Two weeks before the 2000 election, the district attorney charged a city council member with embezzling public funds. The district attorney later moved to dismiss the criminal charges in the interest of justice. The council member lost his re-election bid. He sued several city officials, alleging that they conspired to initiate criminal proceedings based on false allegations. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. The district court overlooked the plaintiff's claims alleging First and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The plaintiff alleged that the false allegations were motivated by his constitutionally protected speech and his Arabic descent. The presumption of prosecutorial independence does not bar claims against city officials if they improperly exerted pressure on the prosecutor or knowingly provided misinformation. Likewise, collateral estoppel does not bar the action if the evidence presented in the criminal proceeding was fabricated. Therefore, the plaintiff's pleading survives the motion to dismiss.

Sabri was charged with violating a federal statute prohibiting bribery of state and local officials of entities that receive federal funds. Before trial, he moved to dismiss the charges. He alleged that the federal statute was unconstitutional because it did not require a nexus between the federal funds and the alleged bribes. The district court granted his petition but the Eighth Circuit reversed.

The Supreme Court of the United States held that the statute is a valid exercise of Congress' authority. Congress has Spending Clause authority to appropriate federal funds to promote the general welfare; the Necessary and Proper Clause provides authority to ensure that the funds are properly spent. Congress does not have to accept the risk of getting poor performance for its money as a result of bribery. The statute addresses the bribery problem by rational means intended to safeguard the integrity of federal dollar recipients. It was adopted after less restrictive laws were deemed inadequate. Therefore, the statute is necessary and proper legislation.

City council member Chacon was charged with conspiring with other council members to repeal a city ordinance in order to remove a legal obstacle to her immediate appointment as city manager. The prosecution charged Chacon with violation of Government Code section 1090, which prohibits conflict of interest by public officials. In a pre-trial motion, Chacon raised the defense of entrapment by estoppel. She alleged that she relied on the advice of the city attorney who drafted the motion to repeal the city ordinance and her employment contract as city manager. The trial court denied the prosecution's motion to exclude the entrapment defense. The case was dismissed after the prosecution announced it was unable to proceed to trial.

The appellate court reversed. The state may not be estopped from prosecuting a city councilperson because the municipal attorney gave bad legal advice. The city attorney did not have the authority to bind the People of California to an erroneous interpretation of state conflict of interest statutes. To allow the defense would undercut the district attorney's prosecutorial authority.

The Commission held a meeting at which public comment was taken before or during the consideration of each agenda item. The meeting was adjourned for the day and continued the following day without public comment. Plaintiff sued, alleging that the Brown Act and the Sunshine Ordinance require that members of the public be given an opportunity to comment at each session of public hearings. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the Commission.

The appellate court affirmed. The Brown Act and Sunshine Ordinance mandate that a single general public comment period be provided per agenda at public meetings. The Library Commission fully adhered to the language of these enactments and the legislature's intent by hearing public comment on every agenda item on the first day of the hearings.

The city charter mandates that city council members deal solely with the city manager and not give orders to the manager's subordinates. A city council member spoke with city planning department employees on behalf of a constituent to inquire about a playhouse built on a neighbor's property. When the planning department issued a notice of violation to the neighbors, they brought an action against the city alleging violation of the city charter. The city moved to strike based on the anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) statute. The trial court held the SLAPP statute inapplicable and denied the motion.

The appellate court reversed. The SLAPP statute permits the defendant to file a motion to strike a cause of action that interferes with a party's constitutional right to petition or free speech. Communications between a city council member and the city planning department are protected by the First Amendment and thus the court erred by ruling that SLAPP did not apply.

The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors met in private to discuss a ballot measure. The Los Angeles Times and a First Amendment rights group sued the Board alleging violation of the Brown Act. The Brown Act, California Government Code § 54950, requires government agencies to meet and act in public. The trial court found violations of the Act but held that because the suing party was a wealthy newspaper conglomerate, it was not entitled to attorneys fees.

