court authorized the attorney to appear pro hac vice. After the judge made factual findings the district court held in favor of the parents and authorized payment of attorney's fees incurred after the state court granted authorization.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The IDEA gives a district court the discretion to award attorney's fees to the parents of a child who is the prevailing party. However, the attorney must be licensed to practice law. Under Arizona statutes no person may practice law in unless the person is an active member of the State Bar or is authorized to appear pro hac vice. The plaintiff's argument that a hearing officer and opposing counsel consented to the initial representation is unavailing because statutory requirements may not be waived. Therefore, the district court properly denied attorney's fees prior to authorization to appear pro hac vice.

After terminating a construction contract for convenience, a school district retained another construction company to complete a renovation project. The district alleged that it was exempt from statutory competitive bidding requirements because the unfinished project posed a safety hazard to students thus creating an emergency. Plaintiffs sued to compel the district to allow competitive bidding for the project. The trial court held in favor of the plaintiffs.

The appellate court affirmed. The Public Contract Code defines an emergency as an unexpected occurrence that poses a clear and imminent danger, requiring immediate action to prevent or mitigate the loss of life, health, property or imminent services. The district's decision to terminate the initial contract was not a sudden, unexpected occurrence posing a clear and imminent danger. Furthermore, there is a strong p

A student passenger was severely injured in a school bus owned by the district. Each of two insurance companies contributed $2.1 million towards settlement of the student's claims. One insurance company sued to recover its contribution alleging that it was only responsible for excess liability coverage for amounts above the $3 million in coverage provided by the primary carrier. The defendant company alleged that its insurance policy was not intended to cover vehicles owned by the district and that this mutual mistake was corrected pursuant to an amendment executed after the accident. The trial court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs.

The appellate court reversed. The trial court erred in holding the defendant's belated agreement to change its policy invalid. Amending a policy by reformation to reflect the intent of the contracting parties may be proper even where the rights of third party claimants may be adversely affected. Both parties presented conflicting evidence regarding the coverage of defendant's insurance policy. Therefore, the allegations of mutual mistake of fact raised a material issue of fact for the court to resolve at trial and summary judgment was not proper.

Katz owns a house on property that straddles two school district boundaries. Most of the property lies outside of the defendant school district's boundary. However, the defendant district receives a portion of the property taxes paid. Katz sued the district after it denied entry to the son of tenants living on the property. The trial court ordered the school to admit the student.

The appellate court affirmed. Applicable sections of the Education Code are ambiguous. However, for purposes of construing the statute it is sufficient that some part of the place where the student's parents reside is located within the geographic territory of the district. Such interpretation is consistent with the overriding purpose of the Code which is to provide compulsory education. Therefore, even though only a small part of the house lies within district boundaries, the residence is located in the district for purposes of school enrollment.

Parents brought suit on behalf of their children against charter schools that allegedly promised to provide instructors, computers and educational materials for at-home education but failed to do so. Plaintiffs claimed breach of contract, misrepresentation and violations of the California False Claim Act (CFCA). The trial court held that all claims were related to the quality of education and thus barred by the educational malfeasance doctrine.

The appellate court affirmed that schools were immune to claims of breach of contract and misrepresentation but reversed dismissal of CFCA claims. Actions based on breach of contract and misrepresentation are barred because resolution would require review of the quality of education received. Classroom methodology poses no readily acceptable standards of care, causation, or injury. The trial court erred in applying the educational malfeasance doctrine to CFCA claims because they are based on allegations that the school defrauded the state by submitting false attendance records. The standards of care, causation and injury for these claims are easily measured and unrelated to classroom methodology.

A contractor submitted the low bid on a school construction project. The contractor then realized that its bid included a clerical error and timely sent the district a letter withdrawing its bid. The district told the contractor that it would be contacted if more information was needed. The district failed to inform the contractor that the letter did not provide sufficient information to comply with the bid withdrawal statute. Instead, it waited for the bid withdrawal period to lapse and granted it the contract. The trial court granted the contractor a rescission and dismissed the district's cross complaint for breach of contract.

The appellate court affirmed. The district deliberately induced the contractor's failure to meet statutory bid withdrawal requirements. These actions are inconsistent with the Public Contract Code's purpose of insuring fairness in the bidding, awarding, and administration of public contracts. The district is therefore estopped from enforcing the contract.

The plaintiff, a first grade student, was seriously injured when a car struck her on a street next to an elementary school. Her complaint alleged that the school district breached its duty of care by failing to provide supervision. The trial court granted summary judgment in the defendant's favor.

The appellate court affirmed. Under Education Code section 44808 a school district is not liable for injuries incurred off campus and after school unless they arise out of the district's negligence on school grounds, or were the result of some specific undertaking performed negligently. In this case the school's administrative regulations addressing students left on site after school hours did not constitute such an undertaking.

An eleventh grade student was having consensual sex with a teacher, and had been since the tenth grade. The student's parents found out and reported the crime. The teacher was convicted. The parents brought a civil suit against the school district for emotional distress. A jury awarded the parents damages for distress.

The appellate court reversed. A school district cannot be held liable to the parents of a student who was having an affair with a teacher. There was no negligent hiring or supervision. Even if there had been, the district cannot be liable unless the negligence was directed at injuring the parents.

Defendant charter high school received its charter from a city elementary school district. Under Proposition 39, school districts must provide facilities to charter schools within their district. The plaintiff city high school district did not want to contribute to the charter school and claimed that the elementary school district should pick up the bill. A trial court ordered the plaintiff to provide facilities to the charter school.

The appellate court affirmed. The requirement that public school districts provide funding to charter schools within that district is not limited to public schools that sponsored the charter school. Students who would normally be attending the plaintiff school are attending the defendant school, thus the plaintiff school must share funds.

Plaintiffs are a mentally retarded public school student and his parents. They sued the school district for violation of the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act for denial of a free appropriate public education. The District Court granted summary judgment in the district's favor.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The school district's decision to create an individualized education program the student without his parents present did not deny the child a free appropriate public education. The district's decision to not include the child in a regular classroom was based on the opinions of many people who had worked with the child.