The appellate court reversed. Under the Brown Act, attorneys fees are awarded unless special circumstances would render the award unjust. The purpose of the fees is to encourage private parties, even wealthy private parties, to enforce the Act. That the action was brought by a well-funded metropolitan newspaper does not make the party less entitled to attorneys fees.

School district sought an easement across county property. Some of the meetings to discuss the issue were held in private session. Plaintiff resident of a different county alleged that the closed nature of the meetings violated the Brown Act. That Act requires local government meetings be open to the public. The trial court dismissed on the ground that plaintiff lacked standing since he was not a resident of the county where the closed meetings were held.

The appellate court reversed and remanded. Interested persons may sue under the Brown Act. The term must be construed liberally. As a resident of the state of California, plaintiff has an interest in seeking the vindication of the public's right to know what its lawmakers are doing.

During a chase on foot, an officer lost track of the suspect. She found plaintiff lying on the ground in the area of the chase with a different colored shirt as the suspect but carrying a similar bag. The officer arrested the plaintiff. The officer then advised the deputy district attorneys that she did not believe the plaintiff was the same suspect she had been chasing. The deputy district attorneys nonetheless prosecuted the plaintiff. A jury determined that the officer did not have probable cause for the arrest and returned a verdict of $80,000 in favor of the plaintiff.

The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. It affirmed the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Municipal liability is proper where deputy district attorneys acted as final policy makers for the city in prosecuting a suspect the arresting officer admitted was probably the wrong suspect. In this case, a state statute conferred final policymaking authority on deputy district attorneys.

The county council denied a conditional use permit for conducting a commercial wedding business on beach-front residential property. Operator of the business sued under §1983. The District Court granted the council's motion to dismiss claims against them in their official capacities. It denied their motion to dismiss the claims against them in their individual capacities on the ground of legislative immunity.

The appellate court affirmed. Despite its formally legislative character, the council's decision whether to grant the CUP was an administrative act -- not a legislative act. Thus, defendants were not entitled to legislative immunity. Whether the act of a government official is legislative for the purpose of immunity under §1983 turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it. The council's decision to deny the CUP was ad hoc, affected only the plaintiffs and did not bear all the hallmarks of traditional legislation.

Plaintiff city councilmember sued her fellow councilmembers and the city attorney for damages. She alleged that they violated her right to free speech under the California Constitution by denying her information, taking action without notice to her, and threatening to sue her, in order to interfere with performance of her duties. The trial and appellate courts ruled plaintiff had no cause of action.

The Supreme Court affirmed. It applied the test it formulated in this decision's companion case, Katzberg v. Regents of the University of California (summarized above under Section 6.5, “Employment -- Civil Rights”), to determine whether a constitutional tort for damages should be recognized. Neither the free speech clause nor its history express or imply an intent that a damages remedy is authorized or prohibited. Nor do the Katzberg factors warrant creation of a damages remedy. The Brown Act and the mandamus statute provided plaintiff with meaningful alternate remedies. Although free speech is an important constitutional protection, that consideration is outweighed by the adverse policy consequences and practical problems of creating a damages remedy. There is no measure of damages. A damages remedy could chill the political process. And the court was reluctant to create a tort that subjected the political differences, squabbles and perceived slights inherent to representative government bodies to post-hoc judicial scrutiny. Although the clause might support a damages cause of action in a differehe California Constitution by denying her information, taking action without notice to her, and threatening to sue her, in order to interfere with performance of her duties. The trial and appellate courts ruled plaintiff had no cause of action.

The Supreme Court affirmed. It applied the test it formulated in this decision's companion case, Katzberg v. Regents of the University of California (summarized above under Section 6.5, “Employment -- Civil Rights”), to determine whether a constitutional tort for damages should be recognized. Neither the free speech clause nor its history express or imply an intent that a damages remedy is authorized or prohibited. Nor do the Katzberg factors warrant creation of a damages remedy. The Brown Act and the mandamus statute provided plaintiff with meaningful alternate remedies. Although free speech is an important constitutional protection, that consideration is outweighed by the adverse policy consequences and practical problems of creating a damages remedy. There is no measure of damages. A damages remedy could chill the political process. And the court was reluctant to create a tort that subjected the political differences, squabbles and perceived slights inherent to representative government bodies to post-hoc judicial scrutiny. Although the clause might support a damages cause of action in a different context, it did not do so here.

Petitioner citizens supported an initiative which limited city council member terms. They wanted the initiative put on the November 2002 ballot. The city council put the initiative on the March 2004 ballot instead. The Superior Court of Orange County held that the city council has the legal authority to delay election of a ballot initiative. Petitioners sought a writ of mandate to challenge the order.

The appellate court denied the writ petition. The city council has authority to delay an election of a ballot initiative. Section 9255 of the Elections Code requires that an initiative be put on a ballot not less than 88 days of the initiative's approval. However, it does not have a maximum time limit. The court noted that the Legislature may want to take a look at the whole matter of scheduling initiatives.

The Burbank City Council began its meeting with an invocation expressing gratitude for Jesus Christ. Plaintiff, who is of Jewish faith, sued the city. He claimed that the city knowingly and intentionally allowed sectarian prayer at the meeting in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The trial court held in plaintiff's favor.

The appellate court affirmed. Reviewing de novo, it held that sectarian prayer at City Council meetings is public speech and must be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. The compelling interest is that of maintaining separation of church and state. Although the government cannot restrict free speech, it may not advance one religion over another in its public places.

The Public Utilities Commission adjusted the prices public utilities must pay to small privately owned electric generation facilities. They also adopted a new methodology for determining the amount due. An electric company sued, claiming that the Public Utilities Commission acted beyond the power given it under the Public Utilities Regulatories Policies Act. The Commission denied review. The Supreme Court ordered the matter transferred to the appellate court.

The appellate court affirmed in part and annulled in part. The conversion of the methodology for determining the amount due was a valid exercise of the Commission's decision making authority under PURPA. However, the Commission failed to cite any valid reason for adjusting the prices that public utilities must pay to small privately owned electric generation facilities. Societal benefits are not enough.

A county water district attempted to incorporate as a city. The county argued that as a district of limited powers, the water district could not incorporate as a city without special legislation. The trial court issued an injunction agreeing with the county.

The appellate court reversed. A county water district can incorporate as a city under Government Code section 56000. The code permits any district to make any change of organization, including city incorporation. That right extends to districts of limited power.

Defendant county commissioner fired plaintiff administrative assistant for budgetary reasons. Plaintiff sued under section 1983 for violation of his civil rights. The defendants did not take notes at the meeting where they decided to terminate plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that this meeting was therefore not public in violation of legislative requirements that all decisions made by the commissioners be public. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants under legislative immunity.

The appellate court reversed and remanded. Legislative immunity bars suits against legislators where they have acted in their legislative capacities as opposed to in their administrative or executive capacities. The decision to eliminate employees for budgetary reasons is clearly legislative. However, the decision to fire a specific person is an administrative act not clothed in legislative immunity.

The city council used municipal funds to create Vote 2000, a program targeted at getting citizens to vote. Plaintiff sued the city council seeking a declaration that the city's Vote 2000 program was an illegal expenditure of public funds. The council moved to dismiss the action. The trial court granted the city's motion to dismiss for failure to show a likelihood of success on the merits. The trial court awarded attorney fees to the city.

The appellate court affirmed. A city council may spend municipal funds for a non-partisan vote drive. Plaintiff did not prima facie show that the Vote 2000 program was an unlawful expenditure of city funds. There is a public policy of encouraging citizens to exercise their franchise. Therefore, expenditures for the Vote 2000 program are within the broad concept of a public purpose for which municipal funds may be spent.

Defendant City Council held closed session discussions regarding the use of real estate. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief to require fuller disclosure under the Brown Act. The trial court granted the injunction.