Plaintiff was a 14-year-old member of defendant school district's swim team. Swim meets were held at a racing pool. The water was three and one-half feet deep at either end. Plaintiff told her coach that she was terrified of diving in the shallow water. The coach promised her that she would not have to dive. On the day of the meet, the coach told her she would have to dive. She broke her neck on the third practice dive. Plaintiff sued the coach and the school district. A trial court held in defendants' favor, citing assumption of risk. An appellate court affirmed.

The California Supreme Court reversed and remanded. A coach may be liable for inexperienced athletes' injuries if his conduct is reckless. A coach acts recklessly when his acts are totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in coaching the particular sport. Demanding a young athlete to perform the very act which terrifies her, with no prior training, raises a triable issue regarding the coach's behavior.

Plaintiff public high school student allegedly defaced a classmate's name in a publication. A group of students repeatedly threatened the plaintiff. The dean recommended that plaintiff be transferred to another high school. The school district did not act on the recommendation. One morning before the start of school, plaintiff was shot in the neck by a classmate with a gun. They had met at school and had walked to a sidewalk outside the school grounds. A trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district on the ground that the shooting was unforeseeable.

The appellate court reversed and remanded. School districts have a duty to protect students from foreseeable harm. Where a student has been subject to repeated threats, it is foreseeable that he will be attacked and shot. It does not matter that the attack occurred before school hours and off of school grounds.

Plaintiff is a public school student with Down's syndrome. In her old school, she was mainstreamed with the general student population. When her family relocated, she was placed in a special classroom. Her mother sued the district for violation of the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act. The District Court held in favor of the school district.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. IDEA requires that when a school district takes in a transfer student, it must approximate the environment of the student's old school. However, the school district may consider the burden on the teacher and other students. Thus, the school district's placement of the child was proper under IDEA.

Plaintiff is a mentally retarded 15-year-old public school student. She was dropped off every day at school at 7:15 a.m. There was no direct supervision of students until 7:45 a.m. Plaintiff was sexually assaulted before 7:45 in a school restroom. She sued the school district for negligent failure to supervise the campus. A trial court found the school district liable.

The appellate court affirmed. The school district had a duty to protect plaintiff from the assault. It was aware that students, including plaintiff, arrived on campus well before 7:45 a.m. Moreover, they knew that the student who attacked plaintiff was a troubled child. This created a foreseeable risk of assault.

An elementary school vice principal taped a second grade student's head to a tree for disciplinary purposes. A fifth-grade girl suggested the action might be excessive and the vice principal gave the girl permission to remove the tape. The boy sued the state department of education and the vice principal under §1983 for violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The District Court denied the vice principal's motion for summary judgment and qualified immunity.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed and remanded for further proceedings on the Fourth Amendment claim. A student has a Fourth Amendment right to be free of excessive physical punishment or restraint at the hands of teachers and school disciplinarians employed by the state. A school vice principal should know that taping a child's head to a tree would violate the child's constitutional rights.

Plaintiffs sought to distribute anti-abortion and pro-abstinence literature at a high school as students arrived in the morning. The principal of the high school refused to let them do so. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, asserting that the school's regulations violated their right to speak. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the school.

The appellate court affirmed. A high school has a strong interest in preventing disruption at school. The high school is not a college campus, and it is not a public forum. Therefore, high school administration may limit access by outsiders, regardless of their message or purpose, in order to prevent disruption.

Article XIII B, § 6 of the California Constitution provides that whenever the state mandates a new program on a local government, it shall reimburse additional costs incurred because of the program. School districts participated in state-funded programs requiring the development of advisory committees. They sought reimbursement for the costs of developing the committees. The trial court held that a reimbursable state mandate is not created unless the local entity has no true choice but to participate in the program. The appellate court reversed, concluding that a reimbursable state mandate is created even if the program is not required by state law.

The California Supreme Court reversed. A local entity is not entitled to reimbursement if the state, in providing program funds to the local entity, already has provided funds to cover additional expenses. If the state were to impose a substantial penalty upon any local entity that declined to participate in a program, that might create a reimbursable state mandate.

A public school student threatened to hit a student and was suspected of having set fire to a poster on a bulletin board. Minor plaintiff was punched by that student during a fight the next day. Plaintiff and his parents sued the school district for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district.

The appellate court affirmed. A school district does not owe a duty to students to suspend a student who is suspected of a bad act or who threatens another student. The school correctly intended to investigate the allegations prior to suspending the student.

Plaintiff was to give a speech at his high school graduation. He wanted to encourage his fellow graduates to develop a personal relationship with God and Jesus. The principal censored those portions of the speech. She allowed distribution of the full written speech at the ceremony. The student sued for First Amendment violation. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Defendant's actions were necessary to avoid a conflict with the Establishment Clause. Had the speech been given as intended, dissenters in the audience would have been forced to implicitly participate in plaintiff's proselytizing through their silence.

Plaintiff school teacher did not receive written notice of her status as a temporary employee until she had been working in the classroom more than two weeks. She sued to enforce Education Code §44916. The trial court held that the notice came too late and that plaintiff must be considered a probationary employee. The appellate court reversed.

The California Supreme Court reversed. Under Education Code §44916, school districts must provide new certificated teachers with written notice of employment status on or before their first day of work. If the district fails to do so, the employee's status is considered probationary as a matter of law.

Several high school students accused a fellow student of multiple accounts of sexually-related misbehavior. This included touching another student in a sexually abusive manner and making obscene gestures. The accused was informed of the charges. He admitted to the conduct. He was suspended from school for five days. He sued under §1983 for violation of due process. The trial court held in his favor.

The appellate court reversed. A student facing short-term suspension from school for sexually-related misbehavior has minimal due process rights. These include the right to a hearing. The hearing however, need only include a brief description of the accusation and a chance to rebut the acts. It is not necessary to identify the accusers.