The appellate court affirmed. Injunctive relief for failure to disclose under the Brown Act may be granted to prevent future violations of the act. The Brown Act was enacted to ensure that in doing the people's business, government would deliberate in public. Injunctive relief is allowed to prevent violations of the act. There was a likelihood that closed discussions would recur in the future. Thus, injunctive relief was warranted. The City Council may not interpret and adjust the requirements of the Brown Act as it sees fit. Its attempt to do so clearly demonstrates that violations will likely occur in the immediate future.

Nathanson, a former member of the California Coastal Commission, was imprisoned for federal offenses committed during his service. As part of a motion to reduce his sentence, he attached two letters that alleged impropriety on the part of a high political figure and another individual. The Sacramento Bee requested access to the unredacted letters after they were sealed by the court. The appellate court granted the Bee's writ of mandamus. On remand, the district court found that the redactions served a compelling privacy interest. The Bee petitioned for a second writ of mandamus.

The appellate court granted the writ and remanded with instructions to unseal the letters and make them publicly available. A high public official has no privacy interest in freedom from accusations that touch on his conduct in public office. In addition, a private individual has no privacy interest in allegations bearing on the way he does business with public bodies. The press must be free to monitor the courts by access to their records.

Plaintiff was the elected city clerk of Lawndale. The city council voted to declare his office vacated, on the ground that he was not a resident. The council appointed an acting city clerk. Seeking to regain his office, plaintiff sued the city and city council for writs of ordinary and administrative mandate, injunctions, damages for due process violations, and declaratory relief. The trial court sustained Lawndale's demurrer on the ground that plaintiff's sole remedy was quo warranto. While plaintiff's appeal was pending, a new city clerk was elected.

The appellate court affirmed. Quo warranto is the specific action for challenging title to any public office. The title cannot be tried by any other cause of action. The technical question of whether quo warranto was plaintiff's sole remedy during the trial court proceedings (before the election) is irrelevant; after the election, it was indisputably his sole remedy. Further, because quo warranto is a state law remedy that provides redress and satisfies due process, plaintiff could not sue for violation of his due process rights.

The appellant's appointment to district manager of the West Bay Sanitary District was challenged. The suit alleged that the appointment violated Government Code section 1090, since the appellant was a member of the District's Board of Directors at that time. The trial court found the employment contract void, and compelled the appellant to restore all compensation he had received under the contract.

The appellate court affirmed. The appellant violated section 1090 by accepting a position as district manager before resigning his position as a member of the District's Board of Directors. Section 1090 prevents members of the Legislature, state, county, district, judicial district, and city officers or employees from becoming financially interested in any contract made by them in their official capacity, or by any body or board of which they are members. Here, the appellant became financially interested by means of his employment contract to become district manager.

The Hollywood Entertainment District Property Owner's Association was a private nonprofit entity created by the city council to manage some governmental functions for the Hollywood Entertainment District Business Improvement District (BID I). BID I was superseded by BID II, which extended the geographic boundaries of BID I by ten blocks. A property owner in BID II sued the Association, alleging that the Association's board of directors violated the Brown Act (Government Code section 54950 et seq.) by failing to hold noticed and open meetings and posting its agenda in advance. The plaintiff further asserted that the Association was a legislative body for purposes of the Brown Act, since the Act dictates that only agencies created by a legislative body to exercise governmental functions are to be considered legislative bodies. The trial court concluded that because the Association pre-existed BID II, it was not created to govern BID II.

The appellate court reversed. The Association was a legislative body subject to the Brown Act. The Association was not a pre-existing corporation that just happened to be available to manage BID II; it was created by the City to exercise delegated authority over BID I. Moreover, the City retained the authority to overturn the Association's actions; it could have removed the Association as the entity managing the BID at any time. Therefore, BID II was merely a geographic extension of BID I. When the boundaries of BID I were extended, the Association continued to exercise the same functions in the enlarged district. Further, the Association's status as an entity created by the City to manage BID I was not annulled simply because its role was expanded by a geographic extension.

The Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) issued an opinion finding that Oakland's mayor was precluded from participating in decisions concerning a redevelopment project in Oakland by the Political Reform Act of 1974 (Government code section 87000 et seq) because he owned property near the proposed project. Section 87100 precludes public officials from participating in decisions when the official knows, or has reason to know, that he has a financial interest in the outcome. Section 87101 provides that section 87100 does not prevent a public official from participating in governmental decision making if his participation is legally required. The mayor petitioned for a writ of mandate, asserting that his participation was legally required by the city charter, and sought to compel the FPPC to withdraw its opinion.

The appellate court found that Oakland's charter revision in 1998 established the mayor as head of the executive branch of city government with authority to control the city manager's administrative functions. Under the charter, the mayor is the chief executive officer of Oakland's redevelopment agency. The mayor is also the only elected official who can effectively veto legislation, call special council meetings limited to discussion on his proposals, and participate in council votes on ordinances when there is a deadlock. The court held that for the charter revision to function as intended, the mayor's broad scope of authority over matters of city government and economic development legally required him to participate in the redevelopment project.

The defendant city, a general law city, entered into a primarily verbal contract with the plaintiff to provide a waste discharge system by a certain date if plaintiff moved its plant to the city. Although the plaintiff kept its end of the bargain, the city rejected the contract. The plaintiff sued the city for breach of oral and written contract, inverse condemnation, and civil rights violations. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court concluded that California Government Code section 40602 (requiring that a mayor or other designated officer sign "[a]ll written contracts and conveyances made or entered into by the city") and the city's municipal code (which allows the city manager or mayor to sign section 40602 documents, and requires the city council and city attorney to approve all contracts and agreements), read together, require that contracts with the city be in writing, approved by the city council, approved as to form by the city attorney, and signed by either the mayor or city manager. The Court also concluded that the doctrines of estoppel and ratification cannot be invoked to enforce an oral contract with a city.

Only an entity that has allegedly violated the Brown Act may be a defendant in an action to enforce its provisions. Thus, a controversy initiated by a school board member against a district attorney for declaratory or injunctive relief under the Brown Act is not justiciable.

A district attorney is absolutely immune under Government Code section 821.6 from tort liability for statements made as part of the prosecution process. The prosecution process includes a press release a district attorney issues after he has completed his investigation and decided not to prosecute.

Civil Code section 47(a)'s "official duty" privilege also protects district attorneys from liability. A district attorney may issue a press release after he has completed his investigation and decided not to prosecute. The district attorney is acting within the proper discharge of his official duty.

Qualified immunity shields city council members from liability under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, unless no reasonable official could have believed that his conduct was lawful because it violates someone's clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. A "policymaking" public employee has no clearly established right to keep her job while exercising her First Amendment right to political speech; where political considerations, such as party affiliation, are appropriate job requirements an employer may fire a public employee for purely political reasons. A lawyer affiliated with a private law firm who performed the tasks of City Attorney for a city is a "policymaking" public employee. Thus, city council members have qualified immunity from liability for threatening to fire this attorney because of her family's politically damaging speech. City Council members also have qualified immunity from the attorney's family's claims as they derive from her claim and have no independent standing.

The Brown Act does not require council members to keep minutes, or to tape record closed sessions. Nor does it require council members to disclose their personal recollections of closed, unrecorded meetings. Requiring such disclosure would destroy the closed session confidentiality inherent in the Brown Act. If the legislature had intended to require council members to respond to discovery requests regarding closed, unrecorded meetings, it would have expressed its intent to do so in the Act.

The Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act, Government Code section 11120 et seq., requires state bodies to open meetings to the public and to give advance notice of meetings. Section 11130(a) grants any interested person a right of action to address only present or future violations of the Act. Section 11130.3(a) grants any interested person a right of action to seek judicial determination that state actions violating the Act are null and void; "any action seeking such a judicial determination shall be commenced within 30 days from the date the action was taken." Ordinarily fraudulent concealment of a cause of action will toll the statute of limitations. Here, the court holds that section 11130.3(a)'s 30-day statute of limitations may not be extended for any reason. The legislature knew that state bodies, by holding secret meetings, would conceal rights of action from interested parties; but it still chose to cut off the right of action 30 days after a state violates the Act.