During a school board meeting, appellant dumped two 13-gallon bags of school trash onto a tarp in the cafeteria. He intended to display drug paraphernalia and empty alcohol bottles contained therein. The superintendent called the police. The police refused to arrest appellant because no misdemeanor had been committed in their presence. The superintendent made a citizen's arrest of appellant for wilfully disturbing a public meeting. Officers handcuffed appellant and brought him to the station. He was issued a citation and released. He sued the school district for false arrest, false imprisonment and violation of his First Amendment rights. A jury held in favor of the defendants.

The appellate court affirmed. The act of dumping gallons of garbage on a school cafeteria floor during a school board meeting is sufficient to support an arrest for disturbing a public meeting. Such an act substantially impairs a school board meeting and is not protected by the First Amendment.

Plaintiffs had a daughter with cerebral palsy in the public school system. Five times a week, the child was removed from her regular classroom for unsupervised peer tutoring. Plaintiffs sued for violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act for lost educational opportunity. They sued for money damages. The District Court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff appealed on the ground that they had sued for money damages, a remedy not available under IDEA.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Where a plaintiff has alleged injuries that could be redressed to some degree by IDEA's administrative procedures and remedies, exhaustion of administrative remedies is required. Parents should not be permitted to opt out of IDEA simply by making a demand of money or services not available under IDEA. Where it is unclear whether injuries could be redressed under IDEA, exhaustion is required.

The state eliminated its bilingual education program, which had allowed students with limited proficiency in English to take classes in their native languages. The new proposition required classes be taught in English, unless the student had a special need. Plaintiff immigrant public school student sued the state, claiming that the proposition violated Equal Protection. The district court dismissed the claim.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. An initiative requiring public school classes be taught in English does not prevent minorities from receiving equal treatment. The state has a moral obligation and a constitutional duty to teach its students the English language. They can do this by conducting classes in English. Knowledge of the English language is necessary in helping children become productive members of society.

Plaintiff real estate developer replaced a 56-unit apartment complex with 38 single family homes. The school district imposed a fee viewing the project as “new residential construction” within the meaning of Education Code section 17620. That code imposes a fee when new homes are built, to compensate for student population growth. Plaintiff sued for a refund claiming that the homes were not new residential construction. The trial court held in favor of the school district.

The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. Redevelopment construction is subject to imposition of school impact fees under Education Code section 17620 although the statute does not expressly address it. However, the fee amount must be reasonably related to the increase in new residences.

A student at a public institution sued a teacher for negligence after he was injured during a field trip. The teacher claimed his action was barred by the school field trip immunity set forth in California Education Code section 35330. The trial court held that the statute's bar did not extend to school district employees.

The appellate court reversed. California Education Code section 35330 extends to employees of school districts. Although the statute expressly bars personal injury suit against school districts and the state, the statute should be extended to employees of school districts. Otherwise, the legislature's intent to provide absolute immunity to school districts for personal injury claims arising from field trips would be undermined.

A community college district hired appellant as a temporary teacher under California Education Code section 87482.5. Under the Code, a teacher must not exceed sixty percent of the hours per week considered full time for regular employees. Appellant filed for reclassification as a regular employee when her workload increased beyond that amount. The trial court denied appellant's writ of mandate.

The appellate court reversed. It remanded for determination of how many hours appellant actually worked. Under California Education Code section 87482.5, a temporary employee who exceeds sixty percent of full time is entitled to automatic reclassification as a regular employee.

The California Constitution provides that whenever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program on a local government, the state shall reimburse the local government for the cost of the program. The San Diego Unified School District sought reimbursement under the Constitution for costs incurred in carrying out expulsions of students for possession of a firearm at school -- which was required by the state. The District Court granted the school district's petition and ordered reimbursement.

The appellate court affirmed. If a state mandates expulsion of a student, the school district is entitled to full reimbursement. If the state made expulsion discretionary, the school district is reimbursed to the extent the costs result from hearing procedures mandated by the state and exceeding federal due process requirements.

A state scholarship program gives vouchers to families so that their children can attend private religious or non-religious schools. Most of the families using the vouchers chose religious schools. Taxpayers sued, arguing that the voucher system violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Federal District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the taxpayers. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The voucher program was enacted for the valid secular purpose of providing educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public school system. It is a program of true private choice -- parents can choose to send their children to any religious or non-religious school. It is neutral in all respects toward religion and therefore does not violate the First Amendment.

Respondent students sued the board of education. They alleged that the policy that all students participating in extracurricular activities submit to drug testing violated their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches. The Tenth Circuit held that the policy was unconstitutional.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The policy of testing students for drug use serves the Board's important interest in detecting and preventing drug use among its students. The drug test is a reasonably effective means of addressing drug use in the face of evidence of increased drug use at schools.

Respondent student sued a private university after the university contacted the state agency responsible for teacher certification. The university discussed allegations of sexual misconduct against the student. This was in violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. The student was denied an affidavit of good moral character which was required of all new teachers. The Washington Supreme Court reinstated the student's action.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded. To create new rights enforceable under §1983, Congress is required to do so in clear and unambiguous terms. The student's action under FERPA was foreclosed because the relevant FERPA provisions created no personal rights to enforce under §1983.

Plaintiff sued the school district and the State Department of Education contending that the racial and ethnic balancing component of the district's open-transfer policy violates Proposition 209. The district court granted the district's motion for summary judgment.

The appellate court reversed. School districts retain the authority to maintain appropriate racial and ethnic balances in their schools. However, the Huntington Beach school district classifies its students by ethnicity and will not allow a student of a certain ethnicity to transfer in unless a student of that ethnicity transfers out. That violates Proposition 209.

Plaintiff's daughter was performing badly in school although she scored high on traditional IQ tests. The parents sued under the Individuals with Disabilities Act claiming that the school's “standardized tests” were inadequate in detecting learning disabilities. The parents claimed that a traditional IQ test should be used at the public schools. The district court held that the standardized tests were adequate.

The appellate court affirmed. A discrepancy in a child's education assessment report does not render a standardized learning disability test inadequate. Also, if a parent chooses to test a child's intelligence independently, the school is not required to reimburse them the costs of testing. Moreover, the parents' due process rights were not infringed.

Plaintiff sued the State Department of Labor and Industrial Relations and the vocational rehabilitation supervisor, alleging violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The school required him to take twelve units per semester although the DLIR recommended he only take nine because of his dyslexia. They also refused him the proper specialized computer programs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his dyslexia was a disability under the ADA and whether the DLIR acted reasonably in refusing plaintiff's request for a reasonable accommodation. However, the grant of summary judgment in favor of the rehabilitation supervisor under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act was affirmed because it was barred by the comprehensive remedial scheme of those Acts.

Plaintiff sued, arguing that under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, a request for preliminary injunction to maintain the educational status quo of a disabled child must be automatically granted. Pursuant to the “stay put” provision, plaintiff was required to remain in the same educational program until a school-parent dispute was resolved. The district court considered traditional preliminary injunction factors.

The appellate court affirmed. To succeed in enjoining a preexisting “stay put” order, a plaintiff must demonstrate either a combination of probable success and the possibility of irreparable harm, or that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardship tips in plaintiff's favor.

An injured student athlete sued her coach and the school district for negligence and premises liability. The trial court determined that the negligence claim was barred by assumption of risk. It determined that there was no material factual dispute regarding premises liability. It granted summary judgment on both claims.

The appellate court affirmed. A racing dive into a shallow pool is fundamental to competitive swimming. Requiring deeper pools would chill opportunities for participation. Thus, plaintiff assumed the risk of her injury. The instructor was not liable because his conduct was not intentionally harmful or reckless. Nor did his conduct increase the inherent risks of the sport. There was no premises liability because the shallowness of the swimming pool where plaintiff was injured was obvious to all users. Thus, placement of starting blocks at the shallow end of the pool did not constitute a dangerous condition of public property.

Teachers sometimes ask students to grade each other's school assignments. Plaintiff students alleged that peer grading violated the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. The act allows federal funds to be withheld from school districts that permit students' education records to be released without their parent's written consent. The district court held that grades put on papers are not education records as covered by the Act. The appellate court reversed.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Peer grading does not violate the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. A student grader is not a person acting for an educational institution. Student grading can be as much a part of the assignment as taking the test itself. The court did not reach the broader question of whether the Act protects grades on individual assignments once they are turned in to teachers.

A teacher sued the Windsor Unified School District demanding it employ her as a permanent certificated teacher. Relying on Education Code section 44911, the District argued that the two years plaintiff had spent teaching under emergency permits could not be counted toward time necessary for her to attain permanent status. The trial court issued the writ in favor of the teacher.

The appellate court reversed. Under Education Code section 44911, time spent teaching under an emergency teaching credential may not be counted in computing an employee's progress toward permanent status -- unless the employee is credentialed in another state and passes a basic skills proficiency test (CBEST). Both requirements must be satisfied -- not one or the other.

Plaintiff graduated from an Australian high school and wanted to retake his senior year in America. The California Interscholastic Federation and the high school found him ineligible because he had completed eight semesters at another high school. The trial court held that the right to participate in interscholastic sports constitutes a property or liberty interest protected by the due process clause of both the federal and California Constitutions. CIF appealed.

The court of appeal reversed. Under the due process clause of the federal constitution, a declared-ineligible student has no property interest in, and thus no due process right to an opportunity to play high school sports. In being allowed to appeal the decision, plaintiff was provided the process to which he was due. Under the California Constitution's due process clause, there is no statutorily-conferred right to participate in high school sports. The right to free education ends at attending a public school where the student is eligible.

Proposition 227 restricts the use of languages other than English in public schools, and permits parents to sue teachers, administrators and officials who violate the restrictions. The California Teachers Association sued the State Board of Education alleging that the Proposition and its enforcement provision were unconstitutional as facially vague. The district court granted the Board summary judgment.

The appellate court affirmed. The Proposition and its parental enforcement provision are not facially vague. Any vagueness in the Proposition threatens to chill only a small amount of legitimate speech; instructional speech receives minimal protection under the First Amendment, assuming it receives any protection at all; and the initiative's high scienter requirement mitigates any potential vagueness.

A school officer detained defendant student because he looked nervous, and was in a forbidden area of campus. When school officials and a security officer detained and searched him, they found a knife in his pocket. In trial court, defendant moved to exclude evidence of the knife. He claimed the detention violated the Fourth Amendment, because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The trial court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed.

The Supreme Court affirmed. The reasonable suspicion standard which governs detentions on the street does not govern detentions on school grounds. In fact, the Fourth Amendment may not apply to such detentions because students have limited freedom at school. If viewed as a substantive due process deprivation, the government's strong interest in maintaining order in school is weighed against the student's weak interest in protecting his vitiated liberty of action. The constitutional test is whether officials' conduct was arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. Defendant never claimed the officials here acted in such a manner.

District psychologists wrote reports indicating that plaintiff preschooler may have been autistic. The district did not disclose this information to plaintiff's parents, although it did enroll her in a special education program. When the parents discovered their child was autistic, they requested a due process hearing to determine whether she was received a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Act. The State Officer ruled that the District denied her a FAPE, but the Review Officer reversed. The district court affirmed.

The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. A court must give due weight to a Review Officer's decision, unless it involves the credibility of a witness. Here, the State Officer correctly determined the district psychologist did not inform plaintiff's parents of her potential autism. Since the Individuals with Disabilities Act requires the district to provide parents with child records, the District violated the Act's procedures, and did not provide plaintiff with a FAPE.

Defendant District opened its facilities for after-school education and recreation. Plaintiff evangelical organization claimed free speech and free exercise of religion violations when defendant withdrew their access to the school. The district court granted an injunction ordering the District to provide plaintiffs the same access to school facilities as other community groups.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The District created a limited public forum. Like other groups, the organization's purpose was educational. The District could not discriminate against it merely on the basis of viewpoint. The organization's meetings did not violate the Establishment Clause. An adult's perspective, not a child's, must be adopted when determining whether a school's actions endorse a religion. From that perspective, permitting the organization to meet at the school after-hours did not constitute an endorsement.

Plaintiff subcontractor performed lath and plaster work on an elementary school. He agreed to pay workers the prevailing wages for their work. Ten years later, defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) directed the contractor to withhold $19,849.83 from plaintiff for failure to pay prevailing wages. Plaintiff requested a formal hearing by The Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards (DLSE). The hearing officer found that LAUSD technicians had reasonable cause to withhold sums. Employees worked on Saturdays and journeymen were paid improperly. Plaintiff then filed 42 U.S.C.S Section 1983 claims against LAUSD, and sought a writ of administrative mandamus against DLSE. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrers. It ruled that the one-year statute of limitations barred plaintiff's section 1983 claims, and the 60-day statute of limitations barred consideration of the writ of mandamus.

The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The trial court properly dismissed the section 1983 claims accusing the LAUSD of inappropriate conduct during the hearing. Judicial officers in quasi judicial hearings are immune from civil rights suits. Also, the facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint only established parties disagreed about relevant law. However, dismissal of the claims against DLSE was improper. While the Supreme Court recently held that a government withholding of subcontractor's wages without notice or hearing did not violate due process rights, it stipulated that plaintiffs must have sufficient opportunity to pursue their claims in state court. DLSE's hearing was inadequate because it did not decide whether a violation occurred, and because it did not gather enough evidence. DLSE's demurrer to the petition for administrative mandamus should not have been sustained on statute of limitations grounds. The pleading was timely under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6.

Plaintiff high school student showed a teacher his poem; the poem described plaintiff killing his classmates. Defendant principal emergency expelled plaintiff. However, the student was allowed him to return to school after 17 days, based on a psychiatric recommendation. Plaintiff filed suit claiming the expulsion violated his First Amendment rights, seeking damages and an order enjoining defendants from maintaining records of his expulsion. The district court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and rejected defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. For First Amendment purposes, there are three categories of student speech: (1) vulgar speech; (2) school-sponsored speech; and (3) all other speech. Plaintiff's poem fell into the third category. To suppress speech falling within the third category, officials must show facts that might reasonably have led them to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities. Officials could reasonably forecast substantial disruption based on the content of plaintiff's poem, his troubled home life, and his history of disciplinary problems at school. Further, officials expelled plaintiff to protect student safety, not to punish him. They allowed him to return to school as soon as a psychiatrist determined he was not a threat to others. Therefore, the expulsion did not violate his First Amendment rights. However, the school had no reason to permanently blemish plaintiff's record by maintaining negative documentation in his file. The district court properly prohibited maintenance of such documentation.

A student may seek tuition reimbursement for special education services at private schools if the public school does not provide a "free public education" as required by the IDEA. The IDEA does not specify a limitations period governing either a plaintiff's request for administrative hearing or the filing of a civil action. Therefore, the federal courts must determine the most closely analogous state statute of limitations and apply that statute unless it undermines the policies underlying the IDEA.

In the present case, the federal Ninth Circuit affirmed that the Oregon two year limitations period under Oregon Tort Claim Act applies. The Ninth Circuit declined to adopt Oregon's longer six year "catch all limitations" for any claim alleging a "liability created by statute." This decision is in accord with other federal appellate courts holding that short limitations periods support the IDEA's policy of expeditious resolution of disputes.

The message for California is not entirely clear. Possible candidates for limitations for IDEA claims would include the two year statute of limitations under the California Tort Claim Act, Government Code section 945.6(a)(2), or the three year statute of limitations for enforcing statutory liability, Code of Civil Procedure section 337(1). Given the similarities between the OTCA and the CTCA, the latter might be the Ninth Circuit's choice. Some states have enacted special statutes of limitations claims for IDEA reimbursement claims, but California apparently has not.

Civil Code section 3287 governs award of prejudgment interest. The pre-1967 version of section 3287 provided that prevailing plaintiffs had a right to prejudgment interest on liquidated damages (i.e. damages that were certain, or could be made certain by calculation). It specified that "this section" applied to public entity defendants as well as private defendants. In 1967, section 3287 was amended. The existing provision for prejudgment interest on liquidated damages became subdivision (a). The amendment added subdivision (b), which gives courts discretion to award prejudgment interest on unliquidated damages in contract cases. Subdivision (b) did not state whether it applied to public entities. After analyzing the statute's language, the court decided that subdivision (b) does allow discretionary prejudgment interest awards against public entity defendants. It interpreted the words "this section" in subdivision (a) to apply to the entire statute, not just that subdivision. The interpretation promotes, rather than subverts, the policies behind the Government Claims Act: promoting early investigation and settlement of claims. Since subdivision (b) only allows an award of interest from the date a lawsuit is filed, if a claim is settled at the administrative stage prejudgment interest will never become an issue.

Plaintiff union representatives visited defendant's company's construction sites to inspect for unsafe conditions and wage violations. Defendant school Superintendent warned them they had to register with the school before coming on the property. Defendant Company placed them under citizen's arrest on two occasions when they refused to leave. Two District Attorneys declined to press trespass charges, but a third prosecuted plaintiffs without doing legal research. The jury acquitted the plaintiff union representatives. Plaintiffs sued the Company, the Superintendent, and the District Attorney, claiming conspiracy to violate their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and violations of state law including false arrest and false imprisonment. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on all claims, and sanctioned plaintiffs' attorneys $75,000 under Rule 11.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The district court properly dismissed all section 1983 claims. No evidence suggested either the District Attorney or the Superintendent had conspired to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights. In addition, because no evidence suggested a governmental actor conspired with the Company, a section 1983 claim, which requires state action, could not be brought against it. The district court erred when it dismissed the state law claims under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel could not apply because the state court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for a directed verdict was not subject to appeal. Appellees erred when they contended that The National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C section 157) preempted state false arrest and false imprisonment law. The state has traditionally regulated that area of the law, and the state has a substantial interest in regulating it. This is true even though the state statutes refer to the NLRA. Finally, the district court erred when it awarded defendants Rule 11 sanctions. Defendants did not comply with Rule 11's mandatory twenty-one day advance service provision.

The respondent met with her supervisor and another male co-worker to review job applicant files. When the supervisor commented to the other co-worker that he did not understand a sexually explicit remark in one of the files, the co-worker responded that he would explain later, and the two men laughed. The respondent complained to another supervisor that the two co-workers' reactions constituted sexual harassment. The respondent claimed that she was transferred as a result of her complaint, and as a result of filing charges against the Clark County School District with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The respondent sued the School District, alleging it retaliated against her in response to protected activities in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The School District appealed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment.

The Supreme Court reversed. Any punishment suffered by the respondent for complaining to the School District's officials did not constitute actionable retaliation. The incident itself did not violate Title VII. Her complaints about it thus did not constitute protected activity. The conduct of the co-workers' at most constituted an isolated incident which could not be deemed sufficiently severe and pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of her employment. Further, the School District's intention to transfer the respondent, expressed shortly after the lawsuit was filed, did not establish a causal connection between the transfer and the lawsuit based on temporal proximity. The School District was not served with the complaint until after the statement was made.

The plaintiff was a student at Mission Viejo High School, and president of the Fellowship of Christian Athletes student club. The club's application was rejected when it sought formal club status at the high school. The Saddleback Valley Unified School District argued that all of the clubs at the high school were curriculum-related; therefore the high school was a closed forum to which the provisions of the Federal Equal Access Act did not apply. The plaintiff sued the District, alleging that the school violated his rights under the FEAA by denying his application. The District sought summary judgment, claiming that the provisions of the FEAA were inapplicable because the high school was a closed forum. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the plaintiff's club was not entitled to access under the FEAA because of the provision in the club's constitution giving faculty advisors some authority over the selection of officers, and that granting it access to campus would therefore amount to impermissible state sponsorship of religion. Moreover, the court concluded that, because participation in two other school clubs satisfied the high school's community-service graduation requirement, those clubs were curriculum-related and the high school, therefore, maintained a closed forum to which the plaintiff had no right of access under the FEAA.

The appellate court reversed. In making curriculum-relatedness determinations, courts must look not only at what schools say, but also at what they do. Community service clubs are, at best, only marginally related to the usual high school curriculum. Therefore, allowing participation in those clubs to satisfy a graduation requirement does not necessarily transform them into scholastic endeavors. Moreover, allowing the high school to remain a closed forum merely by making participation in such marginal groups a graduation prerequisite would essentially permit the high school to evade the FEAA by requiring some or all students to have limited participation in a club designated to be curriculum-related.

The plaintiff schoolteacher sued her school district employer for race discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The appellate court affirmed. The plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to defeat the defendant's summary judgment. Although there was other evidence that would have made the plaintiff's claim strong enough to defeat the motion, the evidence was not in her summary judgment papers, but was in other papers on file. There was no evidence in the deposition, or anywhere else in the summary judgment papers, of any basis in personal knowledge for the plaintiff's subjective belief about the defendant's motive. The district court judge was not required to examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact where the evidence was not set forth in the plaintiff's opposition papers so that the evidence could have been conveniently found. Whatever establishes a genuine issue of material fact must both be in the district court file and in the response. A lawyer drafting an opposition to a summary judgment motion can easily show a judge, in the opposition, the evidence that the lawyer wants the judge to read. It is difficult for a judge to perform a search through the entire record to look for the evidence.

A student was expelled from school by the school board for possession of a pipe bomb. The Sacramento County Board of Education overturned the School Board's decision, stating that the school board failed to expel the student within the forty days set forth in the California Educational Code section 48919, therefore depriving the school board of jurisdiction to discipline the pupil. The appellate court reversed. Statutorily prescribed time limits are usually deemed to be directory unless the Legislature clearly expresses a contrary intent. In construing a statute, a court may consider the consequences that would follow from a particular construction and will not readily imply an unreasonable legislative purpose. Furthermore, since the statute contained no penalty for noncompliance, nor an exhaustion provision, the only remedy for failure to adhere to the deadline would be a writ of mandate to compel compliance. The statute's failure to impose a consequence for failure to meet the deadline brings it within the general rule that the "shall" directive in the statute was intended to be only directory. Further, the statute's language showed a legislative intent that the time limitation be directory. Language in the statute allowed a pupil to request a postponement without giving a time limit. Finally, the statute expressed that a proceeding be conducted with reasonable diligence and without any unnecessary delay following commencement of a hearing. The court found that this language would be inconsistent with a finding that the forty day period was mandatory. The court distinguished this case from Garcia v. Los Angeles County Board of Education (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 807 [177 Cal.Rptr. 29] (holding an expulsion hearing under former section 48914 was mandatory rather than directory) because here the right at issue was the right to a decision once the hearing has been held, which is not be comparable in constitutional stature to the right to a prompt expulsion hearing.

Three organizations that represented the interests of minority educators sued California and the Commission on Teacher Credentialing, alleging that California's test for teacher credentialing (CBEST) had a disproportionate, adverse impact on minority teacher candidates and violated Title VII. Both parties moved for summary judgment on whether Title VII applied to the CBEST. The district court determined that it was applicable. At the trial's conclusion, the court held for the defendants, but did not grant defendants' motion for costs. Both parties appealed. The plaintiffs contended that the district court erred in concluding that the CBEST was properly validated. The defendants cross-appealed the summary adjudication that Title VII applied to the CBEST, and the order denying costs.

Title VII states that discriminatory treatment by employers shall be unlawful. In California, public school teachers are employees of the local school district, not the state. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit determined that a direct employment relationship is not a prerequisite for the state's Title VII liability. California exercises a substantial degree of control over local school districts that affect the day-to-day operations of its public schools. The court held that California's level of involvement in public education was sufficient for Title VII to apply to the CBEST. The court also held that the district court's reliance on studies that validated the CBEST as testing skills important to job performance was not clearly erroneous, and upheld the district court's determination. Finally, the court found that the district court had discretion on whether it would be equitable to award defendants their costs.

Two graduating students were asked by their school to give a valedictory speech and an invocation at their graduation ceremony. The principal refused to allow them to give their speeches when he discovered that the content of their speeches contained religious references and denominational advocacy. The two students, along with other students and parents, sued the district and the district officials, alleging a violation of free speech. They sued for an injunction to allow students to give sectarian speeches, and for damages. The appellate court found that since the two students who were asked to give graduation speeches had graduated, their injunctive claims were moot. There was no standing for the third party parents and other students because any injury to those parties was too speculative to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III. The district was immune from suit because of the Eleventh Amendment, and the district officials received qualified immunity from the damage claims because they acted reasonably in trying to avoid violating the Establishment Clause.

A California school district suspended an employee for 30 days for telling bidders on a district construction project that there was a conflict of interest in the selection process. The employee sought a writ of mandate to overturn the suspension. The trial court found that the communication was protected by the First Amendment and overturned the suspension. The employee then sued the district, alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The district contended that it was an arm of the state and thereby entitled to sovereign immunity.

On appeal, the court found that the ability to sue a California school district under section 1983 turned on whether California school districts are instrumentalities of the state entitled to 11th Amendment immunity. If the districts are instrumentalities of the state, they are immune to section 1983 suits. The appellate court weighed a number of factors to determine whether the districts are instrumentalities of the state, including: that public education in California is a fundamental concern of the state; the state constitution has always vested plenary power over education in the state and not the districts; and that the state funds the districts with state funds, and controls the fiscal affairs and political status of the districts. The court held that on balance, the factors favored finding that California school districts are instrumentalities of the state.

The parents of a home-schooled disabled child sued the school district they were geographically in because the district refused to subsidize speech therapy services that the child was medically eligible for. The parents alleged that the district violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. section 1400 et seq. (IDEA). IDEA provides special services for disabled children in "private schools". The parents contended that the district's definition of "private schools" violates IDEA because it did not include home-schooled children. The Ninth Circuit held that IDEA leaves discretion to the states to determine what constitutes a "private school" and affirmed the dismissal of the IDEA claim.

The parents also brought suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 alleging that the district's policy of not providing IDEA funds for home-schooled children violated the child's equal protection and due process rights. The Ninth Circuit found that there was no fundamental right to receive funds to educate a child at home, nor was the child a member of a suspect class. There was a legitimate government interest in the district's action, namely to maximize utility of scarce educational funds. Thus, there was no equal protection or due process violation.

A disabled student instituted a due process hearing before the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). IDEA guarantees procedural safeguards for handicapped children for free appropriate public education. During the course of the hearing a settlement was reached to provide the student with an appropriate education program. The SEHO hearing officer ordered the parties to abide by the terms of the settlement. California Education Code section 56505(g) states that a special education due process hearing shall be the final administrative determination binding on all parties. Once a decision is rendered by SEHO, that decision is final and the same issue may not be revisited by SEHO.

The parents initiated a second SEHO due process hearing alleging that the district failed to comply with the prior order. The request was denied because SEHO did not have jurisdiction to hear issues regarding compliance.. Issues pertaining to compliance must be brought before the Compliance Office of the California Department of Education. The parents sued in district court asserting that SEHO had jurisdiction to hear the issues concerning compliance. The Ninth Circuit held that pursuant to section 56505(g), SEHO did not have jurisdiction to hold a due process hearing regarding the school district's alleged noncompliance with a final order from a prior SEHO due process hearing.

Golden Day School operated child care programs in Los Angeles under contracts awarded annually by the California Department of Education. Golden Day received contracts with the Department for numerous years to provide child care programs. During an application review, it was determined that audit reports for Golden Day were unacceptable. Golden Day was debarred from eligibility to apply for a new contract for three years. Golden Day requested an administrative hearing on the decision. One of the members on the Appeals Panel was the person who determined that Golden Day's audits were unacceptable. Golden Day appealed on the ground that it was not given a fair hearing because of this conflict.

The Court of Appeals held that an employee involved in investigating a case may not participate as an adjudicator of the case. Also, since one of the members on the hearing panel was the person who determined that the audits were unacceptable, this violated the Department's own rule, Reg.18003(a)(3) of the Child Care and Development Services Act, which requires that members of the Appeals Panel shall be independent from the application review process.

A public high school teacher objected to his school district's recognition of Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month, which included a bulletin board put up by other staff regarding homosexuality and tolerance. Under district policy, the board's content was subject to the discretion of the principal. Only faculty and staff had access to post on the board. The teacher put up a competing bulletin board on campus and posted anti-homosexual materials on it. The principal removed, or ordered the teacher to remove the materials he placed on the board. The teacher filed suit against the district alleging a violation of his freedom of expression and equal protection.

The court found that the speaker was the district through its agent, the principal. Because the boards were merely an outlet for the district to express its own views, they were not a public forum and viewpoint neutrality did not apply. The principal's acceptance or removal of materials on the boards was equivalent to the district speaking or choosing not to speak. The district, in policing the boundaries of its own message, did not violate the teacher's free speech rights. Since the teacher had no First Amendment right to speak for the district, his equal protection claim based upon the deprivation of this asserted right also failed.

The Long Beach Community College District disqualified appellant from consideration for a managerial position because her husband was on the Board of Trustees, thereby entailing a prohibited conflict of interest. She was already employed by the District as an accountant. Appellant petitioned for a writ of mandate to reverse the District's decision. The trial court denied the petition, and the appellate court affirmed. Government Code section 1091.5(a)(6) is an exception to section 1090's conflict of interest prohibition. Section 1091.5(a)(6) allows a spouse employed by the District to retain her job, if she held the job for more than a year before her husband became a Board member. The appellant construed employment as meaning any job within the District, but the court of appeals disagreed, and used a strict interpretation of employment. It held that it means the same job, or such a sufficiently similar job as to amount to the same job. Promoting appellant to a managerial position would be tantamount to giving her a new job, and would require the Board to act. Thus, the exception does not apply.

Pursuant to Oregon's Complaint Resolution Procedure (CRP), the parents of an autistic child filed a complaint with the Oregon Department of Education regarding deficiencies in their child's education program. The child was entitled to special-education benefits under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. Secs. 1400-1490. The Department ordered the school district to convene an Individualized Education Program (IEP) to address the errors that the Department identified. The parents attended the IEP meetings and were represented by an attorney in at least three of them. The parents sued the school district to recover attorney fees incurred in the IEP meetings. The district court granted the request and the school district appealed, asserting that 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(i)(3)(B) does not allow plaintiffs to recover attorney fees because the CRP is not an action or proceeding brought under the section.

20 U.S.C. Sec 1415(i)(3)(B) provides: in any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court may award reasonable attorney fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party. The appellate court held that the CRP was a "proceeding" and affirmed the grant of attorney fees. Federal court jurisdiction is also proper under this section, the court ruled, where fees are sought, but liability is established outside the district court proceeding itself.

The California Interscholastic Federation found that football coach Bell, an employee of the Vista Unified School District, violated its undue influence rule. It placed the school's athletic program on one-year suspension. The VUSD Board of Trustees held a special closed session to consider action in response to the probation. It did not give Bell 24 hours notice; it only asked him to be available as a resource. Bell did not attend. At the meeting, the Board removed Bell from his coaching position. The court ruled that VUSD violated the Brown Act. Government Code section 54957 permits a closed session to discuss a personnel matter; but if "complaints or charges" against the employee will be discussed, the statute requires the employee be given 24 hours notice of his right to have the charges heard in an open session. The undue influence finding was a "complaint or charge." The termination was therefore null and void. The court also affirmed the trial court's issuance of a temporary restraining order staying Bell's termination before the statutory 30-day period had run for VUSD to cure or correct the Brown violation. (Government Code section 54960.1.) The TRO did not prevent VUSD from curing or correcting the violation if it so chose.

But the trial court erred in failing to apportion its attorney fee award ($147,862) between the Brown Act violation (which permitted a fee award) and Bell's eleven other claims for wrongful termination, defamation, etc. Since the only claim on which fees were allowed was the Brown Act claim, Bell's attorney should have specified which of his billed tasks were incurred pursuing that claim -- particularly since it occupied a small part of the case. If the attorney could not further define his block-billing entries to enlighten the court of which tasks were related to the Brown Act violation, "then the trial court should exercise its discretion in assigning a reasonable percentage to the entries, or simply cast them aside."

Defendant public school district's policy allowed high-school students to vote on whether to have invocation prayers "to solemnize" varsity football games and to select one student to pray before each game. The United States Supreme Court held that the policy violated the Establishment Clause on its face. First, conducting prayers improperly coerced a minority of students with conflicting religious beliefs to either forego important school social events or to endure an offensive religious ritual. Second, allowing students to use school property (such as the PA system) for prayer at official, school-sponsored events constituted symbolic and actual endorsement of religion. Third, although the District's policy had not yet been implemented, it was facially invalid because there was no secular purpose for beginning football games with prayers. Finally, by allowing students to decide whether one of their peers would pray before games, the District did not create a public forum for private speech. On the contrary, the District's majority-selection policy ensured that every football game would begin with a school-sanctioned prayer from the majority's religion.

Los Angeles officers saw defendant several miles from Hollywood High school, and determined he was truant. A search of defendant's backpack revealed a dagger, which he moved to suppress. The court found that the search of the backpack was incident to the defendant's arrest for truancy under Education Code section 48264. The officers have the right to search the minor's body and the area in the minor's control. The lawfulness of the search turns not on whether the officer intended to release the defendant after taking him into custody, but on whether the officers were justified in arresting the defendant and taking him into custody in the first place. The search must be contemporaneous with the section 48264 arrest.

Government Code section 91012, which precludes an award of costs to government agencies in actions under the Political Reform Act (Government Code sections 81000 et seq.), does not preclude individual government officials from recovering costs in such actions, including attorney fees. Accordingly, in a Political Reform Act action against a school board member and district, a court may require the plaintiff to post security in a member's favor. That the school district was defending the school board member did not affect his entitlement to an award for costs and thus did not affect his entitlement to request an order for security against the potential award of costs. Moreover, the court properly determined that the school board member was unlikely to prevail on the merits of his claim, and thus properly required plaintiff to post security.

Summary judgment is proper in student-on-student harassment cases where female students fail to show that school officials were aware that they were being harassed by male students. Here, plaintiffs failed to report their harassment to anyone in authority until plaintiffs were themselves threatened with disciplinary action. By that time, the school year had ended, and there was no evidence that any harassment occurred after the school district learned of the plaintiffs' allegations. Thus, the school district cannot be deemed to have "subjected" the plaintiffs to the harassment. Moreover, the record did not support the claim that the school district punished the plaintiffs with discriminatory intent in violation of their right to equal protection of the law, since the school district had timely notice of the plaintiffs' infractions, and no notice of the alleged misconduct by the boys.

The plaintiffs, members of a college men's wrestling team, sued their school for reducing the number of spots on the team. The school reduced the number of spots on men's sports as part of a university-wide program to bring the proportion of women participating in school sports to nearly the proportion of women students at the school. The court held that Title IX does not prevent schools from taking steps to ensure that women are approximately as well represented in sports as they are in the student body. The court stated that the fact that women were less interested in participating in school sports was not relevant because part of Title IX's purpose is to increase women's interest in sport participation.

Proposition 227 gives parents a private cause of action against teachers and administrators who teach non-English speaking children in any language other than English.

Plaintiffs argued that 227 was vague and would chill constitutionally protected speech, such as speech on the playground, in social settings, or in emergency situations. The court held that 227 is clear, and applies only to classroom instruction, which is nonprotected speech. Moreover, parents have a cause of action only where teachers "willfully and repeatedly" violate 227. Thus, teachers would only be liable for damages if they realize that they are violating 227